Chinese Communist Party

The Communist Party of China (CPC),[23][note 2] commonly known as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),[24] is the founding and sole governing political party of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The CCP leads eight other legally permitted subordinate minor parties together as the United Front. The CCP was founded in 1921, mainly by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, with the help of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Far Eastern Secretariat of the Communist International.[25][26] The party grew quickly, and by 1949 it had driven the Kuomintang (KMT)'s Nationalist Government from mainland China to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War, leading to the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949. It controls the country's armed forces, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It is also one of the two major historical contemporary parties in Chinese history, the other being the Kuomintang.

Communist Party of China
Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng
AbbreviationCPC (official)
CCP (common)
General SecretaryXi Jinping
Standing Committee
  • Xi Jinping
  • Li Keqiang
  • Li Zhanshu
  • Wang Yang
  • Wang Huning
  • Zhao Leji
  • Han Zheng
FoundersChen Duxiu
Li Dazhao
... and others
Founded1 July 1921 (1921-07-01) (official foundation day)

23 July 1921 (1921-07-23) (1st CPC National Congress)

Site of the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 106 Rue Wantz, Shanghai French Concession
HeadquartersZhongnanhai, Xicheng District, Beijing
NewspaperPeople's Daily
Youth wingCommunist Youth League of China[1][2]
Young Pioneers of China[3]
Research officeCentral Policy Research Office
Armed wingPeople's Liberation Army[4]
People's Armed Police
Militia of China
Labour wingAll-China Federation of Trade Unions
Media wingChina Media Group
Membership (2021)95,148,000[5][6]
National affiliationUnited Front[19][20]
International affiliationInternational Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties[21]
Colours  Red
SloganServe the People[note 1]
Anthem"The Internationale"[22]
National People's Congress (13th)
2,095 / 2,980(70%)
NPC Standing Committee
118 / 175(67%)
Party flag
  • Politics of China
  • Political parties
  • Elections
Communist Party of China
"Communist Party of China" in Simplified (top) and Traditional (bottom) Chinese characters
Chinese name
Simplified Chinese中国共产党
Traditional Chinese中國共產黨
Hanyu PinyinZhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng
Tibetan name
Zhuang name
ZhuangCunghgoz Gungcanjdangj
Mongolian name
Mongolian CyrillicДундад улсын (Хятадын) Эв хамт (Kоммунист) Нам
Mongolian scriptᠳᠤᠮᠳᠠᠳᠤ ᠤᠯᠤᠰ ᠤᠨ
(ᠬᠢᠲᠠᠳ ᠤᠨ)
ᠡᠪ ᠬᠠᠮᠲᠤ
Uyghur name
Uyghurجۇڭگو كوممۇنىستىك پارتىيىسى
Manchu name
Manchu scriptᡩᡠᠯᡳᠮᠪᠠᡳ ᡤᡠᡵᡠᠨ ‍ᡳ
(ᠵᡠᠨᡤᠣ ‍ᡳ)
RomanizationDulimbai gurun-i(Jungg'o-i) Gungcan Hoki

The CCP is officially organized on the basis of democratic centralism, a principle conceived by Russian Marxist theoretician Vladimir Lenin which entails a democratic and open discussion on policy on the condition of unity in upholding the agreed-upon policies. Theoretically, the highest body of the CCP is the National Congress, convened every fifth year. When the National Congress is not in session, the Central Committee is the highest body, but since the body meets normally only once a year most duties and responsibilities are vested in the Politburo and its Standing Committee, members of the latter seen as the top leadership of the Party and the State.[27] The party's leader recently holds the offices of general secretary (responsible for civilian party duties), Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) (responsible for military affairs) and State President (a largely ceremonial position). Through these posts, the party leader is the country's paramount leader. The current leader is general secretary Xi Jinping, elected at the 18th Central Committee held on 15 November 2012.

Officially, the CCP is committed to communism and continues to participate in the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties each year. According to the party constitution, the CCP adheres to Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, socialism with Chinese characteristics, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought. The official explanation for China's economic reforms is that the country is in the primary stage of socialism, a developmental stage similar to the capitalist mode of production. The command economy established under Mao Zedong was replaced by the socialist market economy under Deng Xiaoping, the current economic system, on the basis that "Practice is the Sole Criterion for the Truth".

Since the collapse of Eastern European communist governments in 1989–1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the CCP has emphasized its party-to-party relations with the ruling parties of the remaining socialist states. While the CCP still maintains party-to-party relations with non-ruling communist parties around the world, since the 1980s it has established relations with several non-communist parties, most notably with ruling parties of one-party states (whatever their ideology), dominant parties in democracies (whatever their ideology) and social democratic parties. As of 2021, the CCP is the second largest political party in the world with over 95 million members after India's Bharatiya Janata Party.[28]


Founding and early history (1921–1927)

Site of the first CCP Congress, in the former Shanghai French Concession

The CCP claims its origins in the May Fourth Movement of 1919, during which radical Western ideologies like Marxism and anarchism gained traction among Chinese intellectuals.[29] Other influences stemming from the Bolshevik revolution and Marxist theory inspired the CCP.[30] Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao were among the first leading Chinese intellectuals who publicly supported Leninism and world revolution.[31] In contrast to Chen, Li did not renounce participation in the affairs of the Republic of China.[32] Both of them regarded the October Revolution in Russia as groundbreaking, believing it to herald a new era for oppressed countries everywhere.[32] The CCP was modeled on Vladimir Lenin's theory of a vanguard party.[33] Study circles were, according to Cai Hesen, "the rudiments [of our party]".[34] Several study circles were established during the New Culture Movement, but "by 1920 skepticism about their suitability as vehicles for reform had become widespread."[35]

In the summer of 1919, the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decided to assist people of the Far East.[26] In April 1920, the Foreign Affairs Division of its Vladivostok Branch sent Grigori Voitinsky to develop Marxism in China, Korea and Japan. Voitinsky met Li, and then successfully turned Chen into a communist.[36] Voitinsky found the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Communist International (Comintern) at Shanghai. On 5 July, he attended a meeting of Russian communists in China to promote the establishment of the CCP. He helped Chen found the Shanghai Revolutionary Bureau, also known as the Shanghai Communist Group. Stojanovic went to Guangzhou, Mamaev went to Wuhan, and Broway went to Beijing to help Chinese establish communist groups. Voitinsky provided these groups with promotional, conference and study abroad expenses.[26][30]

The CCP was founded on 1 July 1921, according to official narrative account by the CCP. However, party documents suggest this may be inaccurate and that the party's true founding date was actually on 23 July 1921, the date of the first day of the 1st National Congress of the CCP.[37] The founding National Congress of the CCP was held on 23–31 July 1921.[38] With only 50 members in the beginning of 1921, the CCP organization and authorities grew tremendously.[39] While it was originally held in a house in the Shanghai French Concession, French police interrupted the meeting on 30 July[40] and the congress was moved to a tourist boat on South Lake in Jiaxing, Zhejiang province.[40] A dozen delegates attended the congress, with neither Li nor Chen being able to attend,[40] the latter sending a personal representative in his stead.[40] The resolutions of the congress called for the establishment of a communist party (as a branch of the Communist International) and elected Chen as its leader. Chen then served as the first general secretary of the Communist Party[40] and was referred to as "China's Lenin".[41]

