English Defence League

English Defence League
Abbreviation EDL
Motto In hoc signo vinces (in this sign you will conquer)
Formation 27 June 2009 (2009-06-27)
Type Far-right[1]
New social movement[2]
Social movement organisation[2]
Purpose Anti-Islamism[3]
English nationalism[5]
  • Originated in Luton, England
Leader Tim Ablitt[7]
Key people
Alan Lake[8][9][10]
Tommy Robinson (2009–13)
Kevin Carroll (2009–13)
Paul Ray (2009)
Website englishdefenceleague.org.uk

The English Defence League (EDL) is a far-right, counter-jihadist organisation in the United Kingdom. A social movement and pressure group that employs street demonstrations as its main tactic, the EDL presents itself as a single-issue movement opposed to Islamism and Islamic extremism, although its rhetoric and actions target Islam and Muslims more widely. Founded in 2009, its heyday lasted until 2011, after which it entered a decline. It is presently chaired by Tim Ablitt.

The EDL was founded in London in 2009; Tommy Robinson, a former member of the British National Party (BNP), soon became its de facto leader. It coalesced around protests organised by various football hooligan firms to oppose the presence of the small Salafi Islamist group Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah in Luton, Bedfordshire. The organisation grew swiftly, holding demonstrations against Islamism across England and often clashing with anti-fascist protesters from Unite Against Fascism and other groups, who deemed it a racist organisation victimising British Muslims. The EDL also established a strong social media presence on Facebook and YouTube. Moving towards electoral politics, it established formal links with the far-right British Freedom Party, a breakaway from the BNP. The EDL's reputation was damaged in 2011 after supporters were arrested plotting to bomb mosques and links were revealed with Norwegian far-right mass murderer Anders Breivik. In 2013 Robinson—supported by the Quilliam think tank—left the group; he claimed it had become too extreme, and established the rival Pegida UK. Following his departure, the group's membership heavily declined and it began to fragment into smaller, regional organisations.

Ideologically positioned on the extreme or far-right of British politics, the EDL is part of a broader international counter-jihadi movement. Officially, the EDL presents itself as being opposed to Islamism, Islamic extremism, and jihadism, although its rhetoric repeatedly conflates these with Islam and Muslims more broadly. Rejecting the idea that Muslims can truly be English, the EDL presents Islam as intolerant, primitive, and a threat to Western society. Political scientists and other commentators have characterised this stance as Islamophobic and culturally racist. Both online and at demonstrations, EDL members have incited violence against Muslims, with supporters carrying out violent acts both at demonstrations and independently. The EDL's broader ideology features nationalism and populism, blaming a perceived decline in English culture on high immigration rates and an uncaring political elite. Although many of its leaders were previously members of fascist organisations and part of its membership supported fascist parties, the EDL itself was not ideologically fascist, and distinguished itself from Britain's traditional far-right by rejecting biological racism, anti-Semitism, and homophobia.

Lacking official membership, the EDL was controlled by a small leadership team but decentralised among over 90 local and thematic divisions. Its support base consisted primarily of young, working-class white British men, some from established far-right and football hooligan subcultures. Polls indicated that most UK citizens opposed the EDL, and the group was repeatedly challenged by anti-fascist groups. Many local councils and police forces discouraged EDL marches, citing the high financial cost of policing them, the disruptive influence on community harmony, and the damage caused to counter-terrorism operations.


In the early 21st century, Muslims were Britain's second largest and fastest growing religious group; according to the 2011 census, 2.7 million people in England and Wales described themselves as Muslim, representing 4.8% of the total population.[11] At the same time, Muslims became the main scapegoat for far-right groups across Western society.[12] In Britain, this was partly because prejudices against Jews and Afro-Caribbean people—both communities the far-right previously used as social scapegoats—were increasingly socially unacceptable.[13] In the latter half of the 20th century, British Muslims who faced racist abuse had usually been targeted not because they were Muslims but because they were South Asians (particularly from India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh); they faced the "Paki-bashing" that also targeted Hindus and Sikhs.[14] By the 21st century, British Muslims were increasingly targeted because they were Muslim, including by members of other ethnic minorities in the country.[14]

The fascist British National Party (BNP) was most successful at exploiting growing hostility against Muslims. It launched an overt anti-Muslim campaign in 2000, which gained momentum after Salafi jihadi Muslims perpetrated the 2001 September 11 attacks in the United States and then the 7 July 2005 London bombings. This resulted in growing electoral success for the BNP; it secured a seat on the London Assembly in 2008 and two seats at the European Parliament in 2010.[15] By 2011, this support had declined, with the party losing many of its local council seats;[16] however, as noted by the political scientist Chris Allen, the BNP had "extended the frontier of the far right in British politics", creating an environment the English Defence League would capitalise on.[17]

Foundation: 2009

The town of Luton in Bedfordshire—which had a Muslim population of around 18%—had a history of radical Islamist recruitment.[18] On 10 March 2009, the small, extreme British Salafi Islamist group Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah demonstrated in the town to protest against the Royal Anglian Regiment's homecoming parade following their posting in Afghanistan.[19] The demonstration was a deliberately provocative publicity stunt, and had been disowned by representatives from Luton's Islamic communities.[2] Protesters held signs stating "Anglian Soldiers: Butchers of Basra", "Anglian Soldiers: Cowards, Killers, Extremists", and "British Government Terrorist Government".[20] The small protest attracted media attention, generating anger that the authorities had given permission and police protection to Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah's demonstration.[20]

A former regiment member, James Yeomans, organised a counter-protest called "Respect Our Troops" for 28 March.[21] After local anti-Islamist blogger Paul "Lionheart" Ray publicised the event online, various self-described "anti-jihadist" far-right groups originating within the football hooligan firm scene—including the Welsh Defence League (WDL) and the March for England (MfE)—announced their intention to attend.[22] Fearing the far-right would hijack his event, Yeomans cancelled it.[23] In its place, Ray organised an "anti-jihadist" march for St. George's Day, led by the newly founded United People of Luton (UPL), although this was broken up by police. The UPL organised a second demonstration for 24 May, titled "Ban the Terrorists"; this again resulted in disorder, with police making several arrests.[24] A related group was Casuals United, founded by established football hooligan Jeff Marsh;[25] their website used the tagline "One Nation, One Enemy, One Firm", reflecting the group's desire to unite rival football firms in opposition to what it called the "Islamification" of Britain.[26]

It was from this environment that the English Defence League was officially formed on 27 June 2009.[27] Ray claimed to have been its founder, describing how the EDL united the UPL with other "anti-jihadist" groups from around England.[28] Its creation reflected what Roger Eatwell termed "cumulative extremism", whereby the "activities of one extremist group trigger the formation of another".[29] The EDL took its name from that of the Welsh Defence League; its founders also considered the name "British Defence League", but rejected this as being too similar to that of the British National Party.[30] The EDL's foundation was accompanied by an impromptu protest outside the East London Mosque in Whitechapel, which police quickly dispersed.[31] The following week the group picketed an event in Wood Green, North London organised by Salafi Islamist preacher Anjem Choudary and his Islam4UK group.[32] Its first major public appearance to attract attention was in August, when the EDL and Casuals United held a joint protest in Birmingham prompted by Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah's conversion of an eleven-year-old white boy in that city.[33] Ray distanced himself from that event, arguing that the chosen date—8 August—was a deliberate reference to 88, a code for HH (Heil Hitler), in neo-Nazi circles.[34]

Not long after the group's formation, Ray formed a sub-group, the St. George Division; this broke from the EDL soon after, when Ray emigrated.[35] This left the way for Tommy Robinson to become the EDL's de facto leader.[35] A former BNP member with multiple criminal convictions for assault,[36] Robinson's real name was Stephen Yaxley-Lennon; he borrowed the pseudonym from the head of a Luton football hooligan firm who had written several books about hooliganism.[37] Robinson was clearly spoken and articulate, able to present his views in an assured and eloquent way during television interviews and other encounters with the media.[38] According to the political scientist Joel Busher, Robinson was "a high-energy, fast-talking, all action character whose combination of swagger, self-deprecation and derring-do helped make him a popular figurehead within the movement."[39] Ray was critical of his successor, and—from his new base in Malta—posted videos to YouTube in which he threatened to retake control of the EDL. These threats came to nothing.[40]

Robinson's right hand man was his cousin, Kevin Carroll, also a former BNP member with a criminal conviction;[41] Carroll was the first of the pair to attract national attention, appearing on the BBC documentary Young, British and Angry.[39] Another senior member was the multimillionaire IT consultant and fundamentalist Christian Alan Ayling, who used the pseudonym Alan Lake;[42] allegations have been made, but not substantiated, that Lake was the group's primary financier, providing it with millions of pounds.[43][44] Lake never become a visible figure in the movement and few members knew his name;[45] however, it was at Lake's flat in London's Barbican area that Ray, Robinson, and Ann Marchini had discussed the EDL's formation in May 2009.[46]

Growth: 2010–2013

If it were not for the inaction of the government in dealing properly with this form of Islamic fascism, there would be no need for groups such as The English Defence League, Welsh Defence League, Scottish Defence League and Ulster Defence League to counter this threat on the streets and on-line … Our movement is purely set up to pressure whatever government we have in power to deal with this menace and undo all the damage caused by apathy and appeasement.

— Statement on the EDL website[47]

Following the BNP's decline as a serious electoral force,[48] the EDL's profile rose dramatically.[26] The group portrayed itself as a necessary response to public frustration at the government's inaction in dealing with what the EDL initially termed "extremist Muslim preachers and organisations".[26] It claimed that Englishness had been marginalised throughout England, as evidence citing the fact that some state schools only supplied halal meat in their meals, that some schools had stopped celebrating Nativity plays at Christmas time, and that some local authorities had ceased flying the flag of St George.[26]

The group focused on organising demonstrations; between 2009 and 2015, it held an average of between ten and fifteen demonstrations per year, attracting crowds of between 100 and 3000.[49] It faced opposition from anti-fascist groups and media commentators, who described it as a "racist", "far right", and "extreme right" outfit, terms rejected by the group.[39] Many of its demonstrations were met by counter-protests organised by anti-fascist groups, particularly Unite Against Fascism,[50] and sometimes also by Islamic groups.[51] In turn, the EDL targeted left-wing groups.[52] In December 2010, Robinson threatened action against student anti-fee protesters, while in 2011 the EDL harassed Occupy anti-capitalist protesters in London.[52] During the 2011 England riots, contingents of EDL members mobilised in largely white areas of Outer London like Enfield and Eltham, claiming that they were there to "defend" them from rioters;[53] these also resulted in clashes with police,[54] and in one incident EDL members attacked a bus primarily carrying black youths.[55]

From its origins, the EDL built a strong presence online;[56] by mid-2011, the EDL's Facebook group had 90,000 members.[41] In March 2010 it launched the first of its specialist divisions, the LGBT Division, after realising that gay individuals had attended its events but not under a unified banner.[57] This was followed in May by the launch of its Jewish Division.[57] In January 2012, Robinson expressed a wish to expand the EDL into a wider European Defence League.[58] Most of the local EDL divisions also had their own Facebook pages.[59]

The EDL developed links with the British Freedom Party (BFP), a BNP breakaway founded in October 2010. The BFP was led by Eddy Butler, who had previously made an unsuccessful attempt to oust the BNP leader Nick Griffin.[60] The BFP wanted to move closer to mainstream politics by de-emphasizing the BNP's biological racism and imitating European right-wing groups like the Dutch Party for Freedom.[61] In May 2012, it was announced that Robinson and Carroll would join the BFP's executive council as joint vice chairs, cementing links between the BFP and the EDL.[62] Robinson soon resigned from this position, citing a desire to focus on the EDL, although critics suggested that this may have been to shield the BFP from criminal proceedings he then faced.[63] In 2012, Carroll stood for election in the Police and Crime Commissioner elections.[64] In January 2013, BFP leader Paul Weston resigned from the party, leaving Carroll in charge of it.[63] The BFP did poorly at a series of local elections, failing to gain sufficient votes to have its deposits returned, before the Electoral Commission deregistered it for failing to correctly register as a political party.[63] Among the EDL grassroots, there had been much opposition to association with the BFP; many feared that it would damage the EDL's reputation or stressed their desire to be part of a street movement rather than a political party.[65] The EDL subsequently established links with another BNP breakaway group; in February 2013, it provided a security force for an event by the far-right British Democratic Party (BDP), which was founded by Andrew Brons, who had previously represented the BNP at the European Parliament.[66]

