Romanian Front

Romanian Front
Frontul Românesc
President Alexandru Vaida-Voevod
Founded March 12, 1935
Dissolved March 30, 1938
Split from National Peasants' Party
Succeeded by National Renaissance Front
Newspaper Gazeta Transilvaniei
Ofensiva Română
Paramilitary wing Panduri
Ideology Fascism
Economic antisemitism
Political position Far-right
National affiliation National Bloc (1935–1936)
Colours      Black

The Romanian Front (Romanian: Frontul Românesc, FR) was a moderate fascist party created in Romania in 1935. Led by former Prime Minister Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, it originated as a right-wing splinter group from the mainstream National Peasants' Party (PNȚ). While in power, Vaida had an ambiguous approach to the Iron Guard, and constructed his own radical ideology; the FR had a generally xenophobic program of positive discrimination, being implicitly (and eventually explicitly) antisemitic. It was subsumed to the policies of King Carol II, maneuvering between the mainstream National Liberals, the PNȚ's left-wing, and the more radically fascist Guardists. Vaida tried to compete with the former two and appease the latter, assuming fascist trappings such as the black-shirted uniform.

Albeit invested with the king's trust and counting experienced politicians among its cadres, the FR was always a minor force in Romanian politics, and was habitually defeated in by-elections. Early on, it was courted by other groups, narrowly failing to absorb the National Agrarian Party. It came to depend on the more powerful National Christian Party, with which it formed a political alliance in 1935. Called "National Bloc", it too failed to produce a full merger between its components, as Vaida had qualms about the unchecked Germanophilia of his partners. In later years, the FR made several sustained efforts to reunite with, or to absorb, the "centrist" wing of the PNȚ.

The FR's hostility toward successive National Liberal governments gave way to cooperation after the latter also embraced ethnic discrimination. This rapprochement eventually resulted in a cartel, formed by the two parties during the 1937 election. This controversial move bled the FR of members and supporters, leaving it to be absorbed into the single-party National Renaissance Front in 1938. From 1940, Vaida served as the Front's Chairman.



The Front had its roots in the second and third governments of Vaida-Voevod (1932 and 1933), which were characterized by growing levels of antisemitism and discussions regarding the possibility of barring Jews from a number of public posts (Jewish quotas).[1][2] As an ideologue, Vaida-Voevod found inspiration in the work of economic antisemites and authoritarians such as Karl Lueger and Aurel Popovici.[3] In the late 1920s, his views were shaped by eugenics and biopolitics, leading him to demand the state-managed preservation of a pure peasant stock, against "biological competition".[4]

The antisemitic measures were taken to the background of agitation by another homegrown fascist movement, the Iron Guard, which Vaida-Voevod had initially protected and supported in his term as Interior Minister.[5] Specifically against the Guard and other violent organizations, Vaida-Voevod passed laws limiting political freedoms and establishing curfews[6] (although he allowed the Transylvanian Saxons to form Sturmabteilung units which targeted Jews).[1] Vaida was in turn attacked by the Guardist press as a "Freemason", even though, Vaida claimed, his attachment to the Lodge was purely formal and instrumental.[7] Another accusation brought up against Vaida was his partnership in Jewish-owned businesses, in particular the Marmorosch Blank Bank.[8]

Rival politicians such as Armand Călinescu[9] and Victor Moldovan[10] regarded Vaida as a man who secretly cultivated the Guard and refrained from intensifying persecution. By that moment, Vaida had emerged as the leader of a distinct, radical-right, faction of the PNȚ. He backed the increasingly authoritarian King Carol II, while the moderates, under Iuliu Maniu, supported liberal democracy, calling the right-wing "extra-constitutional".[11] For his part, Vaida wanted the group purged of remnants from the old Peasants' Party.[12] Writing at the time, the left-wing radical journalist Petre Constantinescu-Iași claimed that the conflict also reflected differences in global orientation: Maniu's Francophile support base against Vaida's AngloGermanophilia. The latter, he proposed, was aiming for "the complete, vigorous and definitive, fascization" of Romania.[13] However, Vaida viewed himself as a moderate Francophile, merely critical of his country's "subservience to France"; he also rejected the League of Nations as a "spawn of the Jews". Overall, he declared his sympathy for André Tardieu and his French conservatism.[14]

By November 1933, the two wings of the PNȚ were fighting each other out in the open, notably so at a riot in Sibiu.[15] The king openly encouraged such dissent, hoping to weaken his rivals, but also finding that Vaida-Voevod's politics were largely compatible with his own.[16] Nevertheless, the government found it hard to tackle the effects of the Great Depression, and was brutal in its handling of the Grivița workers' strike.[17] The growing rift inside the government party, but also evidence of the Prime Minister's complicity with the Guard, caused additional dissatisfaction among sections of the electorate.[18] The cabinet ultimately fell when the PNȚ's left-wing published a pamphlet against the king, which the latter used as a pretext for demanding Vaida-Voevod's resignation.[19]

The National Liberal Party (PNL), imposing itself on the king with the threat of "civic resistance",[20] was returned to power, and Gheorghe Tătărescu became Prime Minister. In late 1933, Tătărescu was replaced with PNL colleague Ion G. Duca, who organized a clampdown against the Guard and was assassinated by one of its death squads. In the wake of the killing, Vaida-Voevod spoke favorably of Iron Guard men who were on trial for sedition.[21] Tătărescu returned at the helm of a new cabinet, despite Vaida's hopes that the king would prefer an alliance of the far-right parties, including his own faction.[22]