The Russians eagerly wanted to foster pro-Russian forces in the Far East to fight against anti-communist countries, especially Japan. They tried to contact Wu Peifu, but failed.[42][43] Then they found the KMT, a party founded by Sun Yat-sen, which was leading the Guangzhou government to confront the Northern government. On 6 October 1923, the Comintern sent Mikhail Borodin to Guangzhou. Then the communists fully supported the KMT. The Central Committee of the CCP,[44] Joseph Stalin,[45] and the Comintern[46] all hoped that the CCP would control the KMT and called their opponents "rightists".[47][note 3] Sun eased the conflict between the communists and their opponents. CCP members grew tremendously after the 4th congress, from 900 to 2,428 in year 1925.[49] The CCP still treats Sun Yat-sen as one of the founders of their movement[50] and claim descent from him[51] as he is viewed as a proto communist[52][53] and the economic element of Sun's ideology was socialism.[50] Sun stated, "Our Principle of Livelihood is a form of communism".[54][55]

The communists dominated the left-wing of the KMT, a party organized on Leninist lines, struggling for power with the party's right wing.[47] When KMT leader Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925, he was succeeded by a rightist, Chiang Kai-shek, who initiated moves to marginalize the position of the communists.[47] Chiang, Sun's former assistant, was not actively anti-communist at that time,[56] even though he hated the theory of class struggle and the CCP's seizure of power.[48] The communists proposed removing Chiang's power.[57] When Chiang gradually gained the support of Western countries, the conflict between him and the communists became more and more intense. Chiang asked the Kuomintang to join the Communist International to rule out the secret expansion of communists in the KMT, while Chen Duxiu hoped that the communists would completely withdraw from the KMT.[58]

In April 1927, both Chiang and the CCP were preparing for combat.[59] Fresh from the success of the Northern Expedition to overthrow the warlords, Chiang Kai-shek turned on the communists, who by now numbered in the tens of thousands across China.[60] Ignoring the orders of the Wuhan-based KMT government, he marched on Shanghai, a city controlled by communist militias. Although the communists welcomed Chiang's arrival, he turned on them, massacring 5,000[note 4] with the aid of the Green Gang.[60][63][64] Chiang's army then marched on Wuhan, but was prevented from taking the city by CCP General Ye Ting and his troops.[65] Chiang's allies also attacked communists; in Beijing, Li Dazhao and 19 other leading communists were executed by Zhang Zuolin, while in Changsha, He Jian's forces machine gunned hundreds of peasant militiamen.[66][61] Affected by this stimulus, the peasant movement supported by the CCP became more cruel. Ye Dehui, a famous scholar, was killed by the communists. He Jian gunned hundreds of peasant militiamen, as revenge.[67] That May, tens of thousands of communists and their sympathizers were killed by nationalists, with the CCP losing approximately 15,000 of its 25,000 members.[61]

Chinese Civil War and Second Sino-Japanese War (1927–1949)

Flag of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army

The CCP continued supporting the Wuhan KMT government,[61] but on 15 July 1927 the Wuhan government expelled all communists from the KMT.[68] The CCP reacted by founding the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of China, better known as the "Red Army", to battle the KMT. A battalion led by General Zhu De was ordered to take the city of Nanchang on 1 August 1927 in what became known as the Nanchang uprising; initially successful, they were forced into retreat after five days, marching south to Shantou, and from there being driven into the wilderness of Fujian.[68] Mao Zedong was appointed commander-in-chief of the Red Army, and led four regiments against Changsha in the Autumn Harvest uprising, hoping to spark peasant uprisings across Hunan.[69] His plan was to attack the KMT-held city from three directions on 9 September, but the Fourth Regiment deserted to the KMT cause, attacking the Third Regiment. Mao's army made it to Changsha, but could not take it; by 15 September, he accepted defeat, with 1,000 survivors marching east to the Jinggang Mountains of Jiangxi.[69][70][71]

The near-destruction of the CCP's urban organizational apparatus led to institutional changes within the party.[72] The party adopted democratic centralism, a way to organize revolutionary parties, and established a Politburo (to function as the standing committee of the Central Committee).[72] The result was increased centralization of power within the party .[72] At every level of the party this was duplicated, with standing committees now in effective control.[72] After being expelled from the party, Chen Duxiu went on to lead China's Trotskyist movement. Li Lisan was able to assume de facto control of the party organization by 1929–30.[72] Li Lisan's leadership was a failure, leaving the CCP on the brink of destruction.[72] The Comintern became involved, and by late 1930, his powers had been taken away.[72] By 1935 Mao had become the party's Politburo Standing Committee member and informal military leader, with Zhou Enlai and Zhang Wentian, the formal head of the party, serving as his informal deputies.[72] The conflict with the KMT led to the reorganization of the Red Army, with power now centralized in the leadership through the creation of CCP political departments charged with supervising the army.[72]

The Second Sino-Japanese War caused a pause in the conflict between the CCP and the KMT.[73] The Second United Front was established between the CCP and the KMT to tackle the invasion.[74] While the front formally existed until 1945, all collaboration between the two parties had ended by 1940.[74] Despite their formal alliance, the CCP used the opportunity to expand and carve out independent bases of operations to prepare for the coming war with the KMT.[75] In 1939 the KMT began to restrict CCP expansion within China.[75] This led to frequent clashes between CCP and KMT forces[75] but which subsided rapidly on the realisation on both sides that civil war was not an option.[75] Yet, by 1943, the CCP was again actively expanding its territory at the expense of the KMT.[75]

Mao Zedong became the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party in 1945. From 1945 until 1949, the war had been reduced to two parties; the CCP and the KMT.[76] This period lasted through four stages; the first was from August 1945 (when the Japanese surrendered) to June 1946 (when the peace talks between the CCP and the KMT ended).[76] By 1945, the KMT had three-times more soldiers under its command than the CCP and initially appeared to be prevailing.[76] With the cooperation of the Americans and the Japanese, the KMT was able to retake major parts of the country.[76] However, KMT rule over the reconquered territories would prove unpopular because of endemic party corruption.[76] Notwithstanding its huge numerical superiority, the KMT failed to reconquer the rural territories which made up the CCP's stronghold.[76] Around the same time, the CCP launched an invasion of Manchuria, where they were assisted by the Soviet Union.[76] The second stage, lasting from July 1946 to June 1947, saw the KMT extend its control over major cities, such as Yan'an (the CCP headquarters for much of the war).[76] The KMT's successes were hollow; the CCP had tactically withdrawn from the cities, and instead attacked KMT authorities by instigating protests amongst students and intellectuals in the cities (the KMT responded to these events with heavy-handed repression).[77] In the meantime, the KMT was struggling with factional infighting and Chiang Kai-shek's autocratic control over the party, which weakened the KMT's ability to respond to attacks.[77] The third stage, lasting from July 1947 to August 1948, saw a limited counteroffensive by the CCP.[77] The objective was clearing "Central China, strengthening North China, and recovering Northeast China."[78] This policy, coupled with desertions from the KMT military force (by the spring of 1948, the KMT military had lost an estimated 2 of its 3 million troops) and declining popularity of KMT rule.[77] The result was that the CCP was able to cut off KMT garrisons in Manchuria and retake several lost territories.[78] The last stage, lasting from September 1948 to December 1949, saw the communists take the initiative and the collapse of KMT rule in mainland China as a whole.[78] On 1 October 1949, Mao declared the establishment of the PRC, which signified the end of the Chinese Revolution (as it is officially described by the CCP).[78]

Founding the PRC and becoming the sole ruling party (1949–present)

Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949.