The EDL began to lose momentum in 2011.[67] A range of factors contributed to this, including regional rivalries between different divisions, a resurgence of sectarian enmities between members of rival football firms, and personal squabbles.[67] By early 2011, several divisions in northern England were referring to themselves as "the Infidels", expressing an increasingly separate identity from the EDL.[68] A former EDL regional organiser, John "Snowy" Shaw, attracted support from various northern groups and accused Robinson and Carroll of financial impropriety.[69] At a February 2011 EDL rally in Blackburn, Shaw's supporters violently clashed with Robinson's;[70] in September 2011, Robinson was convicted of assaulting a fellow EDL member at that rally.[71] Robinson's criminal record prevented him from legally entering the U.S., and in September 2011 he sought to do so using someone else's passport. He was caught and returned to Britain; in January 2013 he was convicted of breaching the Identity Documents Act 2010 and imprisoned for ten months.[72][73] Robinson's imprisonment coincided with Carroll's bail conditions which legally barred him from contacting fellow EDL members; this left the organisation without its co-leaders for part of 2012.[64]

The EDL was further damaged after it was revealed that it had links to Anders Breivik, the Norwegian far-right activist who carried out a series of bombing and shooting attacks in July 2011, killing 77 people. He was affiliated with the EDL's Norwegian sister organisation, the Norwegian Defence League, and stated that he had "more than 600 EDL members as Facebook friends and have spoken with tens [sic] of EDL members and leaders".[66] Breivik described EDL co-founder Ray as his "mentor",[41] having been in communication with him since 2002.[74] Four months before his attack, Breivik posted on the EDL website, describing them as an "inspiration" and "a blessing to all in Europe".[75] Online, he described having attended an EDL rally in Bradford.[76] Robinson denied any EDL links with Breivik and deplored the killings;[77] however, after Breivik was convicted, some EDL members praised his actions.[78] In July 2011, Interpol requested Maltese police investigate Ray due to his links with Breivik.[79][80] In December 2011, two EDL supporters—one a serving soldier in the British military—were convicted of plotting to bomb a mosque in Stoke-on-Trent.[60][81]

Decline: 2013–present

By early 2013, commentators believed that the EDL had entered a decline, reflected in the declining number of individuals attending its events, Robinson's imprisonment, and its failure to enter electoral politics.[48] Groups which had closely allied to the EDL, such as Casuals United and March for England, began to reassert their individual identities.[67] Splinter groups appeared, among them the North West Infidels, North East Infidels, South East Alliance and Combined Ex-Forces.[82] Some of these, such as the North West Infidels and South East Alliance, adopted more extreme perspectives, cooperating with the fascist National Front and making reference to the white supremacist 14 words slogan on their social media.[67] Other activists moved away from the EDL to focus on campaigning for Brexit, the UK's exit from the European Union.[67] It is possible that the electoral growth of the right-wing UK Independence Party (UKIP) in this period also contributed to the EDL's decline, with many EDL supporters finding it easier to vote for UKIP than physically attend EDL events.[83] In April 2013, the EDL leadership requested that members use tactical voting to benefit UKIP; the latter responded by distancing themselves from the EDL.[84]

The EDL experienced a brief resurgence in its fortunes after the killing of Lee Rigby by Islamist militants in southeast London in May 2013.[85] The group tripled its number of Facebook followers in the 24 hours after the incident,[86] and organised several flash demonstrations.[66] At one such event, Robinson told members that "What you saw today [i.e. Rigby's killing] is Islam. Everyone's had enough."[86] On 27 May, the EDL held a demonstration in central London that attracted a thousand participants;[38] another taking place in central Birmingham in July attracted several hundred.[38]

On 8 October 2013, Robinson and Carroll announced that they were leaving the EDL following meetings with the think tank Quilliam. Robinson said that street protests were "no longer effective" and "acknowledged the dangers of far-right extremism". He stated his intention to continue to combat extremism by forming a new party. Both Robinson and Carroll had been taking lessons in Islam from a Quilliam member, Usama Hasan, and stated their intent to train in lobbying institutions.[87][88][89] Quilliam had given Robinson £8000 to facilitate his departure;[90] it hoped that in doing so it would "decapitate" the EDL and generate its downfall.[91] There was much anger among the EDL grassroots at Robinson's departure, with many members regarding him as a traitor.[92] A meeting of the group's regional organisers led to the EDL's adoption of a new system of collective leadership, through which the 19 regional organisers formed a governing committee with a rotating chair.[93] The first to take on this role was Tim Ablitt;[94][95] in February 2014 he was succeeded by Steve Eddowes;[93] and in December 2015 by Ian Crossland, with the grassroots having been given a voice in his selection through an online vote.[96]

Although the EDL had declined, the sentiments that fed into it—especially anger at immigration and Islam—remained widespread in white working-class communities across Britain.[97] Other far-right groups emerged to claim the space in British society that it left vacant; these had often been influenced by the EDL and its tactics.[98] Many smaller, more regionally focused groups had splintered from the group.[99] Another far-right group, Britain First, sought to court disenchanted EDL members.[93] Britain First and the EDL had been mutually hostile,[100] although like the EDL, Britain First utilised street protests, organising what it called "Christian patrols" through areas with Islamic communities,[67] as well as "mosque invasions" in which members marched into mosques to disrupt proceedings.[101] In December 2015, Robinson launched another anti-Islam street movement, Pegida UK, with fellow far-right activist Anne Marie Waters.[102]


Political scientists identified the EDL as existing on the far-right of the left-right political spectrum.[1] Some academics used the terms "right-wing extremism",[103] and "extreme right" to characterise it,[99] while the sociologist Kevin Braouezec described it as one of the "new far-right extremist movements".[104] In various respects, it resembled other far-right groups,[105] particularly those that emerged across Europe in the early 21st century.[106] As noted by Chris Allen, the EDL is nevertheless "not a direct product of the traditional far-right milieu" in Britain,[107] differing from other groups in its willingness to reach out to communities that the far-right historically discriminates against, namely Jews, people of colour, and LGBT people.[105] The criminologists James Treadwell and Jon Garland suggested that the EDL reflected "both a continuation of and a departure from traditional far-right activity",[108] while Paul Jackson—a historian of the far-right—referred to it as part of the "new far right", a movement that presents itself as being more moderate than older far-right groups.[109]

[D]espite its claims to the contrary, there is much prima face evidence to place the EDL on the more radical fringes of the political right. This ranges from its populist, nationalist agenda; to its condemnation of leftwing figures on its various blogs and websites; to its strong associations with the US Tea Party movement; to its support for international far right figures, such as Geert Wilders. Moreover[…], key EDL figures, such as Steven Yaxley‐Lennon and Kevin Carroll, have historic links with the British National Party (BNP). Finally[…], extreme right‐wing movements, such as the Aryan Strike Force, have found the EDL a useful host organisation.

— Historian of the far right Paul Jackson[110]

Ideologically, the EDL was not wholly clear; it had no specific policies, goals, or manifesto, and no intellectual vanguard to lead it.[111]The political scientist Julian Richards suggested that one of the reasons that the EDL should be categorised as far-right was because of the way that many of its members acted, in contrast to what the group officially stated in its public pronouncements.[112] He observed that "There is no doubt that a considerable number of people with basic Far Right sentiments, including a general dislike of foreigners and ethnic minorities and a sympathy for Nazi movements and ideas can be found in and around the EDL."[112] From its early days, members of far-right political parties like the NF and BNP attended the EDL's demonstrations,[113] while a 2011 survey found that more EDL members intended to vote BNP than for any other party.[114] Although concurring that the EDL was ideologically on the far-right of the political spectrum, the political scientists George Kassimeris and Leonie Jackson cautioned on the need to avoid blurring "the official ideology" of the EDL with the views of its supporters.[115]

The EDL itself disavows the label "far-right",[116] as do many other groups within the counter-jihad movement.[117] On its website, the EDL described itself as being "non-political, taking no position on right-wing vs. left-wing. We welcome members from all over the political spectrum, and with varying views on foreign policy, united against Islamic extremism and its influence on British life."[118] Its online material nevertheless often condemns left-wingers,[110] and members regularly complain about what they see as "stupid lefties" who disagree with the EDL's views.[119] When examining the EDL's public statements, Jackson cautioned against automatically taking them at face value; as he noted, far-right groups typically present "front stage" messages for public consumption which conceal more aggressive views that are expressed in private.[120]

The EDL has also been characterised as being populist in ideology because of its claims to represent "ordinary people" against the liberal elites which it accuses of controlling the country.[121] Some research suggests that many EDL supporters bore more hatred for mainstream politicians than for Muslims themselves.[122] After her fieldwork with the group, the ethnographer Hilary Pilkington suggested that rather than referring to them as "far right", the EDL would be better classified as being part of the "populist radical right", a term earlier developed by the political scientist Cas Mudde.[123] Based on their research among EDL members, Simon Winlow, Steve Hall, and James Treadwell argued that the EDL should also be seen "unequivocally, [as] a working-class political movement" due to the makeup of its membership.[124] In addition, they observed that it was "a fringe political group cut adrift from mainstream politics".[125]

Anti-Islamism and Islamophobia

Despite its fragile and sporadic existence, [the EDL] maintains core principles founded on a dissatisfaction with immigration policies and a desire to mobilise against the spread of what it sees as the hostile alien culture of radical Islamism. It hopes to defend the interests of the native population from the perceived threats posed by immigrants, multiculturalism and what it imagines to be the growing power and paramilitary forms of the Muslim faith in England.

— Simon Winlow, Steve Hall, and James Treadwell on the EDL[126]

The EDL is part of a broader self-described counter-jihad movement which was found internationally.[127] The political scientist Hilary Aked defined counter-jihadism as "a section of the far-right distinguished by its hostility to migrants, Muslims and Islam."[128] Another political scientist, Matthew Goodwin, noted that the counter-jihad movement was "united by their belief that Islam and Muslims are posing a fundamental threat to the resources, identities and even survival of Western states", and that counter-jihad groups were "more confrontational, chaotic and unpredictable than traditional anti-immigrant and ethnic nationalist movements in Western democracies".[129]

Pilkington characterised the EDL as being an "anti-Islamist movement",[3] although noted that despite this, "there is slippage at movement level, and among individual supporters, into a broader anti-Islam or anti-Muslim position".[130] Officially, the EDL stated that it only opposed certain types of Islam and certain types of Muslim,[131] commenting that it opposed the "Islamic extremist" but not the "ordinary Muslim".[132] Some of the group's rhetoric singles out specific members of the Islamic community, such as "preachers of hate", "vile specimens", and "Muslim extremists", as being the problem which it opposes.[133] This distinction is also drawn by many of the EDL's activists.[134]

In contrast to this official distinction, in its rhetoric the EDL regularly failed to make a differentiation between certain types of Islam and Islam as a whole, or between a certain subset of Muslims and Muslims as a whole.[135] On its website, the two are often conflated: a 2011 article stated that "The sheer number of cases of Islamic extremism should suggest... that the problem should not be seen as being with a sub-sect of Islam that no one can really define... but as a problem with Islam itself."[136] Whether this blurring of Islam as a whole with "extreme" elements within it is intentional or not, it is likely that many of those encountering the EDL's rhetoric and being influenced by it were not able to appreciate any such distinction.[131] Research among the EDL's grassroots has found that many supporters also did not draw such a distinction between different forms of Islam or different types of Muslim but viewed them homogenously.[137]

In the EDL's discourse, a binary is constructed between Western culture and Islamic culture, the former presented as being tolerant and progressive while the latter is depicted as intolerant and backward.[138] Islam is perceived as being anachronistic, having failed to adapt to the modern world;[139] EDL members regularly referred to it as an "ideology" or a "cult" rather than a "religion."[140] Like other right-wing populist groups across Europe, the EDL present Muslims as a cultural threat to European nations who are intrinsically culturally incompatible with European societies.[99] In this, it evoked Samuel P. Huntington's notion of the Clash of Civilizations,[47] while also the echoing the idea promoted by Salafi Islamist militant groups like Al Qaeda that the Western and Islamic worlds are fundamentally at conflict.[47] Although the EDL promotes a multi-racial concept of the English nation, its rhetoric explicitly distinguishes Muslims and Islam as being apart from this national group.[141] For the EDL, a Muslim cannot be truly English.,[142] and the idea of an English Muslim or a British Muslim are not considered acceptable identities.[143]

Islam is not just a religious system, but a political and social ideology that seeks to dominate all non‐believers and impose a harsh legal system that rejects democratic accountability and human rights. It runs counter to all that we hold dear within our British liberal democracy.

