Source: p 83, Philosophy: A Complete Introduction (2012) by Prof Sharon Kaye (MA PhD in Philosophy, U. Toronto)
Likewise, if I tie you to a chair, we say that you are unfree because there is an external impediment preventing you from acting in accordance with your nature.
[1.] Suppose, on the other hand, you are unable to get up from the chair because you are lame. We don't call you 'unfree' in that case, since the impediment is internal to you.
1 appears to blame the victim. Does not a finding of (whether an action constitutes) Compatibilism depend on an action's causes? Suppose the external impediment that caused lameness (in the legs) as:
a rock that injured a hiker without correct footwear. Then the victim's negligence contributed to the injury; so the victim can be blamed.
totally unforeseeable space debris that injures a pedestrian. Then the victim must not be blamed.