On 1 October 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong formally proclaimed the establishment of the PRC before a massive crowd at Tiananmen Square. The CCP headed the Central People's Government.[79] From this time through the 1980s, top leaders of the CCP (like Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping) were largely the same military leaders prior to the PRC's founding.[80] As a result, informal personal ties between political and military leaders dominated civil-military relations.[80]

Chinese communists celebrate Joseph Stalin's birthday, 1949.

Stalin proposed a one-party constitution when Liu Shaoqi visited the Soviet Union in 1952.[81] Then the Constitution of the PRC in 1954 changed the previous coalition government and established the CCP's sole ruling system.[82][83] Mao said that China should implement a multi-party system under the leadership of the working class revolutionary party (CCP) on the CCP's 8th Congress in 1956.[84] He had not proposed that other parties should be led before,[85] although the CCP had actually controlled the most political power since 1949.[86] In 1957, the CCP launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign against the political dissents and figures of the other minor parties which resulted in the political persecution of at least 550,000 people. The campaign significantly damaged the limited pluralistic nature in the socialist republic and turned the country into a de facto one-party state.[87][88][89][90][91] The event led to the catastrophic results of the Second Five Year from 1958 when the CCP attempted at transforming the country from an agrarian into an industrialized economy through the formation of people's communes by launching the Great Leap Forward campaign. The Great Leap resulted in tens of millions of deaths, with estimates ranging between 15 and 55 million deaths, making the Great Chinese Famine the largest in human history.[92][93][94][95][96][97][98]

During the 1960s and 1970s, the CCP experienced a significant ideological separation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which was going through the De-Stalinization under Nikita Khrushchev.[99] By that time, Mao had begun saying that the "continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" stipulated that class enemies continued to exist even though the socialist revolution seemed to be complete, leading to the Cultural Revolution in which millions were persecuted and killed.[100] In the Cultural Revolution, party leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai, and He Long, were purged or exiled and the power were fallen into the Gang of Four led by Jiang Qing, Mao's wife.

Following Mao's death in 1976, a power struggle between CCP chairman Hua Guofeng and vice-chairman Deng Xiaoping erupted.[101] Deng won the struggle, and became the "paramount leader" in 1978.[101] Deng, alongside Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, spearheaded the Reform and opening policy, and introduced the ideological concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics, opening China to the world's markets.[102] In reversing some of Mao's "leftist" policies, Deng argued that a socialist state could use the market economy without itself being capitalist.[103] While asserting the political power of the Party, the change in policy generated significant economic growth.[29] The new ideology, however, was contested on both sides of the spectrum, by Maoists as well as by those supporting political liberalization. With other social factors, the conflicts culminated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.[104] The protests having been crushed and the reformist party general secretary Zhao Ziyang under house arrest, Deng's economic policies resumed and by the early 1990s the concept of a socialist market economy had been introduced.[105] In 1997, Deng's beliefs (Deng Xiaoping Theory), were embedded in the CCP constitution.[106]

Flag of the Communist Party of China from 17 June 1951 to 21 July 1996

CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin succeeded Deng as "paramount leader" in the 1990s, and continued most of his policies.[107] In the 1990s, the CCP transformed from a veteran revolutionary leadership that was both leading militarily and politically, to a political elite increasingly regenerated according to institutionalized norms in the civil bureaucracy.[80] Leadership was largely selected based on rules and norms on promotion and retirement, educational background, and managerial and technical expertise.[80] There is a largely separate group of professionalized military officers, serving under top CCP leadership largely through formal relationships within institutional channels.[80]

As part of Jiang Zemin's nominal legacy, the CCP ratified the Three Represents for the 2003 revision of the party's constitution, as a "guiding ideology" to encourage the party to represent "advanced productive forces, the progressive course of China's culture, and the fundamental interests of the people."[108] The theory legitimized the entry of private business owners and bourgeois elements into the party.[108] Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin's successor as general secretary, took office in 2002.[109] Unlike Mao, Deng and Jiang Zemin, Hu laid emphasis on collective leadership and opposed one-man dominance of the political system.[109] The insistence on focusing on economic growth led to a wide range of serious social problems. To address these, Hu introduced two main ideological concepts: the Scientific Outlook on Development and Harmonious Socialist Society.[110] Hu resigned from his post as CCP general secretary and Chairman of the CMC at the 18th National Congress held in 2012, and was succeeded in both posts by Xi Jinping.[111][112] Since taking power, Xi has initiated a wide-reaching anti-corruption campaign, while centralizing powers in the office of CCP general secretary at the expense of the collective leadership of prior decades. Commentators have described the campaign as a defining part of Xi's leadership as well as "the principal reason why he has been able to consolidate his power so quickly and effectively."[113] Foreign commentators have likened him to Mao.[114] Xi's leadership has also overseen an increase in the Party's role in China.[115] Xi has added his ideology, named after himself, into the CCP constitution in 2017.[116] As has been speculated, Xi Jinping may not retire from his top posts after serving for 10 years in 2022.[80][117]

On 21 October 2020, the Subcommittee on International Human Rights (SDIR) of the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development condemned the persecution of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang by the Government of China and concluded that the Chinese Communist Party's actions amount to genocide of the Uyghurs per the Genocide Convention.[118][119][120][121]

On 1 July 2021, the celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the CCP, one of the Two Centenaries, took place.[122]


It has been argued in recent years, mainly by foreign commentators, that the CCP does not have an ideology, and that the party organization is pragmatic and interested only in what works.[123] The party itself, however, argues otherwise. For instance, Hu Jintao stated in 2012 that the Western world is "threatening to divide us" and that "the international culture of the West is strong while we are weak ... Ideological and cultural fields are our main targets".[123] The CCP puts a great deal of effort into the party schools and into crafting its ideological message.[123] Before the "Practice Is the Sole Criterion for the Truth" campaign, the relationship between ideology and decision-making was a deductive one, meaning that policy-making was derived from ideological knowledge.[124] Under Deng this relationship was turned upside down, with decision-making justifying ideology and not the other way around.[124] Lastly, Chinese policy-makers believe that the Soviet Union's state ideology was "rigid, unimaginative, ossified, and disconnected from reality" and that this was one of the reasons for the dissolution of the Soviet Union. They therefore believe that their party ideology must be dynamic to safeguard the party's rule.[124]

Main ideologies of the party have corresponded with distinct generations of Chinese leadership. As both the CCP and the People's Liberation Army promote according to seniority, it is possible to discern distinct generations of Chinese leadership.[125] In official discourse, each group of leadership is identified with a distinct extension of the ideology of the party. Historians have studied various periods in the development of the government of the People's Republic of China by reference to these "generations".

