Resource recommendations for cogent arguments against the MWI of quantum mechanics


I am looking for cogent, current arguments against the Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, from a philosophical, rather than purely physical point of view.

To be clear, I am interested in arguments against the "reality" of these other worlds (i.e. I am interested in ontology), not arguments against the usefulness of this view in making sense of the measurement problem (which it seems to me is a subtly different issue that is often conflated with the former, especially among quantum information people).

I have a background in physics, so technical literature is welcome.

I am aware of e.g. the following questions on this site, but I believe they are substantially different to mine. The first one turns partly on the question of whether the MWI renders the notion of an "I" suspect, while the accepted answer to the second one is concerned with positivism, and claims that most MWI supporters do not care about ontology (I am not sure I believe that claim). I am interested in broader objections.

What do Philosophers think about the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics?

Is the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics philosophically untenable?

Martin C.

Posted 2019-06-05T14:09:59.540

Reputation: 330

Maybe useful Jean Bricmont, Making Sense of Quantum Mechanics (Springer, 2016)

– Mauro ALLEGRANZA – 2019-06-05T14:20:51.457

See also Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.

– Mauro ALLEGRANZA – 2019-06-05T14:21:32.337

1Thank you @MauroALLEGRANZA. If you think those are good resources, why don't you expand your comments into an answer, maybe with some details of the focus of those texts :D? – Martin C. – 2019-06-05T14:24:18.457

That is already done on SEP. The linked article has a subsection Objections to the MWI with short descriptions, and highlighted references for each objection.

– Conifold – 2019-06-05T21:30:17.203

Ah, thanks @Conifold – Martin C. – 2019-06-06T07:19:15.223

No answers