Vaida's dissidence was immediately useful for the king: it absorbed Maniu's attention and toned down PNȚ attempts to restore the constitutional order.[23] According to historian Petre Țurlea, Vaida was "supported by the king, though not as much as he would have liked".[24] Increasingly marginalized by his party colleagues, in January 1934 Vaida announced that he would not resign, but "waited to be thrown out". He also threatened that his ouster would com with "fireworks".[25] His lead was followed by Viorel Tilea and Eduard Mirto, both of whom attacked Maniu in private conversations of public speeches.[26] During February, the various PNȚ factions made a final attempt at reconciliation, with their leaders meeting at Bistrița.[27]

Over the following months, Vaida tested Maniu's resolve by instigating another conflict in Timiș-Torontal County. Supported by the PNȚ newspaper Țara, he fought for the local party presidency against Maniu's favorite, Sever Bocu.[28] Vaida was able to win the seat in June, but, at a September summit in Sovata, the PNȚ decided to depose him.[29] Attempting to regain control of the electoral base, Vaida took up radicalism in the social sphere as well, promising peasants that he would bring about a new land reform.[30] These policies got him expelled from the PNȚ in early 1935, leaving that party to be controlled by left-wing agrarianists.[31]

The "xenophobic and antidemocratic",[32] "antisemitic radical right-wing",[33] Romanian Front was born from this split. It began to function in April 1935 (officially: on March 12), declaring itself ready to serve the king's wishes, and counting on support from traditional PNȚ voters to become the catch-all far-right group.[34] By mid March, when his speech at Oradea drew in an "immense attendance", Vaida-Voevod had organized "separate Vaidist sections" in 60 counties.[35] The split exasperated other PNȚ wings, and resulted in more clashes: the National Peasantist paramilitary guard, or Voinici, staged an attack on Vaida's newspaper, Gazeta Transilvaniei.[36] By 1937, the Front had set up another Transylvanian newspaper, called Ofensiva Română and published from Cluj.[37] Vaidists took over the PNȚ newspaper of Constanța, Aurora Dobrogei, and founded their own regional organs: Basarabia Creștină (Chișinău), Biruința (Botoșani), and Chemarea Noastră (Ismail).[38] At Piatra Neamț, N. Borș put out the affiliate paper Frontul Românesc Neamț.[39]

The new party included Vaida's two sons, Aurel and Mircea, alongside Tilea, Sever Dan, Virgil Potârcă, and Voicu Nițescu.[40] Gheorghe Mironescu (himself a former PNȚ prime minister) became a founding member on March 15, 1935, when he published an open letter supporting Vaida. The PNȚ then shunned him as an enemy of "peasant democracy".[41] A while after, the FR registered in its ranks a prominent PNL defector, Constantin Angelescu.[42] A wave of disgruntled PNȚ cadres also signed up for the FR, including Mirto,[43][44] Aurel Vlad, D. R. Ioanițescu, and Gheorghe Ionescu-Sisești.[45] The Orăștie chapter, organized by Vlad, included the nationalist priest Ioan Moța.[46] Other PNȚ colleagues from Vaida's native Transylvania also joined the FR; major figures include Emil Hațieganu, Dionisie Roman, Gavril Iuga, and Teodor Bohățiel.[47] The Front's branch in Brașov County, supervised by Nițescu, also had Valeriu Braniște among its members.[48]

On April 20, the FR established its own group in the lower chamber. On that day, five deputies of the Peasants' Party–Lupu, including Ioan Modreanu of Someș, Mihai Isăcescu of Constanța, and Alex. D. Rotta of Cetatea Albă, affiliated with "Vaidism".[49] Other members of note were Savian Bădulescu (former Mayor of Bucharest), Coriolan Baltă, Ion Buzdugan, Romulus Cândea, and Ioan Gr. Periețeanu.[50] The Front's section in Dolj was established by a former PNȚ deputy, Nicolae C. Iovipale.[51] The FR was soon joined by professors such as George Moroianu and Mihai Șerban,[52] and had an active cell at the University of Iași, under Petre Dragomirescu.[53] Overall, in the academic world, some 10 professionals rallied with the FR. This was ahead of the Guard, but well below other parties on the right.[54]

Vaidism and fascism

The Front's spokesman, Ioan Alexandru Bran-Lemeny, declared the party to be pragmatic rather than ideological, noting that it did not deal in "abstraction"—and that Maniu's belief in the "peasant state" was a "hybrid, unworkable construct".[55] One of the main points of FR policy was Vaida-Voevod's idea of minority quotas, which he termed the numerus Valachicus: the share in economy and culture "in proportion to [the Romanians'] ethnic number."[56] The party program called for establishing a "really (biologically) national state", the "national organic State" (which "must be a Constitutional Monarchy"), with "the abolition of all class war".[57] Vaida claimed that he was merely fulfilling his old agenda, arguing that, in places such as the Banat Romanians could only find employment doing menial labor.[58] According to calculations by the Front's press, Jews and Hungarians were overrepresented in the liquor business, noting that, although Romanians made up a majority of retailers, their suppliers were still largely non-Romanian.[39] Proclaiming that "capital and labour must be subservient to the superior object of the Nation", the party proposed "the selection of the best elements among the children of the race" to take place within the school system.[59] The program also emphasized that "there must be no policy of hatred towards the minorities", adding: "an end must be put to the privileged situation resulting from the past."[60]