Generations of Chinese Leadership[126]
Generation Paramount Leader Start End Theory
First Mao Zedong 1949 1976 Mao Zedong Thought
Second Deng Xiaoping 1976 1992 Deng Xiaoping Theory
Third Jiang Zemin 1992 2002 Three Represents
Fourth Hu Jintao 2002 2012 Scientific Outlook on Development
Fifth Xi Jinping 2012 Xi Jinping Thought

Formal ideology

A monument dedicated to Karl Marx (left) and Friedrich Engels (right) in Shanghai

Marxism–Leninism was the first official ideology of the CCP.[127] According to the CCP, "Marxism–Leninism reveals the universal laws governing the development of history of human society."[127] To the CCP, Marxism–Leninism provides a "vision of the contradictions in capitalist society and of the inevitability of a future socialist and communist societies".[127] According to the People's Daily, Mao Zedong Thought "is Marxism–Leninism applied and developed in China".[127] Mao Zedong Thought was conceived not only by Mao Zedong, but by leading party officials.[128]

While non-Chinese analysts generally agree that the CCP has rejected orthodox Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (or at least basic thoughts within orthodox thinking), the CCP itself disagrees.[129] Certain groups argue that Jiang Zemin ended the CCP's formal commitment to Marxism with the introduction of the ideological theory, the Three Represents.[130] However, party theorist Leng Rong disagrees, claiming that "President Jiang rid the Party of the ideological obstacles to different kinds of ownership [...] He did not give up Marxism or socialism. He strengthened the Party by providing a modern understanding of Marxism and socialism—which is why we talk about a 'socialist market economy' with Chinese characteristics."[130] The attainment of true "communism" is still described as the CCP's and China's "ultimate goal".[131] While the CCP claims that China is in the primary stage of socialism, party theorists argue that the current development stage "looks a lot like capitalism".[131] Alternatively, certain party theorists argue that "capitalism is the early or first stage of communism."[131] Some have dismissed the concept of a primary stage of socialism as intellectual cynicism.[131] According to Robert Lawrence Kuhn, a China analyst, "When I first heard this rationale, I thought it more comic than clever—a wry caricature of hack propagandists leaked by intellectual cynics. But the 100-year horizon comes from serious political theorists".[131]

Deng Xiaoping Theory was added to the party constitution at the 14th National Congress.[106] The concepts of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and "the primary stage of socialism" were credited to the theory.[106] Deng Xiaoping Theory can be defined as a belief that state socialism and state planning is not by definition communist, and that market mechanisms are class neutral.[132] In addition, the party needs to react to the changing situation dynamically; to know if a certain policy is obsolete or not, the party had to "seek truth from facts" and follow the slogan "practice is the sole criterion for the truth".[133] At the 14th National Congress, Jiang reiterated Deng's mantra that it was unnecessary to ask if something was socialist or capitalist, since the important factor was whether it worked.[134]

The "Three Represents", Jiang Zemin's contribution to the party's ideology, was adopted by the party at the 16th National Congress. The Three Represents defines the role of the CCP, and stresses that the Party must always represent the requirements for developing China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people."[135][136] Certain segments within the CCP criticized the Three Represents as being un-Marxist and a betrayal of basic Marxist values. Supporters viewed it as a further development of socialism with Chinese characteristics.[137] Jiang disagreed, and had concluded that attaining the communist mode of production, as formulated by earlier communists, was more complex than had been realized, and that it was useless to try to force a change in the mode of production, as it had to develop naturally, by following the economic laws of history.[138] The theory is most notable for allowing capitalists, officially referred to as the "new social strata", to join the party on the grounds that they engaged in "honest labor and work" and through their labour contributed "to build[ing] socialism with Chinese characteristics."[139]

The 3rd Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee conceived and formulated the ideology of the Scientific Outlook on Development (SOD).[140] It is considered to be Hu Jintao's contribution to the official ideological discourse.[141] The SOD incorporates scientific socialism, sustainable development, social welfare, a humanistic society, increased democracy, and, ultimately, the creation of a Socialist Harmonious Society. According to official statements by the CCP, the concept integrates "Marxism with the reality of contemporary China and with the underlying features of our times, and it fully embodies the Marxist worldview on and methodology for development."[142]

A billboard advertising Xi Jinping Thought in Shenzhen, Guangdong

Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, commonly known as Xi Jinping Thought, was added to the party constitution in the 19th National Congress.[116] Xi himself has described the thought as part of the broad framework created around socialism with Chinese characteristics. In official party documentation and pronouncements by Xi's colleagues, the thought is said to be a continuation of previous party ideologies as part of a series of guiding ideologies that embody "Marxism adapted to Chinese conditions" and contemporary considerations.[143]


Deng did not believe that the fundamental difference between the capitalist mode of production and the socialist mode of production was central planning versus free markets. He said, "A planned economy is not the definition of socialism, because there is planning under capitalism; the market economy happens under socialism, too. Planning and market forces are both ways of controlling economic activity".[103] Jiang Zemin supported Deng's thinking, and stated in a party gathering that it did not matter if a certain mechanism was capitalist or socialist, because the only thing that mattered was whether it worked.[105] It was at this gathering that Jiang Zemin introduced the term socialist market economy, which replaced Chen Yun's "planned socialist market economy".[105] In his report to the 14th National Congress Jiang Zemin told the delegates that the socialist state would "let market forces play a basic role in resource allocation."[144] At the 15th National Congress, the party line was changed to "make market forces further play their role in resource allocation"; this line continued until the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee,[144] when it was amended to "let market forces play a decisive role in resource allocation."[144] Despite this, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee upheld the creed "Maintain the dominance of the public sector and strengthen the economic vitality of the State-owned economy."[144]

"[...] their theory that capitalism is the ultimate has been shaken, and socialist development has experienced a miracle. Western capitalism has suffered reversals, a financial crisis, a credit crisis, a crisis of confidence, and their self-conviction has wavered. Western countries have begun to reflect, and openly or secretively compare themselves against China's politics, economy and path."

Xi Jinping, the CCP general secretary, on the inevitability of socialism.[145]

The CCP views the world as organized into two opposing camps; socialist and capitalist.[146] They insist that socialism, on the basis of historical materialism, will eventually triumph over capitalism.[146] In recent years, when the party has been asked to explain the capitalist globalization occurring, the party has returned to the writings of Karl Marx.[146] Despite admitting that globalization developed through the capitalist system, the party's leaders and theorists argue that globalization is not intrinsically capitalist.[147] The reason being that if globalization was purely capitalist, it would exclude an alternative socialist form of modernity.[147] Globalization, as with the market economy, therefore does not have one specific class character (neither socialist nor capitalist) according to the party.[147] The insistence that globalization is not fixed in nature comes from Deng's insistence that China can pursue socialist modernization by incorporating elements of capitalism.[147] Because of this there is considerable optimism within the CCP that despite the current capitalist dominance of globalization, globalization can be turned into a vehicle supporting socialism.[148]