— In the EDL mission statement[142]

EDL members characterise Islam as a threat to Western culture, presenting it as a misogynistic, homophobic, and dangerous force,[144] one which is discriminatory, intolerant, and hateful towards non-Muslims.[145] Muslims themselves are presented in EDL discourse as being associated not just with the oppression of women, Jews, and gay people, but also with terrorism, rape, paedophilia, and incest.[138] The caricature of the Muslim in the EDL's discourse is similar to the anti-Semitic caricature of the Jew promoted in Nazi Germany.[146] The EDL consistently associated Muslims with negative behaviour and blames this upon Islam itself, believing that Islamic doctrine provides both the motive and the justification for such activities.[147] The EDL selectively quotes from the Qur'an to identify passages which it claims Muslims use as justification for their anti-social and criminal behaviour.[136] The EDL's Facebook page shared news stories about Islam and Muslims from various parts of the media which depicted Muslims in a negative light,[148] while EDL members often engage in confirmation bias, believing any negative claims about Muslims that they hear—whether they are true or not—because it fits within their pre-accepted worldview in which Muslims are seen as inherently immoral and dangerous.[146]

In the view of EDL members, Muslims would always protect their own while believing that non-Muslims were fair game for abuse and exploitation.[149] EDL supporters thought that Muslims failed to show respect to non-Muslims, whom Muslims regard as "infidels";[150] in turn, various EDL figures openly referred to themselves as "infidels" and the term was emblazoned on some EDL merchandise.[151] Various EDL members recalled incidents in which Muslims had been disrespectful towards them or to British and English culture more broadly. For instance, members cited instances in which Islamist activists campaigning against British military activities abroad had burned remembrance poppies; for the EDL, this was an incredibly disrespectful act towards the British people.[150] Other EDL members described more personal encounters. One woman for example described how she painted the flag of St George on her face in preparation for an England football match, but that when she got onto the bus, the Muslim bus driver refused to let her on, stating that her display of the flag offended him. For her, this event was a catalyst for joining the EDL.[152]

Islamophobia and cultural racism

The English Defence League employed a culturally racist discourse of Islamophobia. Racist discourse construction involves the demarcation of an in-group and an out-group, where the in-group considers itself superior and claims the right to decide who can belong, and the out-group is represented as threatening its privileges and position. EDL discourse performed this function by racialising Muslim culture as the source of Muslim behaviour and conferring the role of arbiters of acceptability to culturally superior non-Muslims.

— Political scientists George Kassimeris and Leonie Jackson[153]

Although there is little consensus as to how Islamophobia should be defined,[154] a range of scholars to have studied the EDL have characterised it as an Islamophobic organisation.[4] Allen noted that "The EDL is creating and perpetuating meanings about Muslims and Islam, whether real or imaginary, accurate or inaccurate, representative or misrepresentative, that are clearly ideologically Islamophobic."[131] As he noted, the EDL's presentation of all Muslims without distinction as the "irrefutable Other" was "clearly Islamophobic".[105] Similarly, Kassimeris and Jackson stated that in presenting non-Muslims as the "in-group" and Muslims as the "out-group" and then trying to "exclude Muslims from the national community" in Britain, the EDL were Islamophobic.[155]

The EDL rejects the idea that it is Islamophobic.[156] In a statement it declared that "the English Defence League do not 'fear' Islam, we do not have a 'phobia' about Islam, we just realise the very serious threat it poses".[157] In defining Islamophobia as a phobia or an affected prejudice—a definition rejected by the majority of academics and activists employing the term—the EDL seek to dismiss the concept itself as nonsense.[158] On its website, it stated that the biggest threat to Muslims is not "Islamophobia" but the "extremism that thrives in the Muslim community" itself, including "the embrace of violent and anti-democratic means, the intolerance, the separatism, the attacks on homosexuals and Jews, the hatred of 'the West', and the continued hosting of radical preachers."[159]

Various political scientists and other academic observers describe the EDL's Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism,[160] or the "new racism" described by Martin Baker in the early 1980s.[161] This emphasis on cultural racism—which entails stereotyping a group on the basis of cultural (as opposed to biological) features and presenting them as having a "culturally 'fixed' set of values" which are dangerous, inferior, and diametrically opposed to the cultural values of "the national community"—was a recurring trait among many of the "new far right" groups active in Europe, and differentiated them from earlier far right groups which tended to adopt biological racism.[13] The EDL rejected the idea that its stance on Muslims could be racist, stating that "Islam is not a race".[67] Conversely, EDL members have referred to Muslims as racist; one member was quoted as saying "people say we're racist but, when you think about it, they're [i.e. Muslims] the ones that's racist. They're killing white people just because they're white. They're killing Christians because they're Christian. It's them that's declared a holy war. We are just reacting."[162]

Hatred of Muslims

On the basis of their fieldwork among EDL supporters, Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell noted that all of those whom they encountered expressed hatred of Muslims.[122] Many placed this hatred in relation to local issues and personal experiences; for instance, being poorly treated by an Asian shopkeeper was regarded by EDL members as evidence that Muslims intrinsically hate the white working class.[163] Instances when Muslims have been friendly toward them are treated as evidence that Muslims are conniving, appearing friendly to white non-Muslims so as to catch them off guard.[149] EDL members expressed anger at what they perceived as the wealth that Muslims displayed, in contrast to their own strained economic situation, as well as the fact that Muslim migrants received council housing and benefits which EDL members believed they had not earned;[164] among EDL members there was a widespread belief that the welfare system should only be available for native Britons and not migrants.[165] EDL supporters expressed criticism of the perceived ruthless entrepreneurship of Muslims, including the way that they profited off of the white working-class through charging high prices in their shops, also alleging that Muslims regularly avoided paying tax and that they always helped other Muslims get ahead of the white British population.[166] EDL members also expressed anger at what they regarded as Muslim involvement in drug dealing and other crimes impacting their communities.[167] For many EDL members, the intimidating and threatening atmosphere that they believed Muslim individuals and gangs had created in their local areas was seen as a more direct problem than Islamic terrorism.[168]

A topic of particular anger was the role of men from Muslim backgrounds in grooming gangs that largely targeted underage white girls.[169] For instance, in highlighting that men from Islamic cultural backgrounds were disproportionately represented in the Rochdale and West Midlands child sex grooming scandals, the EDL claimed that these men had found justification for their actions in Qur'anic references to non-Muslims being inferior and thus acceptable targets for Muslims.[170] They also believed that Muslims could legitimate such actions by reference to the fact that Islam's founder, Muhammad, married one of his wives, Aisha, when she was still a child.[171] Such claims were made despite the absence of evidence that these sex offenders claimed "Islamic supremacism" as justification for their actions; it also ignores the fact that according to Crown Prosecution Service figures, 85% of sex offenders in the UK are white men.[136] In instances where white paedophiles and sex offenders, such as Jimmy Savile, were exposed, EDL members were still angry about the situation but regarded the perpetrator's ethnicity or religion as irrelevant, a firm contrast to their response when the perpetrators were of Muslim background.[172] Pilkington found EDL members who believed that white paedophiles and sex offenders were treated more harshly than their Muslim counterparts; one contrasted how Savile was widely reviled in Britain while Muhammad—whom EDL members typically considered a paedophile due to his marriage to Aisha—was revered.[145]

Online, supporters expressed comments that were derogatory of Islam as a whole, such as "Islam is a sick vile evil primitive barbaric cult that needs wiping from the earth."[173] Academic fieldwork among EDL members found a range of derogatory comments about Muslims; one was for instance quoted as stating that "They can't live like us cos they are not evolved for it, they are simple, made for backward villages in the mountain where they can sit around eating stinking curries and raping chickens."[174] On the EDL's social media platform, many supporters have incited violence against Muslims. Comments include the likes of: "we need to kill", "time to get violent", "Kill any muslim u see [sic]", "Kill the curry munching bastards", and "Petrol bomb your nearest mosque".[144] Chants during rallies have included "We hate all Muslims",[38] "Die, Muslim, die",[38] "Give me a gun and I'll shoot the Muzzie scum",[175] "I hate Pakis more than you",[155] and "Burn our poppies and we'll burn your mosques".[176] Such sentiments are also found among its ethnic minority supporters; Guramit Singh, the head of the EDL's Sikh Division, stated that Muslims will end up "burning in fucking hell";[177] he was also filmed at an EDL event privately stating that "I fucking hate the Pakis. India needs to go to war with Pakistan."[178]

Views on terrorism, extremism, and shariah

The EDL claimed that Britain's Islamic community does not speak out against Islamic extremism or terrorism and that as such it is giving implicit support for such ideas.[179] It also alleged that British Muslims spend more time complaining about discrimination they that face and attacking those who criticise Islam rather than rooting out and eliminating extremism within their own ranks.[179] On its website, the EDL posed the question: "We're always told that this silent majority [of Muslims] reject extremism, but if that is the case then why are they so silent?"[180] Because of this, the EDL alleges that the British Muslim community's commitment to "British values" is questionable.[179] The perception that "moderate" Muslims do little or nothing to counter "extremism" was also widespread among the group's grassroots.[181] In making this accusation, the EDL ignores the many examples in which Islamic groups have spoken out and actively campaigned against extremism and terrorism.[182] In repeatedly presenting extremism as the "dominant characteristic" of Muslim communities, Jackson noted, the EDL promotes "a major distortion of reality."[142]

EDL discourse repeatedly refers to what it calls "Islamic supremacism", the belief that Muslims express a superiority complex over non-Muslims.[183] The building of new mosques was for instance interpreted as an Islamic desire to symbolically dominate Britain.[184] It similarly feared that Muslims had imperialistic designs over Britain, desiring to dominate it,[185] and that this would be facilitated through higher birth rates among Muslims in contrast to non-Muslims in Britain.[140] Robinson for instance stated that "20 years down the line we'll be overrun by Islam",[131] while EDL rhetoric refers to Muslims "spreading across our country" and besieging the "patriotic people" of England.[133] Muslim attempts to participate in political life were portrayed by the EDL as entryism, an attempt to expand the Islamic influence within the British political system.[186]

Th EDL claimed that the greater the reach of Islam in the UK, the more that non-Muslims would be victimised and discriminated against.[183] Meadowcroft and Morrow attended a Wolverhampton EDL meet-and-greet event where the local division leader stated that he was a member of the group "for my children and grandchildren because I don't want them to be taken to mosques as part of their school excursions and I don't want to see my granddaughter wearing a burqa or being punished for wearing a short skirt."[187] Similarly, Richards quoted one young woman at a 2010 group protest in Dudley as saying that she was taking part because "I don't want my daughters to grow up having to wear the burqa."[188] EDL members cite the burqa and niqab as being intimidating towards non-Muslims, degrading to women, and facilitating the concealment of criminals and terrorists.[189]

The EDL claim that Muslims are seeking to impose sharia law on British and wider Western society.[190] The group generalises sharia as a uniform set of rules, ignoring the fact that it represents a diverse and often contradictory range of approaches to Islamic jurisprudence.[120] In opposing sharia, which it regards as inherently misogynistic, the EDL positions itself as the defenders of women,[191] employing the slogan "EDL Angels [i.e. women] stand beside their men, not behind them".[192] Reflecting its rejection of traditional Islamic attitudes to womanhood, many of the women in attendance at EDL events consciously embrace the image of the "slut" who engages in binge drinking and who can present themselves as "one of the lads", engaging in similarly raucous and violent behaviour as their male counterparts.[193] An alternate presentation of women in the EDL is as "angels", with the EDL's women's division being called the EDL Angels.[194] In this imagery, Western women are presented as being angelic in contrast to the stereotype of the burqa-clad Muslim woman.[194] EDL members have expressed support for the French ban on face covering introduced in 2010.[195] The EDL has also emphasised the cruelty of halal slaughter techniques, presenting them as being crueller than kosher slaughter practices.[196] In its "Halal Campaign" launched in 2011, the EDL campaigned against stores and restaurants that sold halal meat without labelling it as such, citing this as evidence that the Islamic community was seeking to impose its practices on the rest of society.[196]

Nationalism and anti-immigration stance

The EDL is staunchly nationalist,[197] with members expressing a strong love of England and describing themselves as patriots.[198] Jackson considered it to be ultra-nationalist,[199] while several academics have argued that the EDL and many of its supporters embrace an ethnic conception of nationalism.[200] Copsey suggested that it was an identitarian form of English nationalism in which a "native English" identity is deployed as the main weapon against Islam.[5] In his view, the desire to protect "Englishness" as a form of "traditional ethno-national dominance" is strong among members.[201] Pilkington argued that although some members expressed nativist sentiment, but that for most members, pride in being English was not the same as the "white pride" expressed by fascist groups like the BNP.[202] The journalist Daniel Trilling nevertheless opined that the EDL's concept of "Englishness" was left ambiguous.[203] Similarly, Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell observed that the EDL's conception of an "English way of life" was "poorly sketched out"; their EDL contacts could not agree on what it constituted, and the only thing that they agreed upon was that Muslims fundamentally rejected it.[204]

The EDL's attitude to nationhood is reflected in such chants as "we want our country back".[205] The EDL's nationalist stance is also reflected in its nomenclature and choice of symbols, which regularly include the cross of St George;[197] its logo, for instance, features the cross of St George on a shield.[118] Such imagery also evokes the symbolism of the medieval Crusades, in which Christian forces battled Islamic powers for control of the Holy Land.[47] The name also reflects a militaristic stance, as did branded clothing with text like "Loyal Footsoldier",[187] while on the EDL discussion board, members regularly referred to the idea of a forthcoming war and often used the martial slogan "NS", an acronym for "No Surrender".[206]