Numerus Valachicus replicated Guardist tactics, but did so in a positive discrimination manner, one not ostensibly antisemitic.[61] Within the FR itself, Potârcă objected to Vaida's ideas on the matter, viewing them as exaggerated.[62] When bar associations began voting their own "Romanianization", the FR's Iovipale criticized a complete purge, proposing that up to 4% of the legal practices could still go to non-Romanians.[51] As noted at the time by Vaida's rival, Constantin Argetoianu, the issue of enforced discrimination was paradoxical, since minorities were largely absent from the state apparatus; introducing quotas would have meant "opening up such careers to a significant number of Jews." That practical matter did not dissuade the "scoundrels of our cities", "the Jew-eaters and extollers of racism", from campaigning around the concept.[63]

Overall, radical antisemites were reserved about the proposal. The Iron Guard's "Captain", Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, wrote that: "if Vaida was ever antisemitic, he was one of the old school".[12] During that interval, the Guard's intellectuals also gave mixed reactions to the FR's antisemitic program. Sociologist Traian Brăileanu cautiously commended the FR for wanting to break away from "kike imperialism" and "kike finance",[64] while philosopher Nae Ionescu referred to the numerus Valachicus as "a platform for agitation, not at all a political program."[65]

The FR is often assumed to have been insincere or vague about its political radicalism. Analysts have dubbed it a "semi-fascist"[66] or "profascist"[67] party, one undecided about whether to support a fully-fledged dictatorship or a milder "national democracy".[68] The group was otherwise compatible with the Iron Guard: both were seen by Guard sympathizer Petre Țuțea as exponents of the "revolutionary right", destined to blend together into "a single party or a state party."[69] As noted by his colleague Mihail Sebastian, Ionescu took part in agitating for Vaida, and argued that the Front's alliance with the Guard and their common victory over Tătărescu were still inevitable.[70] Monarchist writer Ion Sân-Giorgiu claimed that Ionescu was sponsoring the FR with money that ultimately originated in Nazi Germany, and actively trying to create tensions between Vaida and Carol.[24] Allegedly, Ionescu also intervened to save the FR's Mirto when the latter was found to be running a smuggling business.[44]

Vaida, who declared publicly that he had in him "a spark from Hitler's soul",[1] imitated Italian fascism, Nazism, and the Guard itself at a primarily visual and declarative level. The FR had a command structure that led from the authoritarian party leader to the low-ranking members (recruited into watches, centuriae, and legions), and a political uniform consisting of black shirts.[71] From June 1935, the Front's chapter in Constanța County also had a youth paramilitary wing, called Panduri (in honor of the Wallachian rebels).[72] Bran-Lemeny acknowledged that his group disapproved of "some methods employed by German national-socialism", but challenged his adversaries to note that fascism and Nazism were more economically efficient.[73] The party program dictated that elections were the cause of Romania's political problems, and therefore operated on the "authoritative criterion", including the nomination of the party elite "by the supreme leader"; the cadres were only entrusted with "deepening the penetration of the ideology [...] among the masses".[74]

Vaida also stated his radical anticommunism which, as historian Armin Heinen writes, "clashed bizarrely with the actual insignificance of the Communist Party."[75] Communists such as Constantinescu-Iași reciprocated the sentiment, calling the FR part of the "black warmongers' bloc" and of "the fascist peril".[76] The FR was also castigated by the left-wing essayist Constantin Prisnea, who argued that Guardism and Vaidism were "duping the youth with 'ideology', which is nothing other than the very demolition of Romanian cultural values".[77] By contrast, lawyer Mircea Lepădătescu, who was a leading FR cadre in Dolj, maintained contacts with Marxist study circles and defended communist Ana Pauker during her 1936 trial at Craiova.[78]

Nationalist Bloc

Despite official backing and circumstantial supporters, the Front failed to prosper, and was always a "frail party".[79] As noted by Heinen: "Within just a few weeks, it became clear that Vaida could not fulfill the hopes invested in him [by the king]."[80] On May 15, 1935, an FR meeting at Vox Hall in Bucharest gathered some 5,000 spectators, though, reportedly, many of them were delegated by the Iron Guard.[81] The first electoral test was a by-election in Prahova, where the FR only managed 6,000 votes, well below the PNL and PNȚ.[82] In the June by-elections for the Senate seat at Mehedinți, Vaida himself obtained less than 3,000 votes.[83] One contributing factor was that Premier Tătărescu himself introduced some laws implicitly aimed against the Jewish community, whilst also seeking to deliberately contain the FR and other radical groups.[84] The FR could still boast a strong presence in Guardist-dominated regions such as Câmpulung Moldovenesc, where its senator, Dumitru Tinu, ran a successful consumer cooperative.[85]

In early 1935, Vaida was interested in toning down the perception of his party as a Carlist puppet. For this reason, he negotiated a rapprochement with the anti-Carol Constitutional Front, formed by Gheorghe Brătianu and Alexandru Averescu. Reportedly, in April 1935 Vaida had asked that the king's influential mistress, Elena Lupescu, be forced into exile, although his colleague Mirto was still widely perceived as a member of Lupescu's camarilla.[86] The National Agrarian Party (PNA), headed by Vaida's old rival Octavian Goga, also approached the Front with offers of alliance or merger. Reportedly, Goga offered to fuse his group into the FR, only demanding the position of Vice President; Vaida refused, since he had promised that role to Vlad.[87]