Collective leadership

Collective leadership, the idea that decisions will be taken through consensus, is the ideal in the CCP.[149] The concept has its origins back to Vladimir Lenin and the Russian Bolshevik Party.[150] At the level of the central party leadership this means that, for instance, all members of the Politburo Standing Committee are of equal standing (each member having only one vote).[149] A member of the Politburo Standing Committee often represents a sector; during Mao's reign, he controlled the People's Liberation Army, Kang Sheng, the security apparatus, and Zhou Enlai, the State Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[149] This counts as informal power.[149] Despite this, in a paradoxical relation, members of a body are ranked hierarchically (despite the fact that members are in theory equal to one another).[149] Informally, the collective leadership is headed by a "leadership core"; that is, the paramount leader, the person who holds the offices of CCP general secretary, CMC chairman and PRC president.[151] Before Jiang Zemin's tenure as paramount leader, the party core and collective leadership were indistinguishable.[152] In practice, the core was not responsible to the collective leadership.[152] However, by the time of Jiang, the party had begun propagating a responsibility system, referring to it in official pronouncements as the "core of the collective leadership".[152]

Democratic centralism

The CCP's organizational principle is democratic centralism, which is based on two principles: democracy (synonymous in official discourse with "socialist democracy" and "inner-party democracy") and centralism.[153] This has been the guiding organizational principle of the party since the 5th National Congress, held in 1927.[153] In the words of the party constitution, "The Party is an integral body organized under its program and constitution and on the basis of democratic centralism".[153] Mao once quipped that democratic centralism was "at once democratic and centralized, with the two seeming opposites of democracy and centralization united in a definite form." Mao claimed that the superiority of democratic centralism lay in its internal contradictions, between democracy and centralism, and freedom and discipline.[153] Currently, the CCP is claiming that "democracy is the lifeline of the Party, the lifeline of socialism".[153] But for democracy to be implemented, and functioning properly, there needs to be centralization.[153] The goal of democratic centralism was not to obliterate capitalism or its policies but instead it is the movement towards regulating capitalism while involving socialism and democracy.[154] Democracy in any form, the CCP claims, needs centralism, since without centralism there will be no order.[153] According to Mao, democratic centralism "is centralized on the basis of democracy and democratic under centralized guidance. This is the only system that can give full expression to democracy with full powers vested in the people's congresses at all levels and, at the same time, guarantee centralized administration with the governments at each level exercising centralized management of all the affairs entrusted to them by the people's congresses at the corresponding level and safeguarding whatever is essential to the democratic life of the people".[153]


Shuanggui is an intra-party disciplinary process conducted by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). This formally independent internal control institution conducts shuanggui on members accused of "disciplinary violations", a charge which generally refers to political corruption. The process, which literally translates to "double regulation", aims to extract confessions from members accused of violating party rules. According to the Dui Hua Foundation, tactics such as cigarette burns, beatings and simulated drowning are among those used to extract confessions. Other reported techniques include the use of induced hallucinations, with one subject of this method reporting that "In the end I was so exhausted, I agreed to all the accusations against me even though they were false."[155]

Multi-Party Cooperation System

The Multi-Party Cooperation and Political Consultation System is led by the CCP in cooperation and consultation with the eight parties which make up the United Front.[156] Consultation takes place under the leadership of the CCP, with mass organizations, the United Front parties, and "representatives from all walks of life".[156] These consultations contribute, at least in theory, to the formation of the country's basic policy in the fields of political, economic, cultural and social affairs.[156] The CCP's relationship with other parties is based on the principle of "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision, treating each other with full sincerity and sharing weal or woe."[156] This process is institutionalized in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).[156] All the parties in the United Front support China's road to socialism, and hold steadfast to the leadership of the CCP.[156] Despite all this, the CPPCC is a body without any real power.[157] While discussions do take place, they are all supervised by the CCP.[157]

Artificial intelligence

Artificial intelligence has been aggressively developed in the past decade by the Chinese government motivated by its one-party state-enabled consolidation of power. This has occurred so much so that Chinese citizens have been monitored extensively some even having received punitive measures blocking their financial transactions and city-to-city mobility within China.[158]


Central organization

The 18th National Congress, convened in November 2012

The National Congress is the party's highest body, and, since the 9th National Congress in 1969, has been convened every five years (prior to the 9th Congress they were convened on an irregular basis). According to the party's constitution, a congress may not be postponed except "under extraordinary circumstances."[159] The party constitution gives the National Congress six responsibilities:[160]

  1. electing the Central Committee;
  2. electing the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI);
  3. examining the report of the outgoing Central Committee;
  4. examining the report of the outgoing CCDI;
  5. discussing and enacting party policies; and,
  6. revising the party's constitution.

In practice, the delegates rarely discuss issues at length at the National Congresses. Most substantive discussion takes place before the congress, in the preparation period, among a group of top party leaders.[160] In between National Congresses, the Central Committee is the highest decision-making institution.[161] The CCDI is responsible for supervising party's internal anti-corruption and ethics system.[162] In between congresses the CCDI is under the authority of the Central Committee.[162]

Front cover of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party

The Central Committee, as the party's highest decision-making institution between national congresses, elects several bodies to carry out its work.[163] The first plenary session of a newly elected central committee elects the general secretary of the Central Committee, the party's leader; the Central Military Commission (CMC); the Politburo; the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC); and since 2013, the Central National Security Commission (CNSC). The first plenum also endorses the composition of the Secretariat and the leadership of the CCDI.[163] According to the party constitution, the general secretary must be a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), and is responsible for convening meetings of the PSC and the Politburo, while also presiding over the work of the Secretariat.[164] The Politburo "exercises the functions and powers of the Central Committee when a plenum is not in session".[165] The PSC is the party's highest decision-making institution when the Politburo, the Central Committee and the National Congress are not in session.[166] It convenes at least once a week.[167] It was established at the 8th National Congress, in 1958, to take over the policy-making role formerly assumed by the Secretariat.[168] The Secretariat is the top implementation body of the Central Committee, and can make decisions within the policy framework established by the Politburo; it is also responsible for supervising the work of organizations that report directly into the Central Committee, for example departments, commissions, publications, and so on.[169] The CMC is the highest decision-making institution on military affairs within the party, and controls the operations of the People's Liberation Army.[170] The general secretary has, since Jiang Zemin, also served as Chairman of the CMC.[170] Unlike the collective leadership ideal of other party organs, the CMC chairman acts as commander-in-chief with full authority to appoint or dismiss top military officers at will.[170] The CNSC "co-ordinates security strategies across various departments, including intelligence, the military, foreign affairs and the police in order to cope with growing challenges to stability at home and abroad."[171] The general secretary serves as the Chairman of the CNSC.[172]