The EDL has also been described as being anti-immigrant in nature.[144] It stated the view that immigration into Britain is too high, and EDL members expressed the belief that the official figures underestimate the real levels of migration into the country.[207] Although the EDL's founding mission statement made no mention of immigration,[208] in February 2014, the EDL stated its intention to add a reference to its opposition to "mass immigration" to their mission statement.[209] In July 2014 an EDL demonstration was held in Hexthorpe, South Yorkshire in opposition to the migration of Roma people to the area.[210]

In private, anti-immigrant sentiments were common among EDL members.[211] EDL members saw immigration as encouraging fierce economic competition, with many migrants willing to work for less that the legal minimum wage and thus outcompeting white British workers for jobs.[212] Pilkington found that at the same time as viewing migrants as economic competition, EDL members also often expressed sympathies for them as individuals seeking a better life for themselves and their families;[213] EDL members typically also distinguished between "good" migrants who worked hard and paid taxes and "bad" migrants who sought to live off of the welfare state.[214] On the EDL's Facebook page, supporters blamed immigration for what they perceived as a decline in the global status of the United Kingdom and claim that immigration has been detrimental to those they regard as the indigenous white British population;[138] Pilkington found that EDL members often saw high rates of immigration as being socially divisive and fundamentally changing the nature of England itself.[214] While accepting the multi-racial of England, EDL members almost uniformly rejected the ideology of multiculturalism,[215] portraying it as something that mainstream politicians have encouraged out of their own fascination for the exoticism of other cultures and out of a desire to be perceived as progressive and cosmopolitan.[216]

Views on race and sexuality

Robinson described the EDL as a 'multicultural organization made up of every community in this country'. If true, this would clearly make the EDL substantially different to anything typically seen in the traditionally 'all white' make-up of what is deemed to be the far right. And, indeed, this is a unique feature of the EDL. Reflecting its origins in football firms, not only does the EDL march behind banners that state 'Black and white unite against Islamic extremism'—it also marches carrying Israeli flags—but a number of those marching are of black, Asian or mixed heritages. Unlike other far-right organizations, the EDL is proud to recognize and proclaim its diversity.

— Political scientist Chris Allen[59]

The EDL claims that it is not a racist organisation,[217] an idea echoed in the protest chant and slogan "Not racist, not violent, just no longer silent".[218] On its website, it described itself as taking an "actively anti-racist and anti-fascist stance".[118] Various EDL divisions also sought to distance themselves from racism. In its code of conduct, the group's Nottingham Division for instance stipulated that "[m]embers who engage in Racial abuse, Racist 'jokes', Explicitly racist conduct (gesticulating… distributing racist publications…)… will be met with the removal of said party/s from the EDL".[144] From her fieldwork with the group, Pilkington found that EDL members adopted a simple and narrow definition of "racism"; they used the term in reference to hatred for another race, believing that racial categories were rooted in biological difference and demarcated by skin colour.[219]

Robinson stated that people of "all races and faiths" were welcome to join the group,[59] and on its website the EDL employed the slogan "Black and White unite: all races and religions are welcome in the EDL".[118] Individuals of Asian, African, and mixed heritage have attended EDL events,[59] albeit in small numbers,[188] and the group formed specific divisions explicitly for Hindu, Sikh, Jewish, Greek and Cypriot, and Pakistani Christian supporters.[220] Pilkington noted that these ethnic minority supporters were often viewed as "trophy" members, with many white members asking to have their photographs taken with them at EDL events.[221]

Pilkington also found that white EDL members were keen to stress that they had friends and family members from ethnic minority backgrounds as a means of countering accusations of racism;[222] many accepted that England was a multi-racial and multi-cultural country and often regarded this as a good thing.[223] She noted that among many EDL members, "lack of racism towards one group is assumed to be evidence of lack of racism against all"; they believed that because they did not hate people of colour, they could not be truly racist, regardless of their prejudicial views of Muslims.[222] For the EDL, the Muslim identity was solely a "religious" one and not at all a "racial" one, and thus in their view prejudice against Muslims could not by definition be "racism".[224]

The establishment of links with non-white communities was not unprecedented among the British far-right, for the BNP had earlier established some links with anti-Islamic elements of the Hindu and Sikh communities, in 2001 issuing an audio cassette titled Islam: A Threat to Us All: A Joint Statement by the British National Party, Sikhs and Hindus.[225] It may also reflect the EDL's heritage in football hooligan subcultures, which had become increasingly welcoming towards black people following the growth of black players in British football teams.[25] At demonstrations however, EDL members have often used explicitly racist language,[226] for instance, footage from a 2010 protest in Stoke City features an EDL protester shouting at a police officer: "You fucking Paki-loving bastard!",[144] while Pilkington observed the chant "If we all hate Pakis, clap your hands" being used at another demonstration.[227] From his fieldwork with the group, Busher noted that use of the racial slur "paki" was common among EDL members in private meetings.[211] Similarly, Pilkington recalled a car journey with several young EDL members who made comments like "dirty Paki" and "fucking filthy cunt" when passing Asians on the street.[227]

The EDL's discourse therefore presents the Muslim community as being uniquely problematic in Britain, juxtaposing it unfavourably with the country's other ethnic and cultural minorities.[147] On its website, it for instance contrasted Muslims with Sikhs, stating that the latter "have shown an impressive willingness to integrate, to accept the laws of the land, and to confront and defeat any form of extremism."[147] A representative of the Sikh Awareness Society spoke at an EDL event, where they noted that no other religious group has a "-phobia" attached to it, thus implying that Muslims were uniquely guilty in doing things that generated prejudice against them.[228] This attitude has also been reported among EDL members;[229] Treadwell and Garland quoted one young male EDL activist as stating that "The Paki, the Muslim, to me is the enemy, they are like everything we are not... [but] Sikhs and Hindus are not cunts, the Indians, they are ok. They are not like Pakis. Pakis are different... They come here to take advantage of us, they sell fucking smack, rob off whites but not their own, force young girls into prostitution. They are fucking scum."[230]

The EDL also officially condemned homophobia and established an LGBT division in March 2010.[220] It stated that "EDL welcomes gay people to join in the struggle to protect our values, especially as gay people would be some of those who suffer most under an islamic [sic] regime."[220] It had initially invited the anti-Islam American pastor Terry Jones—known for burning copies of the Qur'an—to attend one of its Luton demonstrations, but later noted that it withdrew the invitation because it disapproved of Jones' views on sexuality and race, adding that "The EDL is anti-homophobic and we are a non-racism organisation".[231] Allen suggests that the EDL's supportive attitude of the LGBT community marked it out as being different from the "traditional far right" in Britain.[225] This pro-LGBT rights stance has allowed the EDL to criticise what it sees as the left's refusal to confront homophobia within Islam as well as to conflate Islamism with Nazism.[232] Pilkington argued that this pro-LGBT rights stance was not solely a cynical ploy by the EDL's leadership, but reflected widespread views within the movement.[233] She observed gay and transgender members speaking openly at EDL events and receiving a warm reception, while the LGBT rainbow flag was regularly flown at EDL rallies.[234] This was usually carried by the leader of the group's LGBT Division, a gay male teenager who had left the BNP due to its homophobic stance.[235] He acknowledged that some EDL members were homophobic, but that they were tolerated so long as they did not voice such opinions.[232] Pilkington found that homophobic sentiments and comments had been made at EDL events, while neo-Nazi and other more extreme elements who attended EDL events also held strong anti-LGBT views.[233]

Relationship to fascism and neo-Nazism

Various commentators argued that the EDL could not accurately be categorised as fascist.[66] The historian of the far right Nigel Copsey for instance noted that the EDL was not driven by the same "ideological end-goal" held to by neo-fascist and other fascist groups.[236] Unlike fascist groups, the EDL has not expressed a desire for major structural change to the nature of the British state.[126] Various fascist groups have sought to differentiate themselves from the EDL; one white nationalist was quoted as saying that "The EDL—with its jew flag, nignog members, fag rainbow group, Sikh spokesman and sheeple attendees, are the antithesis of White Nationalism."[237] The BNP sought to distance itself from the EDL and declaring it a proscribed organisation; BNP leader Nick Griffin expressed the view that the EDL was being manipulated by Zionists as a false flag operation.[238]

Putting themselves at odds with the view that the EDL was distinctly non-fascist, in 2014 the political scientists Dominic Alessio and Meredith Kristen stipulated that while the EDL could not be labelled "a fascist organization", there was evidence of "a fascist tradition within the ideology of the EDL".[197] They noted that the EDL "embodied" many of the "key characteristics of fascism", adding that it is "the actions and practices of members", rather than "just their words and slogans", which "lend themselves to a more coherently fascist ideology".[240] In arguing their point, they posited that the EDL shared many of the traits common to fascism, such as a staunch nationalism and calls for national rebirth,[197] a propensity for violence,[241] and what they described as the "pronounced anti-democratic and anti-liberal tendencies" of various EDL leaders.[240] They highlighted that much of the group's leadership came directly from the fascist BNP, and that EDL events have been supported by present and former members of a range of British fascist groups, including the National Front, the Racial Volunteer Force, Blood & Honour, and Combat 18.[242] In addition, they stated that the EDL's tactics bore strong similarities with the Italian interwar squadristi, which formed a crucial element of Benito Mussolini's National Fascist Party.[243]

The EDL is not a neo-Nazi organisation,[38] and it has made efforts to distance itself from neo-Nazism.[144] Seeking to emphasise this distance, in an October 2009 publicity stunt for the BBC's show Newsnight, EDL members burned a Nazi flag,[244] while members have carried the Israeli flag during demonstrations,[245] and the organisation created a Jewish division as a means of distinguishing itself from the anti-Semitism that was characteristic of Nazism.[144] However, some of its earliest demonstrations were advertised on the white supremacist website Stormfront,[246] and neo-Nazi and other anti-Semitic elements were present within the group.[144] Various individuals in attendance at EDL events were also members of neo-Nazi groups, such as Liam Pinkham of the British Freedom Fighters and Trevor Hannington and Mike Heaton of the Aryan Strike Force.[144] At EDL rallies, individuals have given the Nazi straight-arm salute,[247] while Holocaust denial sentiments have been presented on the EDL's social media platforms.[38] In 2011, the head of the EDL's Jewish Division, Roberta Moore, left the organisation, citing the existence of neo-Nazi and fascist individuals within the group.[248]

The EDL has sometimes sanctioned those that it regards as having extremist views, to the extent of expelling them from the movement and banning them from events. At an October 2011 London march, one individual was photographed giving a Nazi salute; after this was discovered, EDL activists investigated to determine who the individual was and ban him from future events.[249] In another case, Bill Baker, who was a senior figure in the London EDL and the leader of the English Nationalist Alliance, was ejected in early 2011 after he had made an interview expressing views that the EDL considered racist.[249] At an October 2010 demonstration, Robinson publicly stated: "We're not Nazis, we're not fascists – we will smash Nazis the same way we will smash militant Islam. We are exactly about black and white unite, every single community in this country can come and join our ranks, fill our ranks. We don't care if you arrived here yesterday; you're welcome to protect our Christian culture and our way of life."[250] Pilkington found that this desire to expunge the EDL of neo-Nazi and more extreme elements was not merely a top-down exercise in public relations, but had the popular support and involvement of EDL members more broadly, who were keen to distinguish themselves from neo-Nazis.[251]

Organisation and structure

Academics have characterised the EDL as a social movement,[252] and more specifically as a new social movement.[2] Given its formation around a specific organisation, it has also been categorised as a social movement organisation.[2] In its organisational structure, the EDL has been characterised by academic observers as a direct action or street-based protest movement.[253] It is a pressure group rather than a political party.[254]

Like several other counter-jihad groups operating in other Western countries,[255] the EDL describes itself as a human rights organisation,[256] although this characterisation is not widely accepted among the British public.[257] During fieldwork with the group, Joel Busher found that many EDL members stressed the idea that the group was not a political organisation, instead presenting it as a single-issue protest group or street movement.[258] Busher noted that these individuals were aware of the tactical advantages of doing so, believing that in presenting itself in this manner it could avoid associations with longer established far-right groups like the NF and BNP and with the accusation of racism.[259]

