Have anyone found a good solution to Kant's dualistic approach to consciousness?



Kant, in his studies of transcendental idealism, made the "illogical gap" between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, at the end of theoretical study, by requiring the contemplation of intelligence in order complete the consciousness study. German idealists tried for over a century to solve this illogical gap, and I haven't seen one truly convincing philosophy that solved it. Now, I'm asking, was that gap ever been solved, or was it left as Kant put it, effectively causing a dualistic approach throughout all of German idealism?

Edit (clarification):

What I mean with closing the illogical gap is closing it while staying in the theoretical philosophy, and not attempting to merge it with the practical, or judgmental/intuitive philosophies.

Edit 2 (replying to the comments, as I can't seem to be able to comment):

My thought is, most philosophies tries to be comprehensive in their method - they try to explain most if not all of the nature in one complete methodological system. I'm not talking about morality, politics, and such, but at least the philosophy of nature (including epistemology). Kant made an ultimately revolutionary move by seperating the fields into theoretical, practical, and judgemental (causing most thinkers past his time to think around these same structures). What I'm asking is, if anyone ever tried (and hopefully succeeded, as I know Fichte tried but in the end dismissed his earlier thoughts) to once again combine those fields under one systemic methodology?

Edit 3: @Philip Klöcking, thanks, I will look into him. And about the interpretation of Kant, I thought that was the well known interpretation of his philosophy, and it was quite intuitive for me - in his quest to eliminate dogmatism, Kant understood that theoretical and practical philosophies must be separated. And sure, the judgmental philosophy synthesize them both (anachronism, I know), but it's still two pieces stitched together and not one whole piece (which was something I liked about the dogmatic, earlier philosophy). By the way, I know the term "illogical gap" from reading Hugo Bergmann's interpretation of Kant, so I may be hugely influenced by a wrong interpretation, but as I've said before, I do think it's the intuitive interpretation.

Yechiam Weiss

Posted 2018-01-01T19:37:00.817

Reputation: 3 468

The "illogical gap" between theoretical and practical philosophy was partly closed by Kant himself in the Critique of the Power of Judgement. As a matter of clarification: Do you understand "dualistic" in terms of practical vs. theoretical or rather in classical terms as ontological divide? You may find some works on his Opus Posthumum by Eckart Förster interesting, as it was one of Kant's main concerns in his late days to mend the seemingly unbridgeable divide between theoretical and practical reason. – Philip Klöcking – 2018-01-01T20:25:02.690

First, it may be helpful if you'd register with the site. It enables you to edit your posts whenever you want and make comments below them for clarification. Second, I am quite puzzled how what you ask should be possible. To frame it like Kant did in his famous letter to Herz (1772): In practical matters, the world is caused to be in correspondence with our ideas. In theoretical matters, our intuitions are produced by the world, but it is harder to justify that our concepts are in correspondence with it. The whole situation is entirely different, how should it be possible to overcome that?! – Philip Klöcking – 2018-01-02T10:27:00.757

1I find the question rather muddled, too much so to give an answer. – None – 2018-01-02T13:46:18.507

I guess Hermeneutics (e.g. Gadamer, Riceur) was one of these tries. Apart from that, I strongly disagree with the understanding of Kant himself "separating" these fields. In his thought, the third critique about judgements brings together the other two, which are more specific in their undertaking. There are many authors interpreting the whole of Kantian philosophy as being a philosophy of judgements and, therefore, one of the first systematic approaches to philosophy of language as the fundamental way of analysing (self-)understanding. – Philip Klöcking – 2018-01-02T14:23:34.737

@Philip Klöcking ha, that's funny, both Bergmann and Zvie Bar-On are Israelis, yet that book hasn't been released in Hebrew. I'll take a look at it, thank you. Though, while taking a quick look, it seems as though Rotenstreich is making some mishmash of Bergmann's interpretation of Kant with his interest of Schelling. As his pupil, it makes sense Bergmann misleadingly talked about Kant with Schelling in mind, or that Rotenstreich himself understood it that way. In any case, I wouldn't go as far as to say Bergmann isn't authoritative on Kant, as he taught about him and wrote a book about him. – Yechiam Weiss – 2018-01-08T15:30:49.843

See, "Mench, Gemeinschaft und Welt in Der Philosophies Immanuel Kants" Lucien Goldmann, Europa Verlags, Zurich, 1945. In English: "Immanuel Kant" Lucien Goldman, NLB, London 1971. Pay especial attention to Kant's letter to Beck of July 1, 1794, "what we ourselves can make" may harken to G. Vico. Also Goldmann's analysis of where the neo-Kantians went wrong p. 156, English edition. – Gordon 6 mins ago – Gordon – 2018-01-08T20:09:58.367

@Yechiam Weiss. You have an answer to your question on Kant. – Geoffrey Thomas – 2018-01-09T15:37:40.610

No answers