A first plenum of the Central Committee also elects heads of departments, bureaus, central leading groups and other institutions to pursue its work during a term (a "term" being the period elapsing between national congresses, usually five years).[159] The General Office is the party's "nerve centre", in charge of day-to-day administrative work, including communications, protocol, and setting agendas for meetings.[173] The CCP currently has four main central departments: the Organization Department, responsible for overseeing provincial appointments and vetting cadres for future appointments,[174] the Publicity Department (formerly "Propaganda Department"), which oversees the media and formulates the party line to the media,[175][176] the International Department, functioning as the party's "foreign affairs ministry" with other parties,[177] and the United Front Work Department, which oversees work with the country's non-communist parties, mass organizations, and influence groups outside of the country.[175] The CC also has direct control over the Central Policy Research Office, which is responsible for researching issues of significant interest to the party leadership,[178] the Central Party School, which provides political training and ideological indoctrination in communist thought for high-ranking and rising cadres,[179] the Party History Research Centre, which sets priorities for scholarly research in state-run universities and the Central Party School,[180] and the Compilation and Translation Bureau, which studies and translates the classical works of Marxism.[181] The party's newspaper, the People's Daily, is under the direct control of the Central Committee[182] and is published with the objectives "to tell good stories about China and the (Party)" and to promote its party leader.[183] The theoretical magazines Seeking Truth from Facts and Study Times are published by the Central Party School.[179] The various offices of the "Central Leading Groups", such as the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, the Taiwan Affairs Office, and the Central Finance Office, also report to the central committee during a plenary session.[184]

Lower-level organizations

After seizing political power, the CCP extended the dual party-state command system to all government institutions, social organizations, and economic entities.[185] The State Council and the Supreme Court each has a party core group (党组), established since November 1949. Party committees permeate in every state administrative organ as well as the People's Consultation Conferences and mass organizations at all levels.[186] Party committees exist inside of companies, both private and state-owned.[187] Modeled after the Soviet Nomenklatura system, the party committee's organization department at each level has the power to recruit, train, monitor, appoint, and relocate these officials.[188]

Party committees exist at the level of provinces, cities, counties, and neighborhoods.[189][190] These committees play a key role in directing local policy by selecting local leaders and assigning critical tasks.[27][191] The Party secretary at each level is more senior than that of the leader of the government, with the CCP standing committee being the main source of power.[191] Party committee members in each level are selected by the leadership in the level above, with provincial leaders selected by the central Organizational Department, and not removable by the local party secretary.[191]

In theory, however, party committees are elected by party congresses at their own level.[189] Local party congresses are supposed to be held every fifth year, but under extraordinary circumstances they may be held earlier or postponed. However that decision must be approved by the next higher level of the local party committee.[189] The number of delegates and the procedures for their election are decided by the local party committee, but must also have the approval of the next higher party committee.[189]

A local party congress has many of the same duties as the National Congress, and it is responsible for examining the report of the local Party Committee at the corresponding level; examining the report of the local Commission for Discipline Inspection at the corresponding level; discussing and adopting resolutions on major issues in the given area; and electing the local Party Committee and the local Commission for Discipline Inspection at the corresponding level.[189] Party committees of "a province, autonomous region, municipality directly under the central government, city divided into districts, or autonomous prefecture [are] elected for a term of five years", and include full and alternate members.[189] The party committees "of a county (banner), autonomous county, city not divided into districts, or municipal district [are] elected for a term of five years", but full and alternate members "must have a Party standing of three years or more."[189] If a local Party Congress is held before or after the given date, the term of the members of the Party Committee shall be correspondingly shortened or lengthened.[189]

Vacancies in a Party Committee shall be filled by an alternate members according to the order of precedence, which is decided by the number of votes an alternate member got during his or hers election.[189] A Party Committee must convene for at least two plenary meetings a year.[189] During its tenure, a Party Committee shall "carry out the directives of the next higher Party organizations and the resolutions of the Party congresses at the corresponding levels."[189] The local Standing Committee (analogous to the Central Politburo) is elected at the first plenum of the corresponding Party Committee after the local party congress.[189] A Standing Committee is responsible to the Party Committee at the corresponding level and the Party Committee at the next higher level.[189] A Standing Committee exercises the duties and responsibilities of the corresponding Party Committee when it is not in session.[189]


The funding of all CCP organizations mainly comes from state fiscal revenue. Data for the proportion of total CCP organizations’ expenditures in total China fiscal revenue is unavailable. However, occasionally small local governments in China release such data. For example, on 10 October 2016, the local government of Mengmao Township, Ruili City, Yunnan Province released a concise fiscal revenue and expenditure report for the year 2014. According to this report, the fiscal Revenue amounted to RMB 29,498,933.58, and CCP organization' expenditures amounted to RMB 1,660,115.50, that is, 5.63% of fiscal revenue is used by the CCP for its own operation. This value is similar to the social security and employment expenditure of the whole town—RMB 1,683,064.90.[192]


"It is my will to join the Communist Party of China, uphold the Party's program, observe the provisions of the Party constitution, fulfill a Party member's duties, carry out the Party's decisions, strictly observe Party discipline, guard Party secrets, be loyal to the Party, work hard, fight for communism throughout my life, be ready at all times to sacrifice my all for the Party and the people, and never betray the Party."

—Communist Party of China Admission Oath[193]

To join the party, an applicant must be approved by the communist party. In 2014, only 2 million applications were accepted out of some 22 million applicants. [194] Admitted members then spend a year as a probationary member.[193]

In contrast to the past, when emphasis was placed on the applicants' ideological criteria, the current CCP stresses technical and educational qualifications.[193] To become a probationary member, the applicant must take an admission oath before the party flag.[193] The relevant CCP organization is responsible for observing and educating probationary members.[193] Probationary members have duties similar to those of full members, with the exception that they may not vote in party elections nor stand for election.[193] Many join the CCP through the Communist Youth League.[193] Under Jiang Zemin, private entrepreneurs were allowed to become party members.[193] According to the CCP constitution, a member, in short, must follow orders, be disciplined, uphold unity, serve the Party and the people, and promote the socialist way of life.[189] Members enjoy the privilege of attending Party meetings, reading relevant Party documents, receiving Party education, participating in Party discussions through the Party's newspapers and journals, making suggestions and proposal, making "well-grounded criticism of any Party organization or member at Party meetings" (even of the central party leadership), voting and standing for election, and of opposing and criticizing Party resolutions ("provided that they resolutely carry out the resolution or policy while it is in force"); and they have the ability "to put forward any request, appeal, or complaint to higher Party organizations, even up to the Central Committee, and ask the organizations concerned for a responsible reply."[189] No party organization, including the CCP central leadership, can deprive a member of these rights.[189]

As of 30 June 2016, individuals who identify as farmers, herdsmen and fishermen make up 26 million members; members identifying as workers totalled 7.2 million.[195] Another group, the "Managing, professional and technical staff in enterprises and public institutions", made up 12.5 million, 9 million identified as working in administrative staff and 7.4 million described themselves as party cadres.[195] 22.3 million women are CCP members.[195] The CCP currently has 90.59 million members,[196] making it the second largest political party in the world after India's Bharatiya Janata Party.[197]

Women in China have low participation rates as political leaders. Women's disadvantage is most evident in their severe under representation in the more powerful political positions.[198] At the top level of decision making, no woman has ever been among the nine members of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party's Politburo. Just 3 of 27 government ministers are women, and importantly, since 1997, China has fallen to 53rd place from 16th in the world in terms of female representation at its parliament, the National People's Congress, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union.[199] Party leaders such as Zhao Ziyang have vigorously opposed the participation of women in the political process.[200] Within the party women face a glass ceiling.[201]

