I am not sure what the majority view is on this matter in philosophy and equally unsure what difference numbers and majorities make in intellectual debate.
What is relevant is to examine the credentials of the presumption. Donald Evans argues that there is a flaw in Flew's use of it. Specifically, that Flew does not observe a sufficiently firm distinction between procedural and substantive presumption. Flew can hardly be ignored since he first propounded the presumption of atheism at least in its current form :
Let us consider Flew's main contention, that the onus of proof
lies on the theist. The "proof" which is required of the theist
involves (a) showing that his concept of God is such that the
existence of God is theoretically possible and (b) providing sufficient reasons, though not necessarily a demonstration, to warrant
believing that God exists. The "onus" which is on the theist
does not preclude the possibility of a theistic proof. It is similar
to the "onus" which is on the prosecutor in an English court: it
is up to the prosecutor to prove guilt, but such proof is possible.
And just as the prosecutor does not have to drop his personal
conviction - if he has one - that the defendant is guilty, the theist
does not have to drop hrs own theistic belief. What Flew is asking
the theist to do is to accept a procedure. Like the affirmative side
in a debate, the theist is asked to concede that if he has not
provided grounds for what he affirms, he has lost the debate -
whether or not the opposition says anything. If a theist moves,
"Resolved that this house affirms the existence of God", the presumption in the debate is atheistic; the theist has to prove his
claim or lose the debate. He is like a prosecutor in a court where
the procedural rule is that innocence is presumed; the prosecutor
must prove guilt or lose his case. Flew holds that the presumption
of atheism is a better procedure than the presumption of theism,
where the atheist would affirm, "Resolved that this house affirms the non-existence of God", and the atheist would have to
prove his claim or lose the argument.
This, if I understand him correctly, is what Flew means when
he calls for a purely procedural "presumption of atheism", and
insists that the concession asked of the theist is procedural rather than substantive. It seems to me, however, that he does not
maintain a firm distinction between a procedural presumption,
which is a rule governing a debate or a court or a philosophical
dialogue, and a personal presumption, which is a man's own
(substantive) convictional stance. A personal presumption that p
is a presuming that p is true unless and until adequate contrary
evidence is produced. (It differs from a "categorical assumption"
that p, which for Flew is (apparently) either a procedural or a
personal assumption which precludes the possibility that p is
false.) Flew blurs the distinction between procedural and personal
presumptions of atheism early in his essay: he first introduces
the "presumption of atheism" as a presumption "that the onus
of proof must lie on the theist"; then he explains that the "atheism"
in this presumption is a "negative atheism"; and then he says
that a negative atheist is "someone who is simply not a theist"
(that is, presumably, someone who personally presumes atheism).
This would preclude theists from taking part in the very debate
which Flew asks them to initiate! This is, I think, a slip, for
Flew's main line of thought in the essay is such that he supposedly
allows a theist personally to presume theism - even to assume
theism categorically - while presuming atheism procedurally. (Donald Evans, 'A Reply to Flew's "The Presumption of Atheism"', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Sep., 1972), pp. 47-50: 47-8.)