The FR's wish to create a "strong nationalist pole" also drove it into negotiations with Carlist supporters on the extreme right. Its first partners were the antisemitic National-Christian Defense League (LANC), in particular its youth wing, and a more minor Iron Guard splinter group, the Crusade of Romanianism.[88] However, the FR and the LANC were irreconcilable over Vaida's numerus Valachicus doctrines. The League's senior president, A. C. Cuza, wrote at the time that Vaida's system of quotas, "instead of signifying the defense of Romanian elements, will bring about the complete extinction of [our] ideal, 'Romania for the Romanians'."[89] Around August 1935, the Front was reportedly negotiating a merger with Ion V. Emilian's "Fire Swastika", which had broken out of the LANC.[90] Vaida's antisemitic ideology also won him the endorsement of the Romanian National Socialists, who were led by Ștefan Tătărescu, brother of the Premier.[91]

Clashes with the PNȚ were still reported during that interval: in October 1935, the Sighet home of a Vaidist was reportedly attacked by a PNȚ crew under Ilie Lazăr. Shots were fired during the scuffle, leaving Lazăr wounded in the arm.[92] By then, the FR was negotiating an alliance with the more powerful National Christian Party (PNC), which had resulted, with Carol's blessing, from the LANC's merger with the PNA. Together, the PNC and the FR established a Nationalist Bloc,[36] the second-largest coalition in Parliament (after the PNL's). The PNC leader, Goga, welcomed Vaida as a fellow combatant "for the national cause."[93] Nevertheless, the alliance saw PNC activists such as Nichifor Crainic, whose radical ethnocratic program was rejected by Vaida-Voevod, leaving in protest.[94] By November 1935, Maniu and the PNȚ had grown fearful of this rapprochement, noting that it could produce an electoral sweep by "the right".[95] The FR soon began merger talks with the PNC, but these exposed other fundamental disagreements between the two sides. Reportedly, Vaida was upset by the PNC's foreign policy, which openly celebrated revanchism and German re-armament.[96]

Carol was enthusiastic about the promised merger, which he hoped would give him a "strong party of the right" to control.[97] In early January 1936, Vaida announced that the merger was no longer being sought, and also that the FR would not field candidates in any partial elections scheduled for that year; demoralized by what he saw as Carol's machinations, he declared his intention to withdraw from politics.[98] Despite renewed efforts by the king,[99] a complete merger between the two parties again failed to materialize, and, to the Guard's stated satisfaction, both the PNC and the FR experienced major internal dissension.[100] At that stage, the FR moved closer to the Guard. Vaida was a guest of honor at the Guard's student congress, held at Târgu Mureș in March.[101] During May, Vaida and Mironescu had private meetings with the Guard, hoping to persuade its leaders to renounce extreme violence.[102] Contrarily, in his interviews with Carol, Vaida voiced his praise toward the Guard, while shunning the PNC. He and Carol agreed that the Guardists needed to be coaxed and kept away from reaching an understanding with Maniu.[103]

1937 elections

A reshuffled Tătărescu government took over in mid 1936. According to the regional journal Viața Ardealului, summer 1936 was a "period of stagnation" for the FR and "the nationalist current as a whole". The Front was still "sure of its destiny", but "organizing in depth" and keeping secret about it.[104] During the following months, Vaida and Angelescu advanced the notion of a PNȚ–FR reconciliation, arguing that it could successfully bring down the PNL cabinet.[105] One other option, advanced by Carol and journalist Pamfil Șeicaru, was for the FR to join efforts with the hard-left Radical Peasants' Party.[106] For its part, the FR continued to highlight his appreciation for Nazism. In June 1936, following the Rhineland crisis, L'Humanité reported that the "racist parties" (the Front, the Iron Guard and the PNC) staged a march outside the French embassy in Bucharest, with chants of "Long live Hitler!"[107] Speaking at Oradea in October, Vaida saluted both Axis powers. According to Vaida, the Locarno Treaties were naturally obsolete, and Germany was right to ignore them; however, he cautioned that Romania needed to obtain reassurances of territorial integrity from both Germany and France.[108]

On September 8, the FR and PNC had agreed on another collaboration, and presented a single list for the local elections of that year.[109] Over the following months, the FR was effectively marginalized: in March 1937, Tătărescu banned the FR's black insignia and uniforms, alongside those of other paramilitary movements (including the Guard and the PNC).[110] The Front continued to be identified by its main electoral logo, "two concentric circles with a single dot at the center", under which it ran in the local elections of June. Called "target" or "wheel" in party documents, it symbolized Greater Romania as an outside circle, and, within, "the belt strap tightening around The Black Dot, namely the xenophile".[111] According to Gazeta Transilvaniei, this symbol was poorly understood by illiterate sympathizers, who mistakenly voted with the PNȚ's circle (which had been intensely popularized by Ioanițescu before his defection).[112]

Early 1937 saw rumors of a tentative co-operation between Vaida and the PNȚ, which was then chaired by Ion Mihalache. According to various outlets, Vaida had ordered his propagandists to only focus criticism on Maniu, while Tilea mediated between the two parties.[37] Later that year, the two camps were still irreconcilable. The PNȚ boasted several victories in the local elections of June. The National Peasantist press noted that victory came despite a "conspiracy" between government and "right-wing parties" (PNC and FR),[113] and despite an "unhinged" propaganda campaign mounted by the extreme right "united under the Vaidist sign".[114] The FR managed to come second in Ilfov County, with 13,505 of the votes cast.[113]