Communist Youth League

The Communist Youth League (CYL) is the CCP's youth wing, and the largest mass organization for youth in China.[202] According to the CCP's constitution the CYL is a "mass organization of advanced young people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China; it functions as a party school where a large number of young people learn about socialism with Chinese characteristics and about communism through practice; it is the Party's assistant and reserve force."[189] To join, an applicant has to be between the ages of 14 and 28.[202] It controls and supervises Young Pioneers, a youth organization for children below the age of 14.[202] The organizational structure of CYL is an exact copy of the CCP's; the highest body is the National Congress, followed by the Central Committee, Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee.[203] However, the Central Committee (and all central organs) of the CYL work under the guidance of the CCP central leadership.[189] Therefore, in a peculiar situation, CYL bodies are both responsible to higher bodies within CYL and the CCP, a distinct organization.[189] As of the 17th National Congress (held in 2013), CYL had 89 million members.[204]


A temporary monument in Tiananmen Square marking the 90th anniversary of the Communist Party of China in 2011

According to Article 53 of the CCP constitution, "the Party emblem and flag are the symbol and sign of the Communist Party of China."[189] At the beginning of its history, the CCP did not have a single official standard for the flag, but instead allowed individual party committees to copy the flag of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[205] On 28 April 1942, the Central Politburo decreed the establishment of a sole official flag. "The flag of the CPC has the length-to-width proportion of 3:2 with a hammer and sickle in the upper-left corner, and with no five-pointed star. The Political Bureau authorizes the General Office to custom-make a number of standard flags and distribute them to all major organs".[205] According to People's Daily, "The standard party flag is 120 centimeters (cm) in length and 80 cm in width. In the center of the upper-left corner (a quarter of the length and width to the border) is a yellow hammer-and-sickle 30 cm in diameter. The flag sleeve (pole hem) is in white and 6.5 cm in width. The dimension of the pole hem is not included in the measure of the flag. The red color symbolizes revolution; the hammer-and-sickle are tools of workers and peasants, meaning that the Communist Party of China represents the interests of the masses and the people; the yellow color signifies brightness."[205] In total the flag has five dimensions, the sizes are "no. 1: 388 cm in length and 192 cm in width; no. 2: 240 cm in length and 160 cm in width; no. 3: 192 cm in length and 128 cm in width; no. 4: 144 cm in length and 96 cm in width; no. 5: 96 cm in length and 64 cm in width."[205] On 21 September 1966, the CCP General Office issued "Regulations on the Production and Use of the CCP Flag and Emblem", which stated that the emblem and flag were the official symbols and signs of the party.[205]

Party-to-party relations

Communist parties

The CCP continues to have relations with non-ruling communist and workers' parties and attends international communist conferences, most notably the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties.[206] Delegates of foreign communist parties still visit China; in 2013, for instance, the General Secretary of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), Jeronimo de Sousa, personally met with Liu Qibao, a member of the Central Politburo.[207] In another instance, Pierre Laurent, the National Secretary of the French Communist Party (PCF), met with Liu Yunshan, a Politburo Standing Committee member.[208] In 2014 Xi Jinping, the CCP general secretary, personally met with Gennady Zyuganov, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), to discuss party-to-party relations.[209] While the CCP retains contact with major parties such as the PCP,[207] PCF,[208] the CPRF,[210] the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia,[211] the Communist Party of Brazil,[212] the Communist Party of Nepal[213] and the Communist Party of Spain,[214] the party retains relations with minor communist and workers' parties, such as the Communist Party of Australia,[215] the Workers Party of Bangladesh, the Communist Party of Bangladesh (Marxist–Leninist) (Barua), the Communist Party of Sri Lanka, the Workers' Party of Belgium, the Hungarian Workers' Party, the Dominican Workers' Party and the Party for the Transformation of Honduras, for instance.[216] In recent years, noting the self-reform of the European social democratic movement in the 1980s and 1990s, the CCP "has noted the increased marginalization of West European communist parties."[217]

Ruling parties of socialist states

The CCP has retained close relations with the remaining socialist states still espousing communism: Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam and their respective ruling parties as well as North Korea and its ruling party, which officially abandoned communism in 2009.[218] It spends a fair amount of time analyzing the situation in the remaining socialist states, trying to reach conclusions as to why these states survived when so many did not, following the collapse of the Eastern European socialist states in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.[219] In general, the analyses of the remaining socialist states and their chances of survival have been positive, and the CCP believes that the socialist movement will be revitalized sometime in the future.[219]

The ruling party which the CCP is most interested in is the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).[220] In general the CPV is considered a model example of socialist development in the post-Soviet era.[220] Chinese analysts on Vietnam believe that the introduction of the Doi Moi reform policy at the 6th CPV National Congress is the key reason for Vietnam's current success.[220]

While the CCP is probably the organization with most access to North Korea, writing about North Korea is tightly circumscribed.[219] The few reports accessible to the general public are those about North Korean economic reforms.[219] While Chinese analysts of North Korea tend to speak positively of North Korea in public, in official discussions circa 2008 they show much disdain for North Korea's economic system, the cult of personality which pervades society, the Kim family, the idea of hereditary succession in a socialist state, the security state, the use of scarce resources on the Korean People's Army and the general impoverishment of the North Korean people.[221] Circa 2008 there are those analysts who compare the current situation of North Korea with that of China during the Cultural Revolution.[222] Over the years, the CCP has tried to persuade the Workers' Party of Korea (or WPK, North Korea's ruling party) to introduce economic reforms by showing them key economic infrastructure in China.[222] For instance, in 2006 the CCP invited the WPK general secretary Kim Jong-il to Guangdong to showcase the success economic reforms have brought China.[222] In general, the CCP considers the WPK and North Korea to be negative examples of a communist ruling party and socialist state.[222]

There is a considerable degree of interest in Cuba within the CCP.[220] Fidel Castro, the former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), is greatly admired, and books have been written focusing on the successes of the Cuban Revolution.[220] Communication between the CCP and the PCC has increased considerably since the 1990s, hardly a month going by without a diplomatic exchange.[223] At the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee, which discussed the possibility of the CCP learning from other ruling parties, praise was heaped on the PCC.[223] When Wu Guanzheng, a Central Politburo member, met with Fidel Castro in 2007, he gave him a personal letter written by Hu Jintao: "Facts have shown that China and Cuba are trustworthy good friends, good comrades, and good brothers who treat each other with sincerity. The two countries' friendship has withstood the test of a changeable international situation, and the friendship has been further strengthened and consolidated."[224]

Non-communist parties

Since the decline and fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the CCP has begun establishing party-to-party relations with non-communist parties.[177] These relations are sought so that the CCP can learn from them.[225] For instance, the CCP has been eager to understand how the People's Action Party of Singapore (PAP) maintains its total domination over Singaporean politics through its "low-key presence, but total control."[226] According to the CCP's own analysis of Singapore, the PAP's dominance can be explained by its "well-developed social network, which controls constituencies effectively by extending its tentacles deeply into society through branches of government and party-controlled groups."[226] While the CCP accepts that Singapore is a liberal democracy, they view it as a guided democracy led by the PAP.[226] Other differences are, according to the CCP, "that it is not a political party based on the working class—instead it is a political party of the elite. [...] It is also a political party of the parliamentary system, not a revolutionary party."[227] Other parties which the CCP studies and maintains strong party-to-party relations with are the United Malays National Organisation, which has ruled Malaysia (1957–2018), and the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, which dominated Japanese politics since 1955.[228]

