I am looking for cogent, current arguments against the Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, from a philosophical, rather than purely physical point of view.
To be clear, I am interested in arguments against the "reality" of these other worlds (i.e. I am interested in ontology), not arguments against the usefulness of this view in making sense of the measurement problem (which it seems to me is a subtly different issue that is often conflated with the former, especially among quantum information people).
I have a background in physics, so technical literature is welcome.
I am aware of e.g. the following questions on this site, but I believe they are substantially different to mine. The first one turns partly on the question of whether the MWI renders the notion of an "I" suspect, while the accepted answer to the second one is concerned with positivism, and claims that most MWI supporters do not care about ontology (I am not sure I believe that claim). I am interested in broader objections.