With the PNȚ ready to assume power, but waiting on the royal prerogative, Carol II ordered it to accept Vaida-Voevod at Internal Affairs. He knew that this request would be ignored, and only hoped to create more rifts between the two currents within the PNȚ.[115] Carol also pressed on for a "cute" merger between the two parties, arguing that both Vaida and Mironescu were essentially Peasantists in their outlook.[116] This intervention renewed the tensions within that group: Armand Călinescu, who had served under Vaida and was close to the king, criticized the party leadership for not sealing a deal with the FR.[117] The deal was accepted in October 1937 by Vaida and Tilea, who reportedly accepted the supremacy of "National-Peasantist ideology".[118] Maniu was also persuaded during secret meetings with Nițescu, describing his break with Vaida as a "temporary" matter.[119] However, during new talks in November, Vaida clarified that he still expected the PNȚ's left to be expelled, and only wanted to absorb the centrists.[120]

The FR was still independent of the PNȚ in December 1937, ahead of the new general election. It registered for this with a new electoral symbol, comprising a rectangle split into solid-white and solid-black halves. The "target" was used by Al. Samoilă's group, the General Union of Small Industrialists.[121] Before the race, the PNȚ had signed its own "non-aggression pact", with the Iron Guard. The FR (having failed in its bid to coalesce with the Guard) ran as an ally of the PNC and the PNL.[122] FR propaganda explained that Vaida's ideas had "corrected" the PNL's stance on various topics, adjusting it to the "stringent necessities of life."[123] Such re-positioning created a new set of tensions between the FR and the Guardists. In Putna County, a local "Vaidist" was physically assaulted after referring to the Guardists as "thieves and criminals", reminding them about the Duca assassination.[124]

Another tangible consequence of the PNL pact was that the National Liberals stripped Jews from their electoral lists, on Vaida's request.[125] At the time, the Front's antisemitic discourse became more explicit, with Vaida asking that Romania be "deloused" of its Jews, slated for mass deportation to Mandatory Palestine.[126] Also joining this pact was the Nazi-influenced German Party, brought into it by a separate understanding with Vaida. The two agreed to run on a "nationally oriented" platform, against communism.[127]

In some respects, the pact was a failure. Vaida himself explained to his colleagues that it did not represent a real collaboration, and that the FR agenda remained intact—although, as Argetoianu writes, the nationalist current was "in shambles".[128] Hațieganu and other Transylvanians quit the Front, calling it a "mockery"[47] and a "sold-over".[129] Upon being reintegrated by the PNȚ's regional committee, Hațieganu declared Vaida to be a "great man, but one who errs".[130] As noted by Heinen, the deal was only apparently lucrative for the PNL: the FR had registered significant gains in local elections, but the extra votes came from members of the Guard, as the latter had opted not to put up candidates of its own.[131] Some of the FR's electorate refused to vote for the PNL, and Jewish National Liberal supporters were also largely alienated.[132]


Following indecisive results, Carol used his prerogative to call in a PNC minority government, under Goga. This act surprised Vaida, who was sure that no explicitly antisemitic party would ever be let into government by Carol.[133] Since he had been overlooked by Carol, he reportedly resumed his negotiations with Maniu, and proposed himself as chairman of the reunified PNȚ. In parallel, he agreed to collaborate with the PNC, but asked that he lead the coalition cabinet; this was rejected by Goga.[134] Goga also courted the Guard, but was swiftly refused, which led to campaigns of violence on both sides.[135] During its brief period in government, the PNC modified the electoral law to limit representation for smaller parties, hoping to attract the FR into a merger; Vaida refused, but Ioanițescu agreed, bringing the entire Old Kingdom sections of the FR under Goga's control.[136] The pact also created tensions within the PNC itself, since it required Goga's followers to also accept reconciliation with Potârcă. As a consequence, PNC radicals staged an anti-Potârcă riot in Craiova.[62] Goga also changed provisions regarding electoral symbols, assigning each party a number of dots, which were to be the only visual identifier. This became another topic of contention between the PNȚ, which initially had five points, and the FR, which had four.[137]

In January 1938, the PNȚ newspaper Facla reported that "the Vaidist party" had lost all credit with the public, and was "morally supporting" the PNC. According to the same source, the FR's fripturiști ("parasites") were pressing Vaida to accept complete merger.[138] Vaida's cooperation with Goga ended abruptly on January 15, when the former withdrew parliamentary support, noting that Goga "endangers the true nationalist principles."[139] Eventually, in February, Carol toppled Goga and set up a government of his choice, under Miron Cristea. Six former FR politicos, beginning with Ioanițescu, became ministers of that cabinet.[140] The FR's strategists proposed to Carol that he outlaw all parties that were not explicitly monarchist; among their competitors, Călinescu proposed that these be merged into a single-party system. Vaida examined the option and remained a skeptic, since he believed Romanians were essentially unruly and too "Byzantine" to accept discipline and a unified command.[141] In the end, both the FR and PNC were officially subsumed by the National Renaissance Front (FRN) when Carol chose in favor of Călinescu's more dictatorial project.[142] Formal disestablishment came on March 30, 1938.[143]

In one of its final manifestos, penned by Nițescu, the FR had noted that Germany could not be trusted to guarantee Romania's borders, and that the "old alliances and friendships", including the Little Entente, still worked best for Romania. Nițescu also noted that solving the "Jewish question" could be done without German intrusion, and that antisemitism was important to the FR only as a facet of its "anti-alienism".[144] With the FRN takeover, Tilea became Carol's ambassador in the United Kingdom, trying to salvage the British–Romanian alliance in the face of German encroachment. During an international incident March 1939, he warned that Germany would invade and carve-up Romania.[145] "Vaidists" were still acknowledged as an "intermediary group", or distinct FRN faction, during the sham elections of June 1939, though Călinescu took pains to prevent their interference with the electoral process.[146] Upon validation, Vaida became Chamber President, helping to pass legislation that introduced protectionism and banned workers' strikes.[147] From January 1940, he was also FRN Chairman.[148] In private, he derided this arrangement, noting that "renaissance" was a misnomer: "all the old politicians are today eminences of the Front."[149]