Since Jiang Zemin's time, the CCP has made friendly overtures to its erstwhile foe, the Kuomintang. The CCP emphasizes strong party-to-party relations with the KMT so as to strengthen the probability of the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China.[229] However, several studies have been written on the KMT's loss of power in 2000 after having ruled Taiwan since 1949 (the KMT officially ruled mainland China from 1928 to 1949).[229] In general, one-party states or dominant-party states are of special interest to the party and party-to-party relations are formed so that the CCP can study them.[229] The longevity of the Syrian Regional Branch of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party is attributed to the personalization of power in the al-Assad family, the strong presidential system, the inheritance of power, which passed from Hafez al-Assad to his son Bashar al-Assad, and the role given to the Syrian military in politics.[230]

Xi Jinping (second from left) with Enrique Peña Nieto (second from right), the former President of Mexico and a leading member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party

Circa 2008, the CCP has been especially interested in Latin America,[230] as shown by the increasing number of delegates sent to and received from these countries.[230] Of special fascination for the CCP is the 71-year-long rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico.[230] While the CCP attributed the PRI's long reign in power to the strong presidential system, tapping into the machismo culture of the country, its nationalist posture, its close identification with the rural populace and the implementation of nationalization alongside the marketization of the economy,[230] the CCP concluded that the PRI failed because of the lack of inner-party democracy, its pursuit of social democracy, its rigid party structures that could not be reformed, its political corruption, the pressure of globalization, and American interference in Mexican politics.[230] While the CCP was slow to recognize the pink tide in Latin America, it has strengthened party-to-party relations with several socialist and anti-American political parties over the years.[231] The CCP has occasionally expressed some irritation over Hugo Chávez's anti-capitalist and anti-American rhetoric.[231] Despite this, the CCP reached an agreement in 2013 with the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), which was founded by Chávez, for the CCP to educate PSUV cadres in political and social fields.[232] By 2008, the CCP claimed to have established relations with 99 political parties in 29 Latin American countries.[231]

Social democratic movements in Europe have been of great interest to the CCP since the early 1980s.[231] With the exception of a short period in which the CCP forged party-to-party relations with far-right parties during the 1970s in an effort to halt "Soviet expansionism", the CCP's relations with European social democratic parties were its first serious efforts to establish cordial party-to-party relations with non-communist parties.[231] The CCP credits the European social democrats with creating a "capitalism with a human face".[231] Before the 1980s, the CCP had a highly negative and dismissive view of social democracy, a view dating back to the Second International and the Marxist–Leninist view on the social democratic movement.[231] By the 1980s, that view had changed and the CCP concluded that it could actually learn something from the social democratic movement.[231] CCP delegates were sent all over Europe to observe.[233] By the 1980s, most European social democratic parties were facing electoral decline and in a period of self-reform.[233] The CCP followed this with great interest, laying most weight on reform efforts within the British Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party of Germany.[233] The CCP concluded that both parties were re-elected because they modernized, replacing traditional state socialist tenets with new ones supporting privatization, shedding the belief in big government, conceiving a new view of the welfare state, changing their negative views of the market and moving from their traditional support base of trade unions to entrepreneurs, the young and students.[234]

On 6 July 2021, the CCP engaged 500 political parties from 160 countries in the first World Political Parties Summit to discuss international cooperation and responsibilities for the wellbeing of people.

Electoral history

National People's Congress elections

Election General Secretary Seats +/– Position
1982–83 Hu Yaobang
1,861 / 2,978
1987–88 Zhao Ziyang
1,986 / 2,979
125 1st
1993–94 Jiang Zemin
2,037 / 2,979
51 1st
2,130 / 2,979
93 1st
2002–03 Hu Jintao
2,178 / 2,985
48 1st
2,099 / 2,987
79 1st
2012–13 Xi Jinping
2,157 / 2,987
58 1st
2,119 / 2,980
38 1st

See also

  • List of Chinese Communist Party members
  • Politics of the People's Republic of China
  • Succession of power in the People's Republic of China


  1. The slogans at Xinhuamen ("New China Gate", the main entrance to Zhongnanhai) are "Serve the People" (middle), "Long live the great Communist Party of China" (left), and "Long live ever-victorious Mao Zedong Thought" (right).
  2. simplified Chinese: 中国共产党; traditional Chinese: 中國共產黨; pinyin: Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng; abbreviation: 中共
  3. Chiang Kai-shek strongly opposed the analysis by CCP. He believed that the KMT serves all the Chinese, and KMT members should not be divided into left or right.[48]
  4. "In the next weeks five thousand Communists were butchered by the stammering machine-guns of the Kuomintang and by the knives of the criminal gangs whom Chiang recruited for slaughter."[61]
    Other sources give different estimates, e.g. 5,000–10,000.[62]



  1. "Relationship between CPC and the Communist Youth League of China". Archived from the original on 13 February 2019. Retrieved 22 August 2019.
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  3. Xin, Wen (10 August 2018). "Company's use of red scarf draws ire of CYL". Zhōngguó Rìbào 中国日报 [China Daily]. Archived from the original on 22 August 2019. Retrieved 22 August 2019.
  4. "ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS – Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019" (PDF). p. 5. Archived (PDF) from the original on 9 May 2019. Retrieved 27 October 2019.
  5. "最新!中国共产党党员总数为9514.8万名". 央视新闻. 30 June 2021. Archived from the original on 30 June 2021. Retrieved 30 June 2021.
  6. "Beijing Braces For Centenary as Ruling Party Hits 95 Million Members". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 30 June 2021.
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Further reading

Scholarly articles
  • Baum, Richard (1996). Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0691036373.
  • Baylis, Thomas (1989). Governing by Committee: Collegial Leadership in Advanced Societies. State University of New York Press. ISBN 9780887069444.
  • Bush, Richard (2005). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0815797814.
  • Broodsgaard, Kjeld Erik; Zheng, Yongnian (2006). The Chinese Communist Party in Reform. Routledge. ISBN 978-0203099285.
  • Carter, Peter (1976). Mao. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0192731401.
  • Chan, Adrian (2003). Chinese Marxism. Continuum Publishing. ISBN 978-0826473073.
  • Cheek, Timothy; Mühlhahn, Klaus; Van de Ven, Hans J., eds. (2021). Chinese Communist Party : A Century in Ten Lives. Cambridge University Press.
  • Coase, Ronald; Wang, Ling (2012). How China Became Capitalist. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1137019363.
  • Ding, X.L. (2006). The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977–1989. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521026239.
  • Feigon, Lee (2002). Mao: A Reinterpretation. Ivan R. Dee. ISBN 978-1566635226.
  • Finer, Catherine Jones (2003). Social Policy Reform in China: Views from Home and Abroad. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 978-0754631750.
  • Fu Delete repeated word = Zhengyuan (1993). Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521442282.
  • Gao, James (2009). Historical Dictionary of Modern China (1800–1949). Scarecrow Press. ISBN 978-0810863088.
  • Gregor, A. James (1999). Marxism, China & Development: Reflections on Theory and Reality. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-1412828154.
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