Traditionally, Knowledge is defined as a True Justified Belief (Let us ignore epistemic caveats and objections to this definition).
According to Wittgenstein, there is no place for knowledge where there is no place for doubt (or at least this is what I understood from references about his philosophy).
If so, then how can we define doubt in terms of Justification, belief and Truth.
I know we cannot define doubt in terms of truth, because we can doubt something that is True.
I also know we should use Belief in our definition, as doubt is a non-belief (or at least, incomplete belief).
And I am very hesitant to whether the lack of justification plays any role in Doubt, because even the most justified truths (like the sun) can also be doubted.
So, how can we define doubt? are there any epistemic or analytical theories defining "doubt" in less ambiguous terms?
References : Wittgenstein's Epistemology