So something strange I've realized lately, in the humanities and social sciences it's fairly common to see labels such as "analytical", "analytic school" etc. which I read to suggest as if these schools are "improved versions" of those that they base on. Because they suggest that "hey those others were not analytical, but we are, so we're better, right?".
However, this might be suggestive and pretentious.
Analytical Marxism is an approach to Marxist theory that was prominent amongst English-speaking philosophers and social scientists during the 1980s. It was mainly associated with the September Group of academics, so called because of their biennial September meetings to discuss common interests. Self-described as "Non-Bullshit Marxism", the group was characterized, in the words of David Miller, by "clear and rigorous thinking about questions that are usually blanketed by ideological fog." The most prominent members of the group were G. A. Cohen, John Roemer, Jon Elster, Adam Przeworski, Erik Olin Wright, Hillel Steiner, and Philippe van Parijs.
It should not sound weird for someone educated in philosophy to see that "are usually blanketed by ideological fog" doesn't mean anything. Since it's impossible to display, what is blanketed by ideological fog and what's not. Everyone are prone to biases. So this statement could be suggestive and the theory a "wannabe better theory" with the investigators possibly enjoying or wanting to enjoy funding and societal praise as "being sharp".
What's the role of these kinds of schools of thought that in philosophy of science sense don't seem to elevate to anything more than "different semantics". Roughly I think that any science, to be better than mere a priori, has to develop to empiricism. Just changing the semantics is not enough, unless the field is entirely a priori (e.g. mathematics).