Leadership and branches

Until October 2013, the EDL was based in Luton.[39] The EDL's structure was informal and lacking in any strict hierarchy,[260] while it also lacked any clear leadership.[261] In its early years, the EDL was controlled by a leadership group referred to as the "team" and which were generally secretive about their operations;[262] they often remained anonymous or used pseudonyms.[46] As of June 2010, this group consisted of six men, including Robinson.[262] In the summer of 2010, the EDL went through a formal restructuring to deal with Robinson's absence.[263] The 2010 reforms included the introduction of a code of conduct which commanded members to respect and obey the leadership, to act in a unified manner, and to be aware that any comments that they made to the press would be taken as formal EDL statements.[264] Till October 2013, the EDL was led by Robinson and Carroll as co-leaders, supported by the regional organisers of the 19 regional divisions.[100] EDL members were expected to take an oath of allegiance to the organisation's leadership.[38] After that duo left the group, it was reorganised around a committee leadership which was headed by a rotating chair.[93]

The EDL lacked a central regulatory structure through which to impose a uniform approach to strategy or maintain ideological purity throughout.[265] It operated through a loose network of local divisions,[39] each of which had a good deal of autonomy.[111] Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell found that most members liked the group's "messy structure and imprecise goals" and did not want to be part of a highly structured organisation under firm leadership.[266] The EDL divided into at least ninety different divisions,[267] some of which are based on locality and others on specialist groups.[262] These have included a women's division, Jewish division, Sikh division, Hindu division, and LGBT division.[38] For a brief period it also had a disabled division,[220] as well as a green division,[220] and a soldiers' division.[262] These groups are designed to raise the profile of a particular social group within the EDL itself and helping the organisation to draw in recruits from sectors of society that would normally avoid membership in a far-right grouping, such as ethnic minorities and LGBT people.[268] In its early years it also formed a youth division, the English Defence Youth, which was led by Joel Titus; after Titus received a criminally-related anti-social behaviour order (CRASBO), preventing his further involvement in the EDL, the youth division became largely inactive.[269]

The local groups were organised into a series of nine areas: North West, North East, East Midlands, West Midlands, East Anglia, South West, South East, South East Central, and Greater London.[262] From the summer of 2010 onward, each of these had its own regional organiser.[270] The EDL was heavily reliant on these grassroots networks and the initiative of local and regional leaders.[199] Some of the local divisions covered whole cities or counties while in other cases there could be more than one division representing a single postcode, in part due to personal disputes.[271]

Branches typically held their meeting in pubs with sympathetic owners, which are referred to as "HQs".[272] Pilkington observed that these meetings always features alcohol consumption.[260] Such divisional meetings were infrequent and often poorly attended.[273] They were typically unstructured, lacking any formal agenda or the taking of minutes, and were mainly an opportunity for divisional organisers to inform members of their decisions.[273] Sometimes guest speakers were also invited to address the audience.[273] As well as these divisional meetings, the EDL divisions also held "meet and greet" events to attract new membership.[273] There was no system of official membership recognised through membership cards,[236] and no membership fees.[274] The EDL accepted donations and local divisions sought to raise funds by selling merchandise and holding fundraising events such as barbeques.[275]


EDL activism has taken place across a range of more or less public and managed spaces. These have included official street demonstrations of varying size, unofficial or 'flash' demonstrations, petitions against mosques, leafleting campaigns, attempted boycotts of restaurants selling halal food, organisational social media pages, personal social media pages of activists, memorials for symbolically significant events and various charity fundraisers.

— Political scientist Joel Busher[259]

The EDL's primary activity have been street protests,[276] which have regularly attracted media attention.[99] Its demonstrations came in three forms: national demonstrations that attracted activists from across the country, local demonstrations featuring largely the local EDL division, and the flash demonstrations held without giving the authorities prior warning of the event.[277] Members attending such flash demonstrations are only informed of the place and time of the protest several hours before it is due to take place.[278] This tactic arose following attempts by the Home Office to ban various organised EDL demonstrations.[279] Such protests included a picket outside of the family home of Member of the European Parliament Sajjad Karim, a Muslim, in July 2011.[280][281]

The EDL claims that it disavows violence,[282] and that it wants its protests to be peaceful, blaming violence on anti-fascist counter-protesters.[283] Despite this, many of those who attend its rallies seek the thrill of violent confrontation,[283] describing the pleasure and adrenalin rush they receive from it as a motivating factor in their attendance at the demonstrations.[284] Some also described violent clashes as being the best way of drawing media attention to their demonstrations and their cause.[285] Copsey argued that EDL demonstrations sought to deliberately provoke a violent confrontation from Muslim communities, which in turn would spur the government to take forceful action against British Muslims.[283] The use of aggressive street rallies has a longer history among the British far-right. In the 1930s, the British Union of Fascists marched through areas with high Jewish populations to intimidate and provoke them, while in the 1970s the National Front employed similar tactics in areas with large non-white communities, an approach also used in the 1980s and 1990s by the British National Party till being abandoned after 1999.[286]

In 2011, Bartlett and Littler stated their view that the EDL's largest demonstration contained between 2000 and 3000 protesters.[287] Copsey noted that the "overwhelming majority" of attendees at EDL demonstrations are "young, white, working-class males".[288] Although EDL demonstrations have included people of colour, in general they remain overwhelmingly white.[188] At events, many members sought to have their photograph taken with the few Sikhs who attended, thus seeking to bolster the idea that they were not personally racist.[289] Copsey suggested that many Sikhs who were sympathetic to the EDL were nevertheless put off from attending rallies due to an awareness that many of the EDL's white members would not be able to differentiate between Sikhs and Muslims.[290] The events were also numerically dominated by men, with relatively few women attending.[291] At demonstrations, speeches typically focus on the perceived threat of Islamification, but also raise issues like the dangers of political correctness and the errors of the political left.[210] During demonstrations, the EDL have regularly been met with opposition from anti-fascist groups like Unite Against Fascism,[292] and sometimes also from Islamic groups.[51] The clashes between the rival groups often resulted in violence and public disorder,[293] with the police seeking to keep the two apart.[51]

To reach national events, local EDL groups often hired coaches to transport them to their destination;[294] en route, they often displayed EDL flags from the coach windows.[295] The coach provided a space in which these members engaged in singing, banter, story-telling, and practical jokes.[296] As well as being protests, these demonstrations served as social events for EDL members,[297] helping to forge a sense of solidarity and of the EDL as "one big family".[298] At demonstrations, many members—including those who may be too young to legally drink alcohol—consume large quantities of alcohol.[299] Many of these events begin and/or end at a pub, which is used as a meeting place.[300] Some members also take cocaine prior to attending demonstrations.[301]

EDL demonstrations were typified by continuous chanting with aggressive slogans aimed at Muslims.[302] Pilkington divided these chants into three types: those which were anti-Islam, those which were patriotic in referencing an English identity, and those which were identity affirming in making specific reference to the EDL itself.[303] Examples of the first category included "Muslim bombers off our streets",[304] "No surrender to the Taliban",[305] "Protect women, no to sharia",[306] "If you wear a burqa you're a cunt",[103] "You can stick your fucking Islam up your arse",[227] "You can shove your fucking Allah up your arse",[307] "Allah is a paedo",[308] and "Allah, Allah, who the fuck is Allah?".[309] Examples of the second category include "I'm England till I die",[103] "We want our country back",[306] and "Whose streets? Our streets!",[310] while the third included the chant "E... E... EDL".[311] When confronting counter-protesters from the UAF and other groups, EDL members often chanted "You're not English anymore".[312] Alongside chants, the EDL often employed songs, including the UK national anthem "God Save the Queen", patriotic songs like "Keep St George in my Heart, Keep me English"—sung to the tune of the hymn "Give Me Joy in My Heart"—and the anti-Islam themed "There were Ten Muslim Bombers in the Air".[303]

At the demonstrations, EDL members often displayed the English flag of St George as well as the British Union Jack; the Israeli and LGBT Pride flags were also often in attendance.[313] As with various older far-right street organisations like the Italian Squadristi or German Sturmabteilung, the EDL had a "street uniform" that members wore in the form of wristbands, t-shirts, and hoodies bearing the group's logo.[314] Many members also wore masks decorated with either the EDL logo or the St George's cross.[314] Some also wore pig face masks or masks of figures whom they wished to ridicule, such as the Salafi jihadist leader Osama bin Laden.[315] The use of the hoodie has symbolic connections with anti-social behaviour and the stereotype of the chav; it was thus selected for its intimidating atmosphere and as a reassertion of working-class status.[316] In wearing such a uniform, the EDL seek to construct a unified political identity.[317] Wearing this material helps to cement individual's loyalty to the group, particularly as they are likely to experience disapproval from other members of the public while wearing it.[297] Reflecting the place of football hooligans in the EDL, some of its male members wore expensive designer clothing to its rallies, most notably Fred Perry polo shirts, jeans or combat trousers, and Adidas trainers.[297] A number of attendees also display EDL-themed tattoos.[295]

Lager, cocaine, a bit of shouting and singing, the possibility of a punch-up, surrounded by friends and like-minded others - there was an air of adventure to proceedings, and some found all of this very attractive.

— Simon Winlow, Steve Hall, and James Treadwell on EDL demonstrations[318]

The police and local authorities initially allowed most EDL rallies to take place and did not often request banning orders.[319] In October 2010, West Yorkshire Police successfully requested a government ban on the EDL holding a rally in Bradford, fearing that it would spark violent racial tensions akin to those which had taken place in 2001.[319] In October 2010, the Home Secretary Theresa May granted Leicester Police's request to ban a planned EDL march in that city.[319] By September 2011, over 600 arrests had been made in connection with EDL demonstrations and the policing costs were estimated to have exceeded £10 million.[155] In some cases, the majority of those arrested during a demonstration have been from the EDL; on other instances the majority of those arrested have been from groups protesting against the EDL.[288] After the group's August 2009 rally in Birmingham for example, in which it first reached national attention, a number of young Asian counter-protesters attacked several unrelated white youths they found in the city, leading the police to pursue the counter-protesters.[246] Through her ethnographic fieldwork within the EDL, Pilkington found that more members felt that the group's tactics would be ineffective than deemed them effective; some even regarded them as counterproductive due to the presence of members who were drunk or who appeared idiotic by displaying the flag upside-down or placards with misspelled words.[320] Although some EDL members expressed reservations about the violent tactics adopted by others, this was not considered sufficient to stop many of them from returning to further events.[321]

Mobilising on local issues

In various cases, the EDL mobilised around localised tensions between Islamic and non-Muslim communities. These were often organised by local divisions rather than by the group's national leadership.[264] After a group of inebriated Somali women carried out a racist assault against a white woman, Rhea Page, in Leicester in June 2010, the EDL organised a protest rally in the city, attributing the attack to the supremacist attitude cultivated by Islam among its followers.[322] When, in the Hyde area of Greater Manchester, a man called Daniel Stringer-Prince was assaulted by Asian youths, the EDL again organised a demonstration in that area against the Stringer-Price family's wishes. The EDL blamed the attack on Muslims, although the religious background of the youths had not been ascertained by police.[159] In April 2011, the group held demonstrations in Blackburn in response to a number of hit and run incidents where Muslim drivers had hit non-Muslims; again, the EDL disregarded requests by the victim's families not to politicise the events.[323]

In the spring of 2011, the EDL launched a nationwide campaign titled "No New Mosques", which built upon earlier campaigns against mosque construction organised by various local divisions.[324] When a mosque was due to be built in West Bridgford, an EDL organiser for the Nottingham area, Christopher Payne, and three associates placed a severed pig's head on a pole at the site, while the slogan "No mosque here EDL Notts" was spray-painted on the adjacent pavement.[325] In April 2010, the group amassed a demonstration of 3000 supporters in Dudley to protest the construction of a new mosque, an issue that had already attracted local opposition.[326] Prior to the event, a cross-party group of local councillors—including members of the Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, Conservative Party, and UK Independence Party—issued a joint letter to the local press calling on the EDL to abandon its plans because of the detrimental impact they would have on community relations.[326] Two months later, a group of EDL members occupied the roof of the abandoned building on the site of the proposed mosque, displaying a banner saying "No to the burka" and expressing intentions to play the Islamic call to prayer from there five times a day to alert locals to the noise pollution they would suffer when the mosque was built. Police swiftly removed the demonstrators.[326] Dudley Council subsequently announced its intention to try and prevent further EDL demonstrations in the town, noting that the group's activities had cost the local council over £1 million.[327]

The EDL was aware that its demonstrations, which are often met by protests from anti-fascist groups, prove costly for local authorities.[328] The Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council for instance stated that the EDL protest in Dudley had forced the council to spent over £1 million of tax-payers money.[328] To deal with an EDL protest in Leicester, the Leicestershire Police Force had to put on its largest operation in 25 years, bringing in 2000 police officers to manage the demonstration.[288] The EDL used this leverage to pressurise local councils into agreeing to some of its demands; in 2010 it issued a letter stating that any local councils that held Winter-themed festivities rather than explicitly Christmas-themed ones could "have their town/city visited by the English Defence League throughout the following year".[329]