In contrast to Tilea, Vaida accepted Nazi demands and, in 1940, acknowledged the loss of Northern Transylvania to Hungary. Almost uniquely among Carol's advisers, he also recommended a population exchange.[150] The FR's former leadership took different paths during the later stages of World War II. In late 1940, the FRN regime was replaced by the Iron Guard's National Legionary State, which was aligned with Nazism. Tilea refused to return home, and organized a pro-Allied Romanian lobby in London.[151] Vaida remained in Romania during the interval. He was arrested after the pro-Allied coup of 1944, and died in March 1950 while under house arrest in Sibiu.[147] By then, Potârcă had emerged as a spokesman of the former FR, leading some of its members back into the PNȚ.[152]

During the election of 1946, Mirto was allowed into the communist-run Bloc of Democratic Parties,[153] while Potârcă became one of its prominent critics.[152] After 1948, a communist regime proceeded to investigate and imprison various other figures associated with the FR. After having returned into PNȚ ranks, Vlad was arrested and sent to Sighet prison, where he died in July 1953.[154][155] Potârcă was tortured and died in similar circumstances the following year;[156] Hațieganu and Sever Dan were also held at Sighet, but both survived.[154] While Buzdugan evaded arrest by going into hiding,[157] Iovipale spent time in Pitești prison, and died while on probation in 1964.[51] By contrast, his colleague Lepădătescu was promoted to high office within the Securitate, and helped to prosecute National Peasantist opponents of the regime.[158]


  1. 1 2 3 (in Romanian) Adrian Niculescu, "O lecție a istoriei (II)", in Observator Cultural, Nr. 72, July 2001
  2. Final Report, p. 30; Ornea, pp. 273, 397, 416
  3. Berți, pp. 147–148; Heinen, pp. 85, 185
  4. Butaru, pp. 223, 224, 230–231
  5. Butaru, p. 169; Eaton, p. 43; Heinen, pp. 185–186, 238; Ornea, pp. 291, 293, 294–296; Veiga, pp. 117, 126, 138, 201–202
  6. Clark, pp. 113, 115; Heinen, pp. 146, 206–208, 218–219; Ornea, pp. 294–295, 297; Veiga, pp. 190–192; Webb, p. 145
  7. Ornea, pp. 243, 245
  8. Moldovan, pp. 232, 282, 321–322, 326–327
  9. Călinescu & Savu, pp. 163, 189
  10. Moldovan, p. 257
  11. Heinen, p. 146
  12. 1 2 Berți, p. 148
  13. Constantinescu-Iași, pp. 265–266
  14. Călinescu & Savu, pp. 298–299
  15. Moldova, p. 322; Veiga, p. 197
  16. Berți, pp. 144–147, 149; Butaru, pp. 304, 307; Heinen, pp. 220–221, 234–235, 242, 245; Veiga, pp. 129–131, 191–192
  17. Călinescu & Savu, pp. 92–94, 136–148; Heinen, pp. 146, 206, 221; Moldovan, pp. 257, 283–305; Veiga, pp. 140–141, 152, 156
  18. Heinen, pp. 146–147, 218–221, 232, 234–235, 444
  19. Veiga, p. 192
  20. Heinen, p. 220
  21. Clark, p. 119; Eaton, p. 28; Heinen, pp. 186, 238; Veiga, pp. 201–202
  22. Berți, pp. 149–150; Bruja (2010), p. 83; Heinen, p. 274. See also Călinescu & Savu, p. 294
  23. Țurlea, pp. 179–182
  24. 1 2 Țurlea, p. 182
  25. Călinescu & Savu, p. 243
  26. Călinescu & Savu, pp. 241–243
  27. Moldovan, pp. 306–307
  28. Munteanu, pp. 54, 79–80, 102–103, 105–106, 189–190
  29. Munteanu, p. 105
  30. Călinescu & Savu, p. 244
  31. Berți, p. 148–151; Boia, pp. 58, 85–86; Heinen, pp. 156–157, 242, 246, 273; Ornea, p. 273; Veiga, p. 215
  32. Berți, p. 144
  33. Iván T. Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, p. 335. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001. ISBN 0-520-22901-0
  34. Heinen, pp. 247–250, 273
  35. "Conferințele d-lui Alex. Vaida-Voevod", in Renașterea. Organ Național-Bisericesc Săptămânal, Issue 12/1935, p. 4
  36. 1 2 Veiga, p. 215
  37. 1 2 "Fuzionează mihalachiștii cu vaidiștii? Șefii spun că nu – ziarele că da...", in Granița. Ziar Politic Național-Liberal, Issue 10/1937, p. 2
  38. Ileana-Stanca Desa, Elena Ioana Mălușanu, Cornelia Luminița Radu, Iuliana Sulică, Publicațiile periodice românești (ziare, gazete, reviste). Vol. V: Catalog alfabetic 1930–1935, pp. 77, 92, 106, 267. Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 2009. ISBN 978-973-27-1828-5
  39. 1 2 "Frontul Românesc Neamț; Comerțul cu băuturi spirtoase (Glasul cifrelor)", in Avântul, Issue 133, April 26, 1935, p. 3
  40. Moldovan, pp. 231, 321. See also Călinescu & Savu, p. 250
  41. Călinescu & Savu, p. 250
  42. Politics and Political Parties..., p. 185; Berți, p. 152; Moldovan, p. 321
  43. Politics and Political Parties..., p. 489
  44. 1 2 Ionuț Butoi, "'Tânăra generație' în haine de funcționar. Cazul Mircea Vulcănescu", in Anuarul Institutului de Istorie George Barițiu din Cluj-Napoca. Series Humanistica, Vol. XII, 2014, p. 10
  45. Berți, pp. 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152
  46. "Marea manifestație a Frontului românesc la Orăștie", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 41/1935, p. 1
  47. 1 2 (in Romanian) Marin Pop, "Emil Hațieganu, deputat al circumscripției electorale Hida", in Caiete Silvane, June 2015
  48. "Ratificarea acordului electoral cu guvernul. Intrunirea Delegației permanente a organizației 'Frontului Românesc'—Brașov", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 91/1937, p. 1
  49. "Din Parlament. Actualii deputați, foști 'lupiști', urmează politica d-lui Vaida", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 31/1931, p. 1
  50. Politics and Political Parties..., pp. 404, 405, 419, 420, 505
  51. 1 2 3 Pătrașcu, p. 154
  52. Politics and Political Parties..., pp. 491, 530
  53. Nastasă, pp. 557, 563–564
  54. Boia, p. 99
  55. Ioan Alexandru Bran-Lemeny, "Aventură?! Diversiune?!", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 59/1935, p. 4
  56. Eaton, p. 44
  57. Politics and Political Parties..., p. 184
  58. Berți, p. 150
  59. Politics and Political Parties..., p. 185
  60. Politics and Political Parties..., p. 186
  61. Berți, pp. 144–145, 146, 147–148, 150, 152; Heinen, pp. 242, 249, 273, 298. See also Politics and Political Parties..., pp. 82, 181–186; Butaru, p. 293; Nastasă, pp. 92, 557; Sebastian, p. 7; Volovici, p. 52
  62. 1 2 Rădulescu, p. 64
  63. Pătrașcu, p. 149
  64. Traian Brăileanu, Sociologia și arta guvernării. Articole politice, p. 99. Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1940
  65. Sebastian, p. 7
  66. Webb, p. 145
  67. Volovici, p. 52
  68. Heinen, pp. 249, 276, 452. See also Berți, p. 150
  69. Boia, p. 58–59
  70. Sebastian, pp. 7–8
  71. Heinen, p. 249
  72. "Pandurii la Constanța", in Aurora Dobrogei, Issue 4/1935, p. 2
  73. Ioan Alexandru Bran-Lemeny, "Renaștere sau anchilozare!", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 31/1931, p. 4
  74. Politics and Political Parties..., pp. 179–180
  75. Heinen, p. 452
  76. Constantinescu-Iași, p. 348
  77. "Însemnări. Tineretul pe calea cea bună", in Țara de Mâine, Issues 3–4/1935, p. 65
  78. Pătrașcu, p. 190
  79. Veiga, p. 248
  80. Heinen, p. 242
  81. Călinescu & Savu, p. 254
  82. Călinescu & Savu, p. 252
  83. Heinen, p. 273
  84. Final Report, pp. 30–31; Heinen, p. 298
  85. Bruja (2010), p. 88
  86. Țurlea, pp. 184–185, 203
  87. Netea, pp. 253–254
  88. Bruja (2010), p. 83
  89. Horia Bozdoghină, "Liga Apărării Naționale Creștine și problema minorităților în anii '30", in Vasile Ciobanu, Sorin Radu (eds.), Partide politice și minorități naționale din România în secolul XX, Vol. IV, p. 147. Sibiu: TechnoMedia, 2009. ISBN 978-606-8030-53-1
  90. Nichifor Crainic, "Corespondență Nichifor Crainic — A. C. Cuza. 'Ce-a fost cuzismul de când există...'", in Magazin Istoric, September 1995, p. 50
  91. "Kin of Premier Joins Roumanian Drive on Jews", in The American Jewish Outlook, March 15, 1935, p. 4
  92. "Bubuie tunurile... Iar la noi un deputat cade împușcat pe fondul politicei de partid", in Isus Biruitorul. Foaie Săptămânală, Întocmită de Preotul Iosif Trifa, Issue 44/1935, p. 8
  93. Berți, p. 151
  94. Ornea, pp. 246, 258
  95. Călinescu & Savu, p. 270
  96. Călinescu & Savu, pp. 275–277, 279–280
  97. Călinescu & Savu, p. 287
  98. Călinescu & Savu, pp. 279, 282
  99. Călinescu & Savu, pp. 279–28, 287
  100. Heinen, p. 283
  101. Țurlea, pp. 193–195
  102. Călinescu & Savu, pp. 300–301
  103. Călinescu & Savu, p. 299
  104. "Situația politică. Sincopa naționalistă", in Viața Ardealului, Vol. III, Issue 22, July 1936, p. 4
  105. Călinescu & Savu, pp. 325–327, 328–329
  106. Călinescu & Savu, pp. 277, 325
  107. "Du Monde entier. En Roumanie. Après l'échec raciste de Bucarest", in L'Humanité, June 1, 1936, p. 3
  108. "La Dernière heure. La politique extérieure roumaine. Un discours de M. Vaïda Voïvode", in Le Petit Parisien, October 19, 1936, p. 3
  109. "Le regroupement des forces d'extrême droite en Roumanie", in L'Humanité, September 9, 1936, p. 3
  110. "En Rumanía ya no se pueden usar más que camisas grises", in Acción, Issue 580/1937, p. 2; Clark, pp. 184–185
  111. Radu, p. 584
  112. Radu, p. 577
  113. 1 2 "Victorii național-țărăniste în alegerile din Dolj, Ilfov, Argeș, Romanați și Dâmbovița", in Românul. Organ al Partidului Național-Țărănesc din Jud. Arad, Issue 1/1937, p. 3
  114. Pop (2017), p. 144
  115. Berți, p. 152; Butaru, p. 304; Gheorghe & Șerbu, p. 237; Heinen, p. 391; Netea, pp. 233–234; Ornea, pp. 311–312; Pop (2017), p. 144
  116. Călinescu & Savu, pp. 349–350, 354–359
  117. Călinescu & Savu, pp. 344, 349–350, 365–371; Heinen, p. 324
  118. Călinescu & Savu, p. 355
  119. (in Romanian) Andreea Vilcovschi, "Iuliu Maniu a fost urmărit de Serviciul Secret de Informații, la ordinul Regelui Carol al II-lea. Ce informații furniza Corpul Detectivilor în radiotelegrame", in Adevărul (Zalău edition), February 10, 2017
  120. Călinescu & Savu, p. 359
  121. See list published alongside N. Papatansiu, "Războiul electoral", in Realitatea Ilustrată, Issue 569, December 1937, p. 6
  122. Argetoianu & Stănescu, pp. 61–63; Călinescu & Savu, pp. 359, 369; Heinen, pp. 249, 322–326, 331, 337, 384; Netea, pp. 209, 234; Pop (2017), pp. 144–147; Veiga, pp. 234–235
  123. "Frontul Românesc în Basarabia", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 7/1937, p. 4
  124. Gheorghe Miron, "Aspecte privind Mișcarea Legionară din Vrancea în perioada interbelică", in Cronica Vrancei, Vol. IV, 2003, p. 181
  125. Heinen, p. 322
  126. Volovici, p. 55
  127. Mihai Adrian Panu, "Reprezentarea politică a minorității germane în Banatul interbelic", in Vasile Ciobanu, Sorin Radu (eds.), Partide politice și minorități naționale din România în secolul XX, Vol. V, p. 125. Sibiu: TechnoMedia, 2010. ISBN 978-606-8030-84-5
  128. Argetoianu & Stănescu, p. 62
  129. Netea, p. 234
  130. Pop (2017), pp. 146–147
  131. Heinen, pp. 320, 331
  132. Heinen, pp. 331–332, 384
  133. Butaru, pp. 270–271
  134. Argetoianu & Stănescu, p. 70
  135. Clark, pp. 229–230; Heinen, pp. 335–345, 448–449; Ornea, pp. 312–313
  136. Heinen, pp. 335–336. See also Netea, pp. 235, 257
  137. "Cum stă lumea și țara. In plină luptă electorală", in Unirea Poporului, Issue 5/1938, p. 4
  138. Al. Gh. Savu, "Din cronica moravurilor politice trecute: fripturismul", in Magazin Istoric, August 1970, p. 83
  139. "Nouvelles breves. À l'étranger. Le Front roumain contre M. Goga", in L'Homme Libre, January 15, 1938, p. 2
  140. Berți, p. 152. See also Moldovan, p. 328
  141. Bruja (2004), p. 235
  142. Bruja (2004), passim; Moldovan, pp. 328–329, 333, 349; Veiga, pp. 247–248; Webb, pp. 152–153
  143. Gheorghe & Șerbu, p. 220
  144. Voicu Nițescu, "Păstrarea țării e unica noastră grije [sic]. Politica noastră în afară", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 10/1938, pp. 1–2
  145. Denis Fabian, "România și inițiativa politică a Marii Britanii pentru crearea unui sistem de securitate colectivă în primăvara anului 1939", in Studia Universitatis Moldaviae, Issue 4, 2007, pp. 12–14
  146. Florin Grecu, "'Campania electorală' din mai 1939; mecanisme, proceduri și comportament electoral", in Sfera Politicii, Vol. XX, Issue 3, May–June 2012, p. 137
  147. 1 2 Gheorghe & Șerbu, p. 229
  148. Gheorghe & Șerbu, p. 228; Moldovan, pp. 333, 349, 359–363
  149. Bruja (2004), p. 237
  150. Netea, pp. 103, 106, 175
  151. Nicolae C. Rațiu, "Prefață", in Ion Rațiu, Jurnal. Volumul I: Începuturile unui exil îndelungat 1940—1954, pp. 14–17. Bucharest: Editura Corint, 2017. ISBN 606-793-118-1 Parameter error in {{isbn}}: Invalid ISBN.
  152. 1 2 Rădulescu, p. 65
  153. Răzvan Victor Pantelimon, "'Unitatea politică a clasei muncitoare': agitație și propagandă în Ialomița, 1944–1948", in Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, Vol. V, Issue 3, 2005, p. 701
  154. 1 2 (in Romanian) Romulus Rusan, "Elitele Unirii exterminate în închisori", in Revista 22, Nr. 977, November–December 2008
  155. Gheorghe & Șerbu, pp. 198, 200–201
  156. Rădulescu, pp. 65–66
  157. C. D. Zeletin, "Taina poetului Ion Buzdugan", in Metaliteratură, Vol. 12, Issues 1–2, 2012, p. 41
  158. Pătrașcu, pp. 190–191


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