Note: I had posted this a day ago, but I hadn't formulated it very clearly. I still recognize that the counter-example is probably not very strong, but I'm wondering where it is wrong. Any help is appreciated!
Nozick's sensitivity definition of knowledge has 4 criteria:
- P is true.
- S believes P.
- If P is not true, S would not believe P.
- If P is true, S would believe P.
Now, imagine, as Nozick had originally formulated, that there is a man in a vat. Except that, in this particular example, instead of a group of psychologists controlling all of the man's beliefs, there is a computer controlling a specific belief. The computer, in every case, makes him believe a given proposition P pertaining to a specific topic that does not have a fixed nature - for example, who won the World Series. The proposition P's content is equivalent to whoever had won the World Series for that season. So, proposition P is always true.
This seems to fulfill Nozick's criterion for truth. P is true (the computer makes S believe P because it is true); S believes P (the computer makes him believe); If P wasn't true, S would not believe P (the computer would not make S believe P if it is not true); if P was true, S would believe P (the computer makes S believe P so long that it is true). However, we cannot classify this as knowledge.
I suspect Nozick would be able to evade this counter-example, but for the moment how he would eludes me. Where does this criticism fall flat?