Copsey noted that "it is hard to escape the conclusion that, on the ground, the EDL is a violent organisation."[201] In various cases, EDL demonstrators have damaged Asian-owned businesses and property;[331] in October 2011, EDL members stormed and ransacked an Ahmadiyya Islamic bookstore in Sandwell,[144][332] and in August 2011 an EDL member was convicted for vandalising a mosque.[333] Demonstrations have also led to physical attacks on Asians themselves.[280] Not all targets of EDL violence have been Muslim; in a July 2010 demonstration in Dudley, EDL members attacked a Hindu temple. It is unclear whether they mistook it for a mosque or whether it reflected broader racist attitudes among the demonstrators extending beyond Islamophobia.[188]

In other instances, EDL members have sought to disrupt the meetings of opponents; in September 2010 they disrupted a UAF meeting in Leicester, and later that month around twenty to thirty EDL activists attacked a meeting of the far-left Socialist Workers Party in Newcastle-upon-Tyne.[279] In June 2011, EDL members attacked an anti-fascist concert in Yorkshire.[334] EDL members also targeted left-wing bookshops and trade union buildings,[335] and memvers have been jailed for attacking staff at office buildings which had hosted anti-EDL meetings.[336] The EDL have also targeted demonstrators from the anti-capitalist Occupy movement; in November 2011, 179 EDL members were arrested near St Paul's Cathedral in central London for repeatedly threatening members of Occupy London.[52] It cited its targeting of these because "Trotskyists, Communists and left‐liberals have systematically and opportunistically supported the very Islamofascists the EDL is against."[324] Journalists that have covered EDL marches have received death threats;[337] for instance, journalist Jason N. Parkinson from The Guardian wrote about receiving a death threat by email from an EDL organiser, as well as death threats sent to Marc Vallée, a fellow journalist.[338]

Meadowcroft and Morrow argued that the opportunities that EDL rallies offered to engage in violence attracted many football hooligans to join the organisation; the fact that participants saw themselves as engaging in violence for a cause may have given them greater personal satisfaction.[51] These individuals may have found a decreasing number of opportunities to engage in violence at football matches themselves, due to greater use of banning orders targeting known hooligans, a more effective police presence, and increasing ticket prices that had becoming prohibitively high for those on low incomes.[51] Treadwell and Garland interviewed EDL members who had engaged in violence both independently and at demonstrations. One described how, at a protest, he attacked an Asian counter demonstrator: "[I] hit this Paki in the face and he just looked so shocked. So I hit him again and that put him down, then we gave him a fucking good kicking." This EDL member added that he felt "proud afterwards. It made me feel like I'd made a stand."[339]

Treadwell and Garland recorded accounts from various EDL members where they had carried out acts of racist violence on occasions outside those of EDL demonstrations. They for instance described the account of an 18 year old man from a White British working class background who was a member of a local football firm and who reported that when drunk, he and two friends came upon "a pyjama wearing Paki kid" aged about 20. Robbie and his friends attacked the Asian youth, pushing him to the floor and kicking him repeatedly in the face. When questioned why he did this, Robbie explained that "I guess I was pissed, but really, he was a Paki Muslim youth, he just deserved it". He further explaining that a group of British Asian youth had similarly physically assaulted him when he was a school pupil, with his injuries necessitating hospitalisation.[340] Meadowcroft and Meadow thus suggested that among the EDL, "violence against the perceived enemies of England is legitimised and glorified and enhances the self-worth of the group members taking a stand against those enemies."[187] Treadwell and Garland similarly reported that those EDL members engaging in violence repeatedly presented it as a heroic act.[341]

Online activism

The EDL established a significant online presence through which it spread its ideology and sought to mobilise supporters to attend its events.[239] The EDL had an official website, but also made heavy use of social media platforms like Facebook and YouTube through which to promote its material.[99] In doing so, Copsey referred to the EDL as "a child of the Facebook revolution",[236] noting that the website was "a critical forum" for the EDL in promoting its views.[342] In making use of social media, the EDL sought to bypass the mainstream media, which it regarded as being biased against it.[343] These social media platforms are moderated by members of the EDL hierarchy, but these moderators do not appear to remove posts by supporters which advocated hatred and violence towards Muslims while blocking users who criticise the EDL and its ideology.[344] The use of Facebook also allowed the group to build momentum and expectancy among their members ahead of public events.[345] The EDL gained a total of 100,000 followers on Facebook, after which the Facebook corporation shut down the group's profile on the website.[346]

Distinguishing itself from political parties, the EDL did not produce leaflets expressing any political program,[347] nor did it print a magazine or newsletter.[345] On the EDL News section of its website it produced articles, commentary, and information on forthcoming events and campaigns, which were then linked to throughout its social media.[347] A study of these articles looking at those produced up to February 2012 found that, of the 117 publicly available articles, 86 discussed Islam or Muslims. Of these, 55.8% discussed extremism, 33.7% discussed terrorism, 31.4% discussed other violence, 24.4% discussed segregationary tendencies, 20.9% discussed supremacism, 20.9% discussed misogyny, and 18.6% described child grooming.[347]

The EDL also used its website as a venue through which to sell its branded merchandise, which included hoodies, t-shirts, caps, pin badges, and face masks.[345] Following internal allegations that EDL members were taking the money from this for themselves rather than using it for the organisation, the EDL pulled merchandise from its website in September 2010.[345] It has also sold its merchandise on the auction website eBay.[40] The EDL has also used the internet and in particular social media to broadcast their activities, such as the placing of severed pig heads outside mosques, the burning of copies of the Qur'an, or footage from demonstrations.[348]

Despite its many unique features, the EDL is nonetheless representative of a wider political change that has swept across Europe over the past fifteen years. The combination of a deeply anti‐Muslim political agenda and populist ultrapatriotism, powered by grass‐roots critiques of mainstream politics, has been a core component of the 'new far right' in Europe. Unsurprisingly, the EDL has tried to develop connections with other 'new far right' groups on the Continent, while also cultivating links with populist right wing American figures too.

— Historian of the far right Paul Jackson[196]

As part of the international counter-jihad movement, the EDL formed links with various ideologically similar groups internationally, particularly elsewhere in Europe and in the United States.[349] These have included sectors of the Tea Party movement in the United States.[350] It was affiliated with the U.S.-based Stop Islamization of America run by Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer.[351] Geller who served as the EDL's bridge to the Tea Party movement,[351] but later distanced herself from it, claiming that the EDL contained neo-Nazi elements.[352] When Moore was head of the EDL's Jewish Division, she established links with a far right Jewish American group, the Jewish Task Force.[269] In September 2010, EDL representatives joined demonstrations in New York City's Lower Manhattan to protest against the construction of the "Ground Zero Mosque",[352] and in 2012 attended the "Stop Islamization of Nations" conference, again in New York City.[353] In October 2010, American Tea Party activist Rabbi Nachum Shifren travelled to England to speak at a rally.[354][355][356][357][358] In his speech, he called Muslims "dogs" and told the EDL that "history will be recorded that on this day, read by our children for eternity, one group lit the spark to liberate us from the oppressors of our two governments and the leftist, fifth column, quisling press, and that it was the EDL which started the liberation of England from evil."[359]

EDL members sometimes attended other events abroad; a small contingent travelled to Berlin in April 2010 to attend a rally in support of Geert Wilders—a right-wing populist politician who had been charged for comparing Islam to Nazism—outside the Dutch Embassy organised by the Pax Europa Citizens Movement.[360] In June 2010 two EDL representatives attended the Counter-Jihad 2020 conference held by the anti-Muslim International Civil Liberties Alliance in Zurich.[360] In October 2010, Robinson and other EDL members travelled to Amsterdam to protest outside Wilders' trial—although Wilders himself stated that he had no personal contact with the EDL—and it was here that Robinson announced the intention to form a "European Friendship Initiative" with the German, Dutch, and French Defence Leagues.[351] In April 2011 Robinson and other EDL representatives attended a small rally in Lyon, France alongside the French far-right group Bloc Identitaire; various participants, including Robinson, were arrested.[352] In June 2011, it sent representatives to a counter-jihadist conference organised by Pax Europa in Stuttgard.[352]

It has partnered with the Welsh Defence League, Scottish Defence League, and Ulster Defence League, none of which had the same success as their English counterpart.[262] The Scottish Defence League retained secret links with the BNP,[361] although in Scotland, it produced particularly difficult to bridge sectarian divisions between rival football firms under the same banner.[362] Sectarianism was also a major issue for the Ulster Defence League, which decided against holding any demonstrations in Northern Ireland itself.[345] The Welsh Defence League faced divisions between its contingent from Swansea, some of whom were former members of Combat 18, and the Casuals United-contingent from Cardiff.[345] After a BBC Wales investigation into the group revealed that a number of its members had neo-Nazi beliefs, in 2011 it was shut down and replaced by the Welsh Casuals.[269]

The Canadian Jewish Defense League held a demonstration in support of the EDL,[363] a move criticised by the Canadian Jewish Congress.[364] The EDL has established links to the Danish Defence League. The latter has established 10 chapters within its first year of operation.[365] However recent attempts to establish a presence in Denmark and the Netherlands have failed to attract support and were respectively described as "a humiliation" and as "a damp squib".[366] The Norwegian Defence League (NDL) is a sister organisation of the EDL. There are strong connections between the two organisations, and the leadership of the EDL is also actively involved in the leadership of NDL.[367] Members of the NDL have on several occasions travelled to England to participate in EDL protests.[368][369]

The English Volunteer Force is a small right-wing street protest movement[370] based in the United Kingdom, which Joe Mulhall considers to be an English Defence League splinter group.[371] Created by John Sheridan and Jason Lock in July 2012, the group calls for the halting of all Muslim immigration, prohibitions on the building of mosques and the sale of halal meat, the rejection of multiculturalism, and a rejection of what they term the 'Islamification' of Great Britain. The group plans to "Unite the Right". The group held its first demonstration in Birmingham in January 2013 which passed peacefully.[370]

Membership and support


The size of the EDL movement has been difficult to gauge.[372] Allen noted that within a year and a half of the group's formation it had "grown substantially" but that it is "extremely difficult to know exactly how big or how well supported the EDL is."[56] The organisation has no official system of membership,[373] or formal means of joining,[374] and thus no membership list.[375] In 2011, Bartlett and Littler estimated that between 25,000 and 35,000 people were active members in the EDL movement.[287] They believed that about half of these had attended demonstrations and that the highest concentration was in the Greater London area.[287] On the basis of her research with the group, Pilkington suggested that there was a "high turnover in the movement",[291] while Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell observed that members "drift in and out of its activities".[126] The internet hacktivist group Anonymous has published personal details of EDL members as part of a campaign against the group.[376]

Much of its support came from individuals that the group called "armchair warriors", those who may not attend street protests but support the organisation and its aims online and campaigning by email, letter writing, and telephoning.[56] Researchers found many individuals in white working-class areas who supported the EDL's views but did not want to attend its demonstrations, fearing violence, arrest, and the potential loss of their jobs.[377] Many supportive women saw the demonstrations as a "man's thing", while various older men explained their non-attendance by characterising these events as a "young man's thing".[377] Some female members also expressed frustration with the laddish culture that dominated the movement; one female member, whose father and partner were also members, complained that it was mostly "coked up bald headed blokes running round the streets".[378]

In July 2010, the EDL had 22,000 followers on Facebook;[345] following the killing of Lee Rigby in 2013 this had reached 160,000,[379] and as of February 2015, it had risen further to 184,000.[99] As of January 2016, its Angels Division for women had over 17,000 likes,[380] while that of its LGBT Division had 3,500 likes.[381] Its Facebook following was smaller than that of its rival, Britain First; in 2015, when the EDL had 181,000 followers, Britain First had 816,000.[382] Pilkington argued that the EDL's active membership, meaning those who attended its rallies and events, peaked between January and April 2010, when national demonstrations could accrue 2000 people, but by the end of that year this had declined to between 800 and 1000.[382] By 2012, the group's national demonstrations were typically only attracting between 300 to 700 people.[382]

Activists... are neither born, nor aggressively recruited, into the EDL. They are neither duped by a charismatic leader nor are they working-class anti-heroes. Their trajectories in and out of the movement are prosaic rather than heroic. Moreover, in contrast to the decisive entrances and exits into and from classic far right movements, activism in the EDL resembles rather a 'hokey kokey' in which activists repeatedly engage and 'step-back' as they marry the costs and consequences of participation with their wider lives.

— Ethnographer Hilary Pilkington on her fieldwork among the EDL grassroots[383]

The EDL forged what Busher described as "seemingly unlikely alliances. Long-term football hooligans marched alongside people waving gay pride flags, and people who had until recently been part of the extreme right scene stood next to people holding Israel flags."[384] The EDL brought together three main constituencies; football hooligans, longstanding far-right activists, and a range of socio-economically marginalised people, the majority of whom were young men.[385] Copsey noted that "beyond their antagonism towards Islam, there is no ideology that binds this ragbag coalition together", and that the EDL was therefore always susceptible to fracture.[386] The group initially drew much of its membership from established football violence networks but later gained recruits from established sectors of the far-right and from within the counter-jihad movement.[387] However, when the group was at its peak only a minority of its supporters had established far-right links,[249] and for the majority their membership of the EDL was the first time that they had been actively involved in a political group.[388]

Involvement with the EDL could bring various problems for its members which would dissuade their ongoing involvement; this included financial costs, the loss of friends, potential police scrutiny, and the restrictions it placed on their time.[297] Various members described having friendships and relationships with family members that ended because of their decision to join the EDL, while others concealed their involvement from their employer out of a fear that they would lose their job.[389] Some expressed fears that social services would take their children into foster care if their EDL membership was known,[390] or that they would be the target of violence from anti-fascists and Muslims.[391]

Meadowcroft and Morrow suggested that the EDL overcame the collective action problem by offering its members "access to violent conflict, increased self-worth and group solidarity".[392] They argued that for many working-class young men who have "little meaning or cause for pride" in their lives, membership of the EDL allows them to "reimagine" themselves as "heroic freedom fighters" battling to save their nation from its fundamental enemy, Islam, "thereby bolstering their sense of self-worth."[393] In addition, they argued that EDL membership gave individuals a sense of group identity and community which they might otherwise be lacking, citing various examples of members who described their local division as being like a family.[393] In various cases, EDL members grew closer to one another because they had lost many other groups outside the organisation as a result of their membership.[394] Pilkington similarly observed members describing the EDL as being akin to family, although noted that they often qualified this by describing certain individuals in the movement as "clowns", "nutters", "pricks", "idiots", and "backstabbers", either because they were suspected of being police informants or had defected to other groups.[395] She noted that a key source of tension within the group surrounded issues of romantic relationships, with various individuals accused of "shagging around" in the movement.[396]

Profile of members

[EDL members] spoke at length about the rise of political Islam and the ubiquitous terrorist threat. They spoke about the involvement of Muslim men in the sexual exploitation of vulnerable young white girls. They spoke about Sharia law and their unwillingness to yield a single additional yard on the field of cultural politics. And when they spoke about these things, they spoke in a forthright manner that reflected their desire to push past the cloying cultural sensitivities that have grown around the popular discussion of immigration, ethnic conflict and religious diversity.

— Simon Winlow, Steve Hall, and James Treadwell on their fieldwork among the EDL[397]

The EDL describe their members as "ordinary, non-racist citizens of England... who have had enough of being treated as second class citizens to Jihadis in our own country".[56] Studies found that the majority of EDL members were young, working-class, white men.[103] A recurring joke among the EDL membership was that the group's female supporters were mostly involved so that they could find men to engage in sexual and romantic relationships with; accordingly, one female member was quoted as describing the EDL's female division as the "sticky knicker brigade".[398]

On the basis of her ethnographic research among the EDL, Pilkington found that 74% of her respondents were under 35, in contrast to the older support base of the BNP and UKIP.[399] 77% were male to only 23% female, although women could be found in several senior positions.[400] 51% described themselves as being "White English", and 23% as "White British".[401] Only 6% of those she interviewed had either completed or were studying for a higher education degree; 20% had never completed their secondary school-level education.[402] 49% were unemployed, 20% were in either part-time or irregular employment, and only 11% were in full-time employment.[403] 57% lived in social housing, in contrast to only 17.5% of the general population.[404] She also found that EDL members had rarely been raised in "stable, strong and protective environments", that accounts of sexual abuse and violence in childhood were somewhat common, and that a number had been cared for by grandparents or in foster care because their own parents were unable to do so.[405] She noted that very few regarded themselves as Christian, and most had an ambivalent view of Christianity.[406] Pilkington also found that while all were critical of recent governments, none—barring the few neo-Nazis who attended EDL rallies but did not consider themselves members—desired a more authoritarian government, one-party state, or dictatorship.[407]

Once they hit their rhetorical stride, it was common for activists to reach beyond complaints ostensibly focused on Islam and Muslims to a more general lament that ranged across themes including immigration, overcrowded social housing, benefit fraud and, in the months after the English riots of August 2011, the supposed links between 'black culture' and a decline in law and order. They would, however, repeatedly return to the core EDL themes, making clear that where they had strayed from those themes they were 'just my opinions'.

— Political scientist Joel Busher on his fieldwork among the EDL grassroots[211]

In 2011, Bartlett and Littler surveyed 1,295 EDL Facebook supporters.[374] At the time, 81% of the EDL's Facebook supporters were male, to 19% female; among those surveyed by Bartlett and Littler most were young, with only 28% being over the age of thirty, and only 30% had attended either college or university.[408] Bartlett and Littler found that EDL supporters were disproportionately unemployed; among 16 to 24 year old EDL supporters, 28% were unemployed (to a national average of 20%), and among 25 to 64 year olds, 28% were unemployed (to a national average of 6%).[409] The issue that was most important to those surveyed was immigration; 42% considered immigration as one of the two largest issues affecting England, while only 31% cited Islamic extremism.[410] They also found 34% of them voted for the BNP, more than for any other party; 14% said they would vote UKIP and another 14% said they would vote for the Conservative Party. Only 9% said that they would vote Labour, and 3% Liberal Democrat.[114] When asked to rank their three most important personal values, 36% said security, 34% said strong government, 30% said rule of law, and 26% said individual freedom.[411] The surveyed EDL supporters also displayed significantly higher than average levels of distrust in the government, police, and judiciary; conversely, their levels of distrust of other institutions, such as political parties, the mainstream media, the army, trade unions, and the European Union were not significantly higher that those exhibited by the broader population.[412]

Additional research was carried out by Matthew Goodwin, David Cutts, and Laurence Janta-Lupinski, who drew upon the data gathered by YouGov in an October 2012 survey. This included 82 people who described themselves as members or expressed an interest in joining, and 298 who agreed with the EDL's values but did not wish to join; Goodwin et al called the latter "sympathisers".[413] Their research found that those who sympathised with the EDL tended to be "older men, have low education levels, are skilled workers, read right-wing tabloid newspapers and support right-wing parties at elections"; they also noted, however, that "they are not disproportionately more likely to be unemployed or live in social housing" that members of the population more broadly.[414] In contrast, those more committed to the movement, who were either members or wanted to join, displayed "greater financial insecurity", being more likely than average to be unemployed or in part-time employment, and more likely than average to live in social housing, rely on state benefits, and have no educational qualifications.[415] These members were found to be "extremely pessimistic about intergroup relationships, strongly xenophobic and considerably more likely than others to endorse the use of violence when defending their in-group from perceived threats".[416] 8% of sympathisers and 9% of members stated that they voted for either UKIP or the BNP, a figure four times higher than in the broader YouGov sample;[417] supporters of the Conservative Party were also found to be significantly more likely to sympathise with the EDL than non-Conservative voters.[418]

Perceptions of victimhood

The most consistent and emotionally charged narrative of 'self' identified among respondents in this study is that of 'second-class citizen'. This narrative is rooted in a sense of profound injustice based on the perception, almost universally expressed among respondents, that the needs of others are privileged over their own. While the perceived beneficiaries of that injustice might be racialised (as 'immigrants', 'Muslims' or ethnic minorities), and it is claimed that they are afforded preferential treatment in terms of access to benefits, housing and jobs, the agent responsible for this injustice is understood to be a weak-willed or frightened government that panders to the demands of a minority for fear of being labelled racist.

— Ethnographer Hilary Pilkington on her fieldwork among the EDL grassroots[419]

The political scientist Alexander Oaten was of the view that a sense of victimhood was "the central formulating point for the EDL's collective identity".[420] Similarly, Pilkington found that "the most consistent and emotionally charged narrative of 'self'" that she encountered among the EDL was that of the self as a "second-class citizen" in Britain.[421] All of the EDL members she encountered believed that the needs of others—especially those of immigrants and Muslims—were prioritised over their own needs by the state.[421] In their view, non-whiteness or ethnic minority status was a powerful tool, given special recognition in law, that could be used against the white British.[422] Among the EDL, there was a widespread belief that the government gave preferential treatment to ethnic minorities when it came to welfare benefits, social housing, and employment.[423] Various members cited personal experiences where they believed that this had been the case.[423] They also saw this two-tiered system being reflected in the judicial system, comparing instances in which Muslims who burned poppies received far more lenient sentences than white individuals who burned Qur'ans.[424]

EDL members also made frequent reference to incidents of racist abuse, bullying, violence, and murder against white British people which they feel went under-reported or inappropriately punished by the judicial system.[425] The most cited example was the 2004 murder of Kriss Donald, a racist attack committed by Pakistani men on a white teenager; EDL members thought that the perpetrators were given excessively lenient sentences and that the incident gained virtually no media attention in comparison to a white-perpetrated racist killing like that of Stephen Lawrence.[426] They also saw this two-tiered system in their perception that ethnic minorities were encouraged to display their own cultural symbols while the white English were not, citing examples in which their own displays of the flag of St George had been censured amid accusations of racism.[424] They also highlighted reports, including personal accounts from their own experiences, of white English school pupils being bullied by ethnic minority pupils and the school authorities refusing to punish the latter.[427]

Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell similarly found EDL supporters repeatedly claiming the existence of "a creeping prejudice against the white heterosexual working class", with said members regarding themselves as "victims of a new systemic cultural injustice".[428] An analysis of posts to an EDL message board indicated that EDL supporters there perceived themselves as victims and that their EDL mobilization was a response to this victimisation.[429] The EDL regularly used this sense of victimhood and victimisation to help construct a sense of collective identity within the movement and to construct an image of its external enemies.[430] Oaten suggested that the EDL had an "obsession with the cult of victimhood", and that this had been present in the movement since its beginnings.[431]

Recurring views

Busher felt that most of the EDL members he encountered "had a highly binary interpretation of the world, seeing themselves as engaged in a millennial struggle between good and evil – an existential fight for the future of their country and culture."[432] He noted that most activists either rarely or never presented this struggle in terms of biological race, even in contexts where they expressed anti-foreigner and anti-migrant sentiments.[432] He also encountered some EDL members who had come to the group from other sectors of the far-right and who claimed that their views had moderated as a result; one London activist for instance stated that he initially disliked black people but through his EDL membership came to abandon such views,[432] something also found by Pilkington.[433] Busher suggested that this might be because the EDL ideology's shifted some individual's hostility from being directed at non-white Britons broadly toward Muslims specifically.[432] At the same time, he noted that as the EDL fragmented, members of some of its splinter groups adopted increasingly extreme white power views.[432]

Braouezec's interviews with EDL supporters found many that were frustrated with being labelled "far-right";[434] Pilkington found the same phenomenon, noting that distinguishing oneself from the traditional far-right was "central to definitions of 'self' for EDL members."[435] Even in private, many members did not identify as being either "far-right",[67] or "racist".[436] On the EDL message board studied by Cleland, Anderson, and Aldridge-Deacon, EDL members expressed frustration at how non-Muslims were portrayed in the media; one thread for instance included members criticising The Guardian newspaper after an EDL supporter's post to their online comment section was not published because it did not abide by what The Guardian called its "community standards".[437] On this message board, EDL supporters also spoke regularly about what they believed would be a forthcoming civil war in Britain between Muslims and non-Muslims.[206]

Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell noted that members placed great importance in their working-class identity and in their class interests, and that many also displayed clear bonds with their local communities.[397] Noting that EDL members expressed a "crude, forthright and hostile worldview",[438] they also opined that "inarticulate anger" was the "basic emotion" that typified "the EDL's cultural and political life".[439] Their EDL contacts all expressed hatred for Muslims, and even more so for mainstream politicians.[122] Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell believed that EDL supporters ultimately desired to live in a "mythical perfect world... in which they felt immediately at home and in which everything made sense", a world with a strong community, security, and order, and where they had satisfying and well-paid employment, and felt listened to and represented in the political sphere.[440]

Many cited coming from families who were Labour voters and sometimes members of trade unions,[441] but also expressed their own anger at Labour, regarding it as the party of multiculturalism, political correctness, mass immigration, and do-goodery.[442] Among EDL members, there was much talk of "stupid lefties" who were believed to hate the white working class.[119] One EDL supporter in his early twenties was quoted as saying that "I fucking hate those who oppose us, the fucking UAF and the fucking cultural Marxists. They are just queers, dirty spoilt whores who like ethnic cock, and middle-class pricks that don't know what life is really like when you live on a shitty fucking estate where everything is disappearing except the fucking foreign faces."[443] They observed that in the build-up to the 2015 general election, most of their EDL contacts expressed the intention to vote for UKIP.[444]

Shifting class allegiances

Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell also engaged in fieldwork among EDL members, noting that it "draws the overwhelming majority of its support from Britain's old white working class".[124] They argued that many white working-class Britons—who had predominantly aligned with the political left during the twentieth century—had shifted to the far-right in the early twenty-first century because mainstream left-wing politicians had increasingly abandoned them.[445] After Tony Blair's New Labour project took control of the Labour Party in the 1990s, it increasingly shifted away from its traditional working-class base and focused attention on middle-class swing voters.[446] As well as no longer seeing the white working-classes as a viable electoral constituency—Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell argued—middle-class leftist politicians also increasingly regarded its cultural attitudes and values as an embarrassment.[447] At the same time, in the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the mainstream British left ceased talking about regulating capitalism and there had been a narrowing in economic policy between Labour and the Conservatives.[445] As a result, Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell found that few of the EDL members they contacted were aware that the British left had historically dedicated itself to improving the economic prospects of the working class.[448]

While the white working classes felt increasingly rejected by the mainstream left, they also perceived it as expressing very visible support for cultural minorities.[449] EDL supporters expressed the view that mainstream politicians of both the centre-left and centre-right had been "seduced by the image of 'the exotic'", wanting to "embrace 'diversity' and cultural novelty" while presenting themselves as "cutting-edge, forward-looking, open, cosmopolitan and progressive". To this end—EDL supporters believed—mainstream politicians had encouraged immigration and multiculturalism while coming to loathe white working-class culture, pushing it "from the centre of English society and culture to the margins."[216] They believed that public policy increasingly favoured minorities—whether they be LGBT people, ethnic minorities, or religious minorities—by using affirmative action employment, drives to "diversify" workforces, or favourable media coverage, and that the state had encouraged these groups to present themselves as victims.[450] EDL supporters believed that the heterosexual white working class were left as the only cultural group in the UK that lacked vocal political representation.[122]

At the same time, economic shifts had seen traditional working-class jobs increasingly replaced by low-grade service sector jobs, which were non-unionised and often part time, for instance on zero hour contracts;[451] EDL members were aware of this economic shift, believing that their parents and grandparents' generations had had a better quality of life.[452] According to Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell, it was the resulting "background of broadly felt anger and frustration" among the white working class, a "sense of disempowerment, abandonment and growing irrelevance", from which the EDL was able to develop.[453] The EDL provided these working-class individuals with "a very basic means of understanding their frustrations", pointing the finger of blame for their economic insecurity and sense of cultural marginalisation at Muslims and recently arrived migrants.[454] At the same time, Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell added that the EDL's identification of Islam as the source of white working-class problems "cannot be justified. At least not rationally."[453] They finished their study by cautioning that unless the left succeeded in reattaching itself to the white working-class—and in doing so ceasing to become "lost in identity politics and dominated by right-on metropolitan liberals" who did nothing to improve the economic life of working class people—then the UK would enter a period dominated by the political right.[455]

Reception and impact

Bartlett and Lister noted that the EDL represented "the biggest populist street movement in a generation" in Britain.[374] Braouezec referred to the EDL as the "spearhead" of "the new populist, nationalist and anti-Islamist movement" in Britain, comparing it in this respect to Bloc Identitaire in France.[456] In 2011, James Treadwell and Jon Garland described the formation of the EDL as "one of the most notable political developments of the past few years".[457] They were of the view that the EDL had been adept at exploiting the "anger, marginalization, alienation and frustration felt by many young men in deprived white working-class".[458] In 2013, the political scientist Julian Richards expressed the view that the EDL had been "one of the more intriguing developments on the Far Right in recent years",[459] while the political scientists Matthew J. Goodwin, David Cutts, and Laurence Janta-Lipinski suggested that from its formation until 2013, it had represented "the most significant anti-Islam movement in Europe".[379] Meadowcroft and Morrow noted that the EDL revived the tradition of far-right street-based protest marches after ten years in which they had been comparatively rare, while at the same time initiating "a new era of Islamophobic protest movements" such as Britain First and Pegida UK.[286]

The EDL's rhetoric both resonated with and fed into broader animosity towards Muslims that existed in British society.[460] The 2010 British Social Attitudes Survey found that 45% of respondents believed that religious diversity was having a negative impact on British society, and that 55% would be bothered by having a mosque built in their street, to only 15% who felt the same about a church.[461] A cross-European survey published in 2011 found that 48% of UK citizens agreed with the statement that Islam was "a religion of intolerance".[462] Trilling attributed this sentiment to parts of the British mainstream media, stating that the EDL had been "nourished by the drip-feed of anti-Muslim, anti-'political correctness' stories in Britain's press";[463] Garland and Treadwell noted that ideas and attitudes akin to those of the EDL could often be found in such popular tabloids as the Daily Mail, The Sun, and the Daily Star.[464] Goodwin suggested that the fact that the EDL emerged at a time when "sections of the media and the British establishment... [were] relatively sympathetic towards Islamophobia" reflected a distinct difference from the heyday of the National Front in the 1970s, for at that time, "very few newspapers of politicians were endorsing the NF's antisemitic message."[465] At the same time, the majority of the British population at the time of the EDL's height did not share the totality of its views on Islam.[466]

Those outside the EDL typically perceived the group as being fascist, racist, or mindlessly violent.[394] A poll by Extremis and YouGov conducted in October 2012 found that only a third of those surveyed had heard of the EDL, and that of those who had, only 11% would consider joining.[275] Of those who had heard of it, 74% thought that the group was racist,[467] and 85% stated they would never join it.[468][469] The historian of the far right Nigel Copsey noted that the EDL "does not represent the values which underpin our communities and our country: respect for our fellow citizens, respect for difference, and ensuring the safety and peace of communities and local areas."[470] The EDL faced derision from much of the mainstream media in Britain,[257] with EDL members expressing anger at how they felt the mainstream media misrepresented them by, for instance, ignoring positive aspects of the group or by interviewing those members at demonstrations who were evidently drunk, unintelligent, and unarticulate.[471] A number of academic studies of the movement were produced, many of them focusing on the attitudes and ideology of EDL supporters.[155]

Responses from the government and state

The government regarded the EDL as a major threat to societal cohesion and integration,[282] and there were fears that the group was seeking to spark racial-aggravated urban disturbances akin to those which had broken out in parts of Britain in 2001.[472] In September 2009, the UK's Communities Secretary John Denham condemned the EDL, comparing its tactics to those used by the British Union of Fascists in the 1930s.[319] To combat the white working class resentment that was feeding into support for the BNP and EDL, he invested £12 million into the "Connecting Communities" programme.[319] During the campaign run-up to the 2010 general election, the Conservative Party leader—and subsequent Prime Minister—David Cameron referred to the EDL as "terrible people" and added that "we would always keep these groups under review and if we needed to ban them, we would ban them or any groups which incite hatred."[319][473] The Home Office minister Phil Woolas stated that the EDL deliberately engaged in "division and provocation, to try and push young Muslims into the hands of extremists, in order to perpetuate the divide. It is dangerous."[474] In 2011, the Conservative Party suspended one of its local Southend councillors from the party after they attended an EDL rally.[475]

Various police officers reported that the EDL's activities hampered their own counter-terror operations among British Muslim communities.[282][476][477] Dr. Robert Lambert, co-director of the European Muslim Research Centre (EMRC) at the University of Exeter and previously head of the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) in the Metropolitan Police, has written that the EDL has undermined efforts by British Muslims to tackle terrorism and extremism.[478]

Anti-fascist, Islamic, and ethnic minority responses

The EDL's events attracted a varied range of counter-protesters, the foremost among them being Unite Against Fascism (UAF).[479] The UAF organised to combat the EDL on both an intellectual and physical level, in this way mirroring the actions of the Anti-Nazi League in countering the National Front in 1970s Britain.[480] Dominated by the Socialist Workers Party, the UAF understood the EDL through a largely Marxist interpretation, regarding its members as "fascist, racist thugs" and believing that it represented an "embryonic pogrom movement".[481] The UAF believed in the need to oppose the EDL at every juncture, countering it with larger numbers at every opportunity and thus demoralising it; like the EDL, it stressed that protests should be peaceful, and blamed the arrest of some of its own protesters on heavy-handed policing.[482] At counter-protests, the UAF's common chant was "Fascist scum off our streets".[319] Copsey suggested that the UAF's approach of directly countering the EDL during its marches gave the EDL exactly what it wanted, enhancing the opportunity for violent confrontation and providing it with the oxygen of publicity.[483] He further argued that such a strategy risked serious injury or death and that in such a scenario it would contribute to further radicalisation on all sides.[483] Jackson similarly thought that the UAF's approach was likely to result in "tit for tat radicalisation".[68]

Another anti-fascist group, Hope not Hate, differed from the UAF in not believing that every EDL rally must meet forceful opposition.[68] It expressed the view that "demonstrations and pickets have their place but they should be a tactic not dogmatic rule", instead arguing that anti-fascists should discuss what tactics might be appropriate for a certain locality with members of its local community before the EDL held their protest there.[482] Hope not Hate foregrounded the need to establish long-term strategies to counter the EDL and far-right politics, establishing links with Labour and to a lesser extent other political parties and focusing on reconnecting disenfranchised people with the established political process.[68] When it has helped to organise counter-protests against the EDL, Hope not Hate often focused on bringing together different sectors of a local community in peaceful protest; in Bradford in August 2010, for instance, it helped organise a counter-protest featuring members of the Christian, Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu communities.[68] Online, various leftist websites have also played a role in monitoring the EDL's activities, including Indymedia, Lancaster Unity, 1 Million United, and IslamophobiaWatch.[68]

Britain's Islamic community was divided on how to deal with he EDL. In some cases, Muslims joined in with UAF counter-protests; when the EDL planned to march in Birmingham in September 2009, the head of the Birmingham Central Mosque, Muhammad Nasee, urged Muslims to do so against police advice.[482] Other Muslim voices have called for the Muslim community to stay away from the protests, and to keep their young people off the streets while they are going on. When an EDL protest was planned in Leicester, for example, the Federation of Muslim Organisations issued a statement saying that that "Our strong advice is that people stay away from the EDL protest and any counter demonstration and rallies that may take place in the city."[482] Another response was the formation of the Muslim Defence League in January 2010, the stated purpose of which was to oppose Islamophobia and counter misinformation about Islam. In various instances, it supported UAF counter-protests against EDL marches.[484] In 2013, six Islamists pleaded guilty to plotting a bomb and gun attack on an EDL march in Dewsbury.[485]

In response to the involvement of some Sikhs in the EDL, an organisation known as Sikhs Against the EDL was formed; it condemned Guramit Singh as a "traitor" for not opposing the "racism and fascism espoused by the EDL".[480] After the EDL founded its Jewish Division, the Board of Deputies of British Jews expressed disappointment; its chief executive Jon Benjamin stated that he EDL's support for Israel was "empty and duplicitous" and that his group rejected the EDL's "Islamophobia and hatred".[57] In 2010, the Association of Pakistani Lawyers asked the government to ban the EDL outright, although this was not done.[319] As noted by Copsey, this would have been difficult, for the EDL did not openly glorify terrorism and thus could not be proscribed under Britain's counter-terrorism legislation; additionally, he thought that were the EDL to be banned, a very similar group would have simply taken its place.[319]



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Treadwell, James; Garland, Jon (2011). "Masculinity, Marginalization and Violence: A Case Study of the English Defence League". The British Journal of Criminology. 51 (4). pp. 621–634. JSTOR 23639102. 
Trilling, Daniel (2012). Bloody Nasty People: The Rise of Britain's Far Right. London: Verso. ISBN 978-1-84467-959-1. 
Winlow, Simon; Hall, Steve; Treadwell, James (2017). The Rise of the Right: English Nationalism and the Transformation of Working-Class Politics. Bristol: Policy Press. ISBN 978-1447328483. 

Further reading

Busher, Joel (2013). "Grassroots Activism in the English Defence League: Discourse and Public (Dis)Order". In Max Taylor, P. M. Currie, and Donald Holbrook (eds). Extreme Right Wing Political Violence and Terrorism. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. pp. 65–84. ISBN 978-1441140876. 
Busher, Joel (2015). The Making of Anti-Muslim Protest: Grassroots Activism in the English Defence League. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0415502672. 
Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander; Brun, Hans (2013). A Neo-Nationalist Network: The English Defence League and Europe's Counter-Jihad Movement (PDF) (Report). London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalism and Political Violence. 
Millar, A. (22 September 2010). The English Defense League: The New Face of Europe? (Report). Hudson Institute. 
Treadwell, J. (2014). "Controlling the New Far Right on the Streets: Policing the English Defence League in Policy and Praxis". In J. Garland and N. Chakraborti (eds). Responding to Hate Crime: The Case for Connecting Policy and Research. Bristol: Policy Press. pp. 